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Introduction
Income and productivity differences between countries are surprisingly persistent
over time, given the increased integration of countries in the past three decades (e.g.
Easterly and Levine, 2002; Milanovic, 2009). Among others, two channels through
which countries can foster economic development have been emphasized in both the
academic and public debate: innovation and participation in international trade.
For developing countries, the most important part of the innovation process is tech-
nology adoption, that is, the investment in new, more advanced technologies. The
adoption of new technologies allows firms to introduce new goods and to produce
more efficiently. Participation in international trade is considered to contribute to
economic growth in three ways. First, lower trade barriers allow the import of for-
eign inputs and capital goods that are cheaper or of better quality than domestic
ones. Second, a reduction in trade barriers increases the market size for exporters
and therewith fosters investment in advanced technologies. Third, import compe-
tition of foreign firms forces less productive firms out of the market and leads to a
more efficient allocation of resources across firms.
However, potential technology adopters, exporters and importers must be able to
take advantage of these growth opportunities. Financial frictions often present an
obstacle to a firm’s investment (e.g. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine,
2008). Investment in new technologies and international trading activities are as-
sociated with sunk costs that have to be paid ex-ante. If firms lack the necessary
funds, the investment does not take place and growth opportunities go unused. Well
functioning financial markets and institutions alleviate financial constraints and al-
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low profitable investment opportunities to be taken. In the words of the economic
historian Rondo Cameron, “[m]etaphorically, finance is the lubricant of the process
of economic growth” (Cameron, 1967, p. 2).
The positive relationship between financial development and, respectively, technol-
ogy adoption, international trade and economic growth is well established at the
aggregate level (for an overview over the theoretical literature see Beck, 2011, for
empirical evidence see e.g. Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000; Beck, Levine, and
Loayza, 2000; Ang, 2011; Manova, 2011). Recently, researchers have started to use
micro-level data to analyze these relationships at the firm level (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt,
Love, and Maksimovic, 2006; Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 2012). This is impor-
tant in order to disentangle the microeconomic channels through which financial
development affects economic growth. Furthermore, financial development has a
different effect on different groups of firms. Financial constraints are a greater ob-
stacle to the operations of smaller firms and this effect is larger in financially less
developed countries (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005; Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, Laeven, and Levine, 2008). Accordingly, financial development might benefit
smaller firms more than larger firms. Informed policy design must thus rely on firm
level evidence.
This dissertation analyzes, both theoretically and empirically, how financial con-
straints affect technology adoption, participation in international trade and the
catch-up process between countries. The first chapter explores credit constraints
as one channel through which trade liberalization impedes convergence between two
countries at different levels of financial market development. The second chapter
studies the effect of financial market development on the probability that a firm
invests in technology adoption. The impact of credit constraints on the export and
import decision of firms is analyzed in the third chapter.
Trade liberalization is one of the most common policy reforms recommended to
developing countries in order to enhance convergence towards the more developed
countries. Recent evidence, however, suggests that despite opening up a coun-
try to trade, the productivity and income gap between developed and developing
2
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economies often does not close. A leading example is the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) between the USA, Canada and Mexico. In the years following
NAFTA, income and productivity disparities between Mexico and the USA did not
diminish (Lederman, Maloney, and Serven, 2005).
The first chapter examines credit constraints as one channel held responsible for
hampering convergence.1 We develop a heterogeneous firm model of international
trade with variable mark-ups where firms decide whether or not to invest in a more
efficient production technology. A fraction of the investment cost has to be financed
externally. We consider a two-country setting where the two countries potentially
differ with respect to financial market development. In a less developed financial
market, the costs of obtaining external finance are higher and fewer firms invest in
the more efficient technology. We use this model to study the effect of a reduction
in trade barriers on technology adoption, average productivity and welfare.
In doing so, we are the first to analyze theoretically how credit constraints change the
impact of trade liberalization on convergence between countries. We find that the
fraction of firms investing in the more efficient technology increases in both countries
after trade liberalization. Together with a reallocation of output towards the more
productive firms, this increases average productivity and welfare in both, the less
and the more developed country. The productivity and welfare gap between the two
countries, however, increases after trade liberalization. The reason is that firms in
the country with lower financial market development cannot take advantage of the
export market due to credit constraints but face import competition. This result
matches empirical evidence from NAFTA and has important policy implications that
have been taken up in the design of The Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA): a reduction of trade barriers without improving access to external finance,
in particular for smaller firms, fails to promote economic convergence (Jaramillo and
Lederman, 2006).
1This chapter is based on the article “Trade Liberalization and Credit Constraints: Why
Opening Up May Fail to Promote Convergence”, which is joint work with Monika Schnitzer from
the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.
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For developing countries, the adoption of new, more advanced technologies is the
most important part of the innovation process (Hall, 2006). However, financial
constraints present a major obstacle to technology adoption in these countries.
The second chapter analyzes first, whether financial development increases firm level
investment in new technologies and second, which firm’s investment is most affected
by financial development. To guide the empirical analysis, we extend the model
developed in Chapter 1 to multiple sectors. Furthermore, and consistent with the
empirical evidence outlined above, the costs of obtaining external finance are larger
for smaller firms. We test the predictions from the model using data from the World
Bank Enterprise Surveys, that is, firm level surveys conducted in a large number
of developing countries around the globe. An advantage of the Enterprise Surveys
is that they collect direct measures of access to finance and of technology use. We
consider two types of new technologies: investment in less costly and in very costly
new technologies. For identification, we use a difference-in-difference approach in the
spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998) that allows controlling for unobserved country
and industry characteristics.
We find first, that financial market development increases access to external finance.
Second, we show that financial market development increases the probability that a
firm invests in new technologies. In the case of less costly new technologies, financial
development benefits in particular smaller firms. For costly new technologies, the
effect works through larger firms that have an incentive but not the necessary means
to invest in costly technologies at lower levels of financial market development.
While the positive relationship between financial development and technology adop-
tion is well documented at the aggregate level (e.g. Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-
Foulkes, 2005), our study is the first to provide firm level evidence of the detrimental
impact of financial constraints on technology adoption. This is interesting for two
reasons. First, our results confirm that credit constraints are a micro-level channel
through which a lack of financial development can hamper economic growth. Sec-
ond, we show that the effect of financial development on technology adoption differs
4
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across the firm size distribution. This is important when designing well-targeted
policies.
In the context of international trade, financial development acts as a source of com-
parative advantage. Financially developed countries export larger volumes, espe-
cially in industries with high demand for external finance. Since participation in
international trade increases productivity, it is crucial to understand to what extent
financial constraints affect entry into importing and exporting.
In the third chapter, we study the impact of credit constraints on the probability
of importing and exporting using firm level surveys conducted in Eastern European
and former CIS countries.2 The data used allow the direct identification of credit
constrained firms. In contrast to previous studies that take account only of rejected
credit applications, we identify all firms with a demand for but no access to credit.
We show that in doing so, we avoid a potential endogeneity bias. We jointly estimate
the importer (exporter) and the credit constraints equation in a bivariate probit
setting, as this allows us to ignore the potential endogeneity of credit constraints
in the importer (exporter) equation. The cross-country nature of the data make
it possible to use country- and sector-varying instruments in order to identify the
effect of credit constraints on a firm’s decision to import and export.
We find that credit constraints lower the probability that a firm imports and ex-
ports by 33 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively. Our study is the first to provide
a comprehensive analysis of the impact of credit constraints on Eastern European
firms’ participation in international trade. This is of particular interest as credit
constraints are still a major problem in a large number of Eastern European coun-
tries (Brown, Ongena, Popov, and Yesin, 2011). While a large body of literature
has looked at the export decision, few studies have analyzed the import decision.
Furthermore, we are the first to show that the negative impact of credit constraints
documented for manufacturing firms is also present among service firms. This is
2This chapter is based on the article “Credit Constraints and The Margins of International
Trade: Evidence from Eastern European Firms”, which is joint work with Fergal McCann from
the Central Bank of Ireland.
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important for policy design. Policies aimed at improving firms’ access to external
finance should also be targeted to service firms that account for an increasing part
of economic activity.
The three chapters taken together provide new insights into the role of finance as
a “lubricant of the process of economic growth” (Cameron, 1967, p. 2). Without
sufficient access to finance, firms that have an incentive to invest in, respectively,
new technologies, export and import activities are prevented from doing so. The
missing technology adoption and the missing international trade represent two chan-
nels through which countries in a globalized world are prevented from catching up.
Financial market reforms, especially targeting small firms, contribute to countries
exploiting their potential instead of missing growth opportunities.
6
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Trade Liberalization and Credit
Constraints: Why Opening Up
May Fail to Promote
Convergence∗
1.1 Introduction
Trade liberalization is one of the most common policy reforms recommended to
emerging countries in order to enhance economic development and close the produc-
tivity gap towards more developed countries (Rodrik, 2006). Opening up to trade
increases the market size for exporters and stimulates investment in advanced tech-
nologies. Furthermore, incoming foreign firms foster competition and contribute to
a more efficient allocation of resources across firms. However, trade liberalization
alone is not enough to ensure economic convergence. A leading example is the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between developed countries, the USA
and Canada, and a developing country, Mexico, in 1994. In the decade following
NAFTA, GDP, exports, and investment in Mexico increased but productivity dis-
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Monika Schnitzer.
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parities with respect to Canada and the USA did not diminish. One key constraint
to achieving convergence have been deficiencies in local credit markets. While large
firms have access to foreign financing, inadequate access to domestic credit prevents
the vast majority of firms, especially smaller and newer ones, from taking full ad-
vantage of the opportunities offered by NAFTA (Lederman, Maloney, and Serven,
2005).
This paper explores credit constraints as one channel through which trade liberal-
ization might impede convergence between countries. We develop a heterogeneous
firm model of international trade where firms decide whether or not to invest in
a more efficient production technology. More specifically, we introduce technology
adoption into the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) framework. A fraction of the cost of
purchasing/renting the advanced technology has to be financed externally. There-
fore, the technology adoption decision is related to credit market development. In
particular, weak protection of creditor rights increases the risk premium creditors
require in order to break even in expected terms. We then analyze the effects of
trade liberalization on technology adoption, average productivity and welfare in a
two-country setting where the two countries potentially differ with respect to credit
market development.
We find that the fraction of firms adopting the advanced technology increases with
trade liberalization in both countries. In addition to the reallocation of output to-
wards more productive firms (selection effect of trade), there is thus a second source
of productivity gains. Technology upgrading and the reallocation of resources lead
to higher average productivity and welfare, as in Bustos (2011). However, if firms
in one country face credit constraints, the difference between the two countries with
respect to the fraction of firms adopting the advanced technology increases. Hence,
productivity gains both through firm selection and through technology adoption are
lower. As a result, the increase in average productivity in the country with a less
developed credit market is lower: the productivity gap widens. Simulations show
that the welfare gap between the two countries widens too.
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This result has important policy implications. Unconditional trade liberalization
that reduces trade barriers without improving access to domestic credit fails to
promote economic convergence. First, credit constraints lead to a lower selection
effect. Second, and more importantly, credit constraints impact negatively on firms’
productivity gains from trade liberalization. These firm level productivity gains
capture dynamic gains from trade and are considered more important for long-term
growth and convergence than the static gains from resource reallocation (Lederman,
Maloney, and Serven, 2005; Jaramillo and Lederman, 2006).
Our paper contributes to the literature by being, as far as we know, the first to
analyze in a theoretical model how credit constraints change the effects of opening
up to trade on technology upgrading, average productivity and welfare. Our model
with credit constraints draws a nuanced picture of the impact of trade liberalization
on economic performance and convergence. Studying trade liberalization between
two countries that differ in their credit market development, we show that the fi-
nancially less developed country gains through the reallocation of output towards
more productive firms and a higher fraction of firms using the advanced technology.
The resulting increase in average productivity, together with an increase in imported
products, leads to more product variety and lower prices. However, inadequate ac-
cess to credit prevents firms from taking full advantage of the larger export market
while facing severe import competition, in contrast to firms in the country with a
more developed credit market. Thus, while the economy as a whole becomes more
affluent, the competitiveness of the corporate sector relative to the more developed
country declines. These findings match empirical evidence from NAFTA: after the
free trade agreement, Mexico increased its GDP and its exports. However, due to
institutional gaps, in particular credit market development, the productivity gap
with respect to the USA and Canada did not close.
One advantage of our framework is that it captures both features of trade liber-
alization, more export opportunities and increased import competition, in a direct
way, by using a heterogeneous firm framework with endogenous mark-ups, with-
out reducing tractability compared to the standard constant mark-up setup à la
9
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Melitz (2003). Consistent with empirical evidence (e.g. Tybout, 2003; Feenstra and
Weinstein, 2010; Impullitti and Licandro, 2011), endogenous mark-ups enable us
to model the selection effect of trade liberalization through increased import com-
petition. This allows us to capture in a very intuitive way the notion that credit
constraints create asymmetries in the way firms benefit from improved export op-
portunities, are hit by increased import competition, and may thus be more or less
inclined to invest in new technologies.
Our analysis builds on and contributes to two strands of literature. First, it is re-
lated to previous research that examines the impact of trade liberalization on firm
productivity. Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) show that in the presence of
heterogeneous firms, trade liberalization induces larger productivity gains in com-
parative advantage industries. In our model, reallocation forces are also larger in
countries that have a comparative advantange in the financially dependent sector. In
addition, a reduction in trade barriers entails a second, empirically important, asym-
metry: the difference in the fraction of advanced technology users increases as well.
Bustos (2011) and Navas-Ruiz and Sala (2007) introduce an endogenous technology
adoption decision into a Melitz (2003) framework with symmetric countries.3 Both
papers show that technology adoption increases after trade liberalization, leading to
an increase in average productivity in addition to the selection effect of trade. In
contrast to these papers, we explicitly consider the financing of technology adoption
and allow for firms to be financially constrained. We show that this has important
implications for economic convergence. While technology adoption still increases in
both countries after trade liberalization, credit constraints prevent the financially
less developed country from speeding up convergence.4
The second strand of literature documents the negative impact of financial con-
straints on firms’ ability to invest in innovation. Information asymmetry between
firm and creditor, moral hazard problems and lack of collateral reduce the access
3Unel (2011) extends the Bustos framework to allow for asymmetric countries, with ambiguous
results.
4Another strand of literature analyzes the dynamic interaction between exporting and innova-
tion activities (e.g. Constantini and Melitz, 2008; Atkeson and Burstein, 2010).
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to external finance for investments in innovative activities (e.g. Hall and Lerner,
2009). The limited access to external finance is likely to result in credit constraints
if the credit market is not sufficiently developed. Potential credit market frictions in
emerging countries are manifold (Levine, 2005). First, the credit market is often not
sufficiently competitive allowing creditors to charge lending rates that largely exceed
the marginal costs of financing credit. Second, employees without adequate manage-
rial skills and business ethics might increase monitoring costs and lay the foundation
for rent-seeking behavior. Moreover, a lack of “Basel Accords” type recommenda-
tions reduces transparency and increases information and transaction costs. Finally,
the legal environment in emerging countries often hampers financial contractibility
and thereby increases the costs of external finance (e.g. Manova, 2011). Alleviating
financing constraints of innovators therefore significantly boosts investment in more
advanced technologies (for a theoretical model see e.g. Keuschnigg and Ribi, 2010,
for empirical evidence see e.g. Hajivassiliou and Savignac, 2007). Finally, our paper
is related to Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2012) who analyze the effect of finan-
cial constraints on the relationship between exporting and innovation using BEEPS
data. They argue that exporting and technology adoption are natural complements
but when internal funds are limited and external finance is costly, they find that
engaging in one activity increases the costs of financing the other, and hence that
the joint observation of both exporting and innovation becomes less likely.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents the model setup. The equi-
librium is described in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 analyzes the impact of trade lib-
eralization and implications for welfare are discussed in Section 1.5. Section 1.6
concludes.
1.2 The Model
In this section, we develop a model of the decision to export and to adopt an
advanced technology in the presence of credit constraints. In the model, firms are
heterogeneous as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), and have the option to decrease
11
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their production cost by investing in technology adoption, as in Bustos (2011).
The costs of technology adoption depend on credit market frictions. We consider
two countries that potentially differ with respect to credit market development.
Variables of the foreign country, if different from the variables of the home country,
are denoted by an asterisk.
1.2.1 Setup of the Model
Preferences. Each country consists of S consumers who have identical preferences
over a continuum of varieties indexed by i ∈ Ω and a homogeneous good chosen as
numéraire and indexed by 0 (p0 = 1). Preferences are described by the quasi-linear
quadratic utility function developed by Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002):
U = qc0 + α
∫
i∈Ω
qci di −
1
2
γ
∫
i∈Ω
(qci )
2 di −
1
2
β
(
∫
i∈Ω
qci di
)2
, (1.1)
where α, β, γ > 0. qc0 and q
c
i denote the per capita consumption level of the homoge-
neous good and of each variety i. The parameters α and β characterize substitution
between the differentiated good and the numéraire good. The demand for differ-
entiated varieties relative to the numéraire increases as α increases or β decreases.
The degree of product differentiation is captured by the parameter γ. If γ = 0,
varieties are perfectly substitutable and consumers only care about their overall
consumption level Qc =
∫
i∈Ω q
c
i di. As γ increases, consumers increasingly prefer to
distribute consumption across varieties. A price increase entails thus a smaller drop
in demand.
Utility maximization is with respect to the budget constraint Ic =
∫
i∈Ω′ piq
c
i + q
c
0
where Ic is consumer’s income. Ω′ ⊂ Ω denotes the subset of varieties that are
consumed in the economy. Assuming that the demand for the numéraire good is
positive (qc0 > 0), the demand for variety i is given by
qi ≡ Sq
c
i =
αS
γ + βN
−
S
γ
pi +
βN
γ + βN
S
γ
p̄. (1.2)
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p̄ = (1/N)
∫
i∈Ω′ pidi is the average price and N is the number of consumed varieties.
Variety i is consumed whenever the price pi is non-prohibitive:
pi ≤ pmax ≡
γα
γ + βN
+
βN
γ + βN
p̄, (1.3)
where pmax is the prohibitive price above which demand qi is equal to zero. Equations
(1.2) and (1.3) then imply a price elasticity of demand equal to
ǫi =
(
pmax
pi
− 1
)
−1
. (1.4)
Given the price pi, an increase in competition — a larger set of consumed varieties N
or a lower average price p̄ — raises the price elasticity ǫi and decreases the mark-up,
µi = ǫi/(ǫi − 1). The mechanism behind this result is the following: an additional
variety reduces overall per-variety consumption and leads to a lower prohibitive
price. The price elasticity increases and mark-ups decrease. Likewise, a lower price
index p̄, implying a higher relative price pi/p̄, reduces demand for variety i and
thereby the mark-up µi.
Hence, in contrast to the case of a CES demand function, higher product market
competition leads to lower mark-ups when using the linear demand system specified
in (1.2).
Supply. The only factor of production, labor, is inelastically supplied in a com-
petitive market. The market for the homogeneous good is perfectly competitive.
Firms produce at constant returns to scale and require one unit of labor to produce
one unit of output. Assuming a positive demand for the numéraire, the quasi-linear
utility in (1.1) ensures labor market equilibrium. Moreover, the nominal wage in
each economy is then equal to unity.5
Firms in the differentiated good industry operate under monopolistic competition
and take the average price p̄ and the number of competitors N as given. Production
is at constant returns to scale with firm-specific labor requirement ci. The param-
5qc0 > 0 is satisfied if β is large enough. We make this assumption in the following.
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eter ci thus reflects cost differences between firms. In order to satisfy demand qi,
firms need to hire li = ciqi units of labor. In the following, we omit the subscript i
for readability.
Entry requires a fixed investment fE. This investment is thereafter sunk and cap-
tures start-up costs such as setting up a facility and buying equipment. Upon entry,
firms draw their production cost from a common distribution G(c). When learning
the cost of production, firms decide (i) whether to exit the industry or to stay and
produce and if they produce (ii) whether to export and whether to invest in tech-
nology adoption.
Technology adoption. In our extension of the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) frame-
work, firms have the option of upgrading their technology by spending f units of
labor. The technology adoption cost f can be thought of as a per-period fixed cost
that comes with adopting the more advanced technology as for example the rent for
new machinery or the periodized purchasing cost. One way to think about technol-
ogy upgrading is that it reduces production cost by a fixed amount t: firms adopt
a process innovation that reduces labor input requirement to l = (c − t)q.6 We call
t the “technological leap.” The advanced technology thus comes at a higher fixed
cost but increases productivity.7
Credit constraints. The fixed cost of adopting the more advanced technology is
paid upfront and cannot be covered by future revenues. Internal funds are not suffi-
cient to cover the investment and firms need to raise external finance for a fraction
d, d ∈ (0, 1) of the fixed cost f . In an imperfect credit market, this need for credit
6Note that for cost draws c ∈ [0, t), this specification implies negative labor input. This
can be ruled out by restricting cost draws to c ≥ t. An alternative, but formally equivalent,
interpretation of t is an increase in the price margin through product innovation or the adoption
of an advanced technology that increases quality at unchanged cost. This interpretation does not
require a restriction of cost draws and hence will be alluded to in order to avoid limiting the cost
distribution.
7Modelling a continuous investment decision, e.g. max π = tφ(p − c)q − t, instead of a binary
one makes the analysis cumbersome but leaves the results qualitatively unchanged: “opening up”
reduces investment of purely domestic firms and has a positive larger market and a negative import
competition effect on the investment of exporters.
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implies additional costs of external finance. We follow Rajan and Zingales (1998)
in that the need for external finance arises from technological reasons and is thus
the same for all firms in the differentiated good industry. Following Manova (2011),
we assume imperfect contract enforcement. Creditors are repaid with probability
λ, λ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, with probability (1 − λ) a firm defaults. Creditors thus re-
quire a collateral that they can seize in case of default. We assume that a fraction
δ, δ ∈ (0, 1), of the capital and equipment required to start production (as captured
by the market entry costs fE) serves as collateral. Creditors recover only a fraction
θ, θ ∈ (0, 1), of the collateral as they incur liquidation costs (e.g. Buch, Kesternich,
Lipponer, and Schnitzer, 2009), e.g. because the collateral good cannot be sold at
the original price. Another reason might be that creditors might need to invest
time and effort in order to sell the collateral good because they do not have suf-
ficient knowledge of the industry. Creditors make firms a take it or leave it offer
specifying the required amount of repayment R. The credit market is perfectly com-
petitive, that is, creditors break even in expected terms. The zero profit condition
for creditors for a credit of size df is given by
λR + (1 − λ)θδfE ≥ df (1.5)
implying a repayment of
R =
d
λ
f −
(1 − λ)θ
λ
δfE.
8 (1.6)
Without advanced technology adoption, the total cost of production is given by
TC (c) = cq(c). (1.7)
The total cost function of firms using the advanced technology, TCA, depends on
the level of credit market frictions:
TCA (c) = (c − t)qA(c)+ (1− d)f +λR+(1− λ)δfE = (c − t)qA(c)+ f + fext, (1.8)
8We assume that f ≥ (1 − λ)θδfE/d such that R ≥ 0.
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where fext = (1 − λ)(1 − θ)δfE. Lower contract enforcement and higher liquidation
costs increase the costs of external finance and thereby the total costs of technology
adoption.
Exporting. Trade between countries involves trade costs that consist of a fixed
(market entry costs) and a variable component (transport costs, tariffs). Following
Ottaviano, Taglioni, and Di Mauro (2009), we collapse all trade costs into a single
indicator. The traditional formulation of iceberg transport costs implies that more
productive firms (those with lower cost draws) have access to a transport technol-
ogy of lower cost. As a consequence, reallocation forces are distorted (Schroeder and
Sorensen, 2011; Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla, 2011). Therefore, we assume
per-unit trade costs, τ > 0.
1.2.2 Firm Behavior
Prices and profits. Let pD, pX , pDA, pXA denote the price in the domestic and in the
export market of firms using the baseline technology and of firms using the advanced
technology, respectively. Profit maximization implies:
pD =
1
2
(pmax + c) , pX =
1
2
(p∗max + c + τ)
pDA =
1
2
(pmax + c − t) , pXA =
1
2
(p∗max + c + τ − t) .
Prices charged by firms using the advanced technology are lower, pDA = pD − t/2
and pXA = pX − t/2. Accordingly, quantities sold are higher. Technology adoption
increases variable profits but involves fixed cost. The profits of firms serving only
the domestic market using the baseline and the advanced technology are given by:
πD =
S
4γ
(pmax − c)
2 , πDA =
S
4γ
(pmax − c + t)
2 − f − fext. (1.9)
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Profits of firms serving also the foreign market are respectively
π = πD + πX =
S
4γ
[
(pmax − c)2 + (p∗max − c − τ)
2
]
πA = πDA + πXA =
S
4γ
[
(pmax − c + t)2 + (p∗max − c − τ + t)
2
]
− f − f ext.(1.10)
Firms’ sorting pattern. Denote with cD, cX , and cA the cost cutoffs below which
firms stay in the market and produce, serve the foreign market, and invest in tech-
nology adoption. A number of empirical studies show that only a subset of domestic
producers serves the foreign market and/or uses an advanced production technology,
that is, cX < cD and cA < cD (e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 1999). Furthermore, there
are two possible sorting patterns (Figure 1.1). In the first case (cA < cX), serving
Figure 1.1: Plausible sorting patterns
cA cX cDadvanced, exporter baseline, exporter baseline, domestic
cX cA cDadvanced, exporter advanced, domestic baseline, domestic
only the domestic market and using an advanced technology is always dominated
by some other choice. This case obtains if the fixed cost of technology adoption
f is high. In the opposite case (cX < cA), the marginal technology adopter is a
purely domestic firm, that is, all exporters use the advanced technology (low f).
The technology adoption decision is then only indirectly affected by trade liberal-
ization whereas in the first case, opening up to trade affects this decision directly.
Given the aim of the paper, we therefore focus on the first case and assume that
cA < cX < cD. The necessary parameter restrictions are provided below.
9 Thus,
there are four types of firms. Firms with a cost draw above cD immediately exit the
market. Firms with marginal cost between cD and cX are purely domestic producers
and those with costs between cX and cA also serve the foreign market. The most
productive firms with production cost below cA adopt the advanced technology and
9Bustos (2011) and Lederman, Maloney, and Serven (2005) provide empirical support for this
assumption on firms’ sorting pattern.
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serve the foreign market.
Firm decisions. The least productive firms serve only the domestic market and
use the baseline technology. They decide to stay in the market and produce if their
profits πD are non-negative:
πD(cD) = 0 ⇔ cD = pmax. (1.11)
A lower entry cutoff cD reflects tougher selection and a more competitive market.
Using (1.11), profits described in (1.9) and (1.10) can be rewritten as
πD =
S
4γ
(cD − c)
2
π = πD + πX =
S
4γ
[
(cD − c)
2 + (c∗D − c − τ)
2
]
πA = πDA + πXA =
S
4γ
[
(cD − c + t)
2 + (c∗D − c − τ + t)
2
]
− f − fext.(1.12)
Firms export if they can profitably serve the foreign market. This is the case if their
production cost is below the export cutoff cX where
πX(cX) = 0 ⇔ cX = c
∗
D − τ. (1.13)
Exporters invest in technology adoption if their total profits are higher when using
the advanced technology, that is, if πA (c) ≥ π (c). Technology adoption increases
variable profits but involves fixed costs. This trade-off is depicted in Figure 1.2.
Firms with cost draws below the technology adoption cutoff cA invest in technology
adoption. We call these firms high-technology firms. Their scale of production is
very large so that it pays for them to bear the investment cost f + fext:
πA (cA) = π (cA) ⇔ cA =
1
2
(
cD + c
∗
D + t − τ −
2γ
St
ψf
)
, (1.14)
where ψ = 1 + (1−λ)(1−θ)δfE
f
. ψ is thus an indicator of credit market frictions, with
higher values indicating a lower level of credit market development. Using (1.11),
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cA cD
c
π, πA
π
πA
Figure 1.2: Technology adoption trade-off
(1.13), and (1.14), we can now state a condition for our assumption on firms’ sorting
pattern:
fmin ≡ (cD − cX + t)
St
2γψ
< f < (cD + cX + t)
St
2γψ
≡ fmax, (1.15)
where fmin and fmax describe the range of f as a function of ψ for which 0 < cA <
cX < cD.
10
Credit market frictions — imperfect contract enforcement and liquidation costs —
decrease access to external finance and thereby increase the total costs of technology
adoption. Hence, firms in a less developed credit market need to be more productive
in order to have an incentive to invest in technology adoption. This is reflected by a
lower technology adoption cutoff: dcA/dψ < 0. It follows that firms with cost draws
c ∈ [( cA, cA (ψ = 1) ) would invest in technology adoption in a perfect credit market
but are prevented from doing so by fext > 0. These are the missing high-technology
firms.
1.2.3 Pareto Distributed Production Cost
We assume that productivity (as implied by the cost draw) 1/c is Pareto distributed
with lower bound 1/cM and shape parameter k ≥ 1. It follows that the marginal
10Note that both cD and c
∗
D depend on τ, k, t, f, γ, ψ, S, fE , cM .
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cost c is also Pareto distributed with shape parameter k ≥ 1 and support [0, cM ]:
G(c) =
(
c
cM
)k
, c ∈ [0, cM ]. (1.16)
The Pareto distribution has been intensively used in the recent literature as sev-
eral studies have suggested that it matches the firm size distribution (e.g. Axtell,
2001; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004; Del Gatto, Ottaviano, and Mion, 2006).
Furthermore, it makes the analysis highly tractable and easily lends itself to inter-
pretation. The upper bound on marginal cost cM indicates how cost effective the
economy is in producing the differentiated good. A higher cM implies higher average
cost of production. The shape parameter k governs the dispersion of the cost distri-
bution. If k = 1, G(c) corresponds to the uniform distribution. A higher k implies a
higher cost concentration and thus higher average cost of production. Moreover, any
truncation of the Pareto distribution is also a Pareto distribution with shape para-
mater k. The ex-ante distribution of successful entrants is the Pareto distribution
in (1.16) truncated at the entry cutoff cD
GcD(c)
(
c
cD
)k
, c ∈ [0, cD]. (1.17)
From the law of large numbers (LLN), this is also the ex-post distribution of do-
mestic producers. The ex-ante probability of using the baseline and the advanced
technology, conditional on being a producer, is given by [G(cD) − G(cA)] /G(cD) and
G(cA)/G(cD), respectively. By the LLN, these expressions also represent the fraction
of low-technology and high-technology firms among domestic producers, NDL/ND
and NDA/ND, where ND, NDL and NDA denote the absolute number of domestic
producers and of domestic low-technology and high-technology firms.
The average cost of production (CoP ) of domestic firms is then
CoP =
NDA
ND
∫ cA
0
(c − t)
g(c)
G(cA)
dc +
NDL
ND
∫ cD
cA
c
g(c)
G(cD) − G(cA)
dc
=
k
k + 1
cD − t
(
cA
cD
)k
. (1.18)
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In the following, we focus on the average cost of production as our (inverse) measure
of average productivity. As an alternative measure, we also consider aggregate cost
where c is weighted either by demand q(c) or by revenues r(c) as (inverse) measure
of aggregate productivity (see Appendix A.2 for analytical expressions of aggregate
cost).
1.3 Equilibrium Analysis
There is an unbounded mass of ex-ante identical firms who decide whether or not
to enter the differentiated good industry. Free entry into the industry ensures that
ex-ante expected profits are zero in equilibrium: firms enter until ex-post expected
profits correspond to the fixed entry costs. The free entry condition is
fE =
∫ cA
0
πA (c) dF (c) +
∫ cX
cA
π (c) dF (c) +
∫ cD
cX
πD (c) dF (c).
And, solving the integral,
(cD)
k+2 + (c∗D − τ)
k+2
k + 2
+ 2t (cA)
k+1 =
fE2γ (cM)
k (k + 1)
S
, (1.19)
where cA is given by (1.14). The free entry condition for the foreign country is
analogous. Each free entry condition will hold as long as there is a positive mass of
domestic entrants NE > 0 (N
∗
E > 0). Otherwise, the respective country abandons
the production of the differentiated good and specializes in the numéraire.11
(1.19) describes a system of two equations with two unknowns (cD and c
∗
D). An
equilibrium in which both countries produce the differentiated good exists if and
only if the solution of (1.19), (cD, c
∗
D), takes positive and real values. Lemma 1
shows the conditions under which this is the case. cD and c
∗
D cannot explicitly
be solved for because (i) they enter cA and c
∗
A additively and (ii) cA and c
∗
A enter
11NE =
{
(cM )
k
/
[
(cD)
k(c∗D)
k − (cX)
k(c∗X)
]
} [
N (c∗D)
k
− N∗ (c∗X)
k
]
≤ 0 implies N∗E =
{
(cM )
k
/
[
(cD)
k(c∗D)
k − (cX)
k(c∗X)
]
} [
N∗ (cD)
k
− N (cX)
k
]
> 0. Hence, at most one country spe-
cializes in the numéraire. In the following analysis, we assume that NE > 0 and N
∗
E > 0.
21
Trade Liberalization and Credit Constraints
in a nonlinear way. However, it is possible to show that there is a unique equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Provided that ψ, for a given ψ∗, is not too large and thus the dif-
ference in credit market development between home and foreign country is not too
large, there is a unique equilibrium pair of cD and c
∗
D.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
This is illustrated in Figures 1.3 and 1.4: FE and FE∗ plot the free entry con-
csymm
D
cM
csymm
D
cM
cD
c∗D
FE
FE∗
Figure 1.3: Open economy equilibrium: Symmetric countries
ditions of the home and the foreign country in the (cD, c
∗
D) space. Figure 1.3 depicts
the symmetric equilibrium (ψ = ψ∗). In the symmetric case, the two countries share
the same entry cutoff, cD = c
∗
D = c
symm
D .
In the following, we assume that the home country has a less developed credit
market. Figure 1.4 shows the asymmetric equilibrium (ψ > ψ∗): higher costs of
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casymm
D
cM
c∗asymm
D
cM
cD
c∗D
FE
FE∗
Figure 1.4: Open economy equilibrium: Asymmetric countries
external finance cause an outward shift of the home country’s free entry condition
curve. Compared to the symmetric case, the resulting equilibrium entry cutoff is
lower in the foreign country and higher in the home country, that is, c∗asymmD <
csymmD < c
asymm
D . Formally, this is reflected by the free entry conditions described
by (1.19). Higher costs of external finance make technology upgrading in the home
country more expensive than in the foreign country. Some exporters who use the
advanced technology in the symmetric case now abstain from technology upgrading.
Therefore, ex-ante expected profits and firm entry are lower as reflected by a higher
entry cutoff. A higher entry cutoff implies softer selection: average productivity, that
is, average competitiveness, is lower. The contrary holds for the foreign country.
cD > c
∗
D implies, by (1.13), that the export cutoff is lower in the home country.
Furthermore, the fraction of exporters, given by (cX/cD)
k, is lower. From (1.14),
it follows that the technology adoption cutoff and therefore the fraction of high-
technology firms, given by (cA/cD)
k, is also lower in the home country.
The following proposition summarizes this discussion.
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Proposition 1. Suppose that fmin < f < fmax such that in equilibrium the
following order of cutoffs holds: 0 < cA < cX < cD. Suppose further that ψ > ψ
∗.
The fraction of exporters, the fraction of high-technology firms and the average pro-
ductivity of domestic firms are higher in the foreign country. Furthermore, the larger
the difference in credit market development (given ψ∗, ψ increases), the larger the
absolute and relative difference between the two countries, that is:
•
d
[
(
c
∗
X
c∗
D
)k
−
(
cX
cD
)k
]
dψ
> 0,
d
[
(
c
∗
A
c∗
D
)k
−
(
cA
cD
)k
]
dψ
> 0,
d(CoP −CoP ∗)
dψ
> 0
•
d
[
(
c
∗
X
c∗
D
)k
/
(
cX
cD
)k
]
dψ
> 0,
d
[
(
c
∗
A
c∗
D
)k
/
(
cA
cD
)k
]
dψ
> 0,
d(CoP /CoP ∗)
dψ
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
1.4 Trade Liberalization
In the following, we study the effects of trade liberalization via a decrease in trade
barriers τ .12 As a benchmark case, we start by analyzing the symmetric case.
1.4.1 Benchmark: Symmetric Countries
The impact of trade liberalization on the symmetric equilibrium is depicted in Figure
1.5. cD, c
∗
D is the equilibrium before trade liberalization and c
′
D, c
∗
′
D the equilibrium
after trade liberalization. A reduction in trade costs τ causes an inward shift of
the free entry condition curves. For a given entry cutoff in the foreign country, the
entry cutoff in the home country is now lower. The intersection of the two curves
moves along the 45-degree line towards the origin. Hence, in the new equilibrium,
both entry cutoffs are lower. In the symmetric case, the free entry condition (1.19)
12This paper develops a static model. Trade liberalization is thus the comparative statics
analysis of how a situation with high trade barriers compares to a situation with lower trade
barriers. However, as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the different situations can be interpreted
as steady state equilibria.
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Figure 1.5: Trade liberalization: Symmetric countries
reduces to
(cD)
k+2 + (cD − τ)
k+2
k + 2
+ 2t (cA)
k+1 =
fE2γc
k
M(k + 1)
S
. (1.20)
From (1.20) we can derive that lower trade barriers τ imply higher expected profits
and therefore more entries and a lower entry cutoff (see Proof of Proposition 2 in
Appendix A.3):
dcD
dτ
> 0. (1.21)
A reduction in trade costs lowers the delivered costs abroad and increases the foreign
demand for imports. Exporters thus serve a larger market abroad and realize higher
profits. However, import competition at home increases also, since lower trade costs
increase the competitiveness of foreign exporters. The least productive domestic
producers start making losses and exit the market. This is the well-known selection
effect pointed out by Melitz (2003): trade liberalization reallocates production to
the most productive firms.
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Differentiating the export cost cutoff (1.13) with respect to trade barriers τ , we
obtain
dcX
dτ
=
dcD
dτ
− 1 < 0. (1.22)
Trade liberalization has two opposing effects on the export cost cutoff given by the
first and second term in (1.22). Lower trade barriers allow the most productive
domestic firms to start exporting (second term). On the other hand, trade lib-
eralization increases competition abroad and makes it more difficult to profitably
export (first term). It can be shown that the first effect dominates (see Proof of
Proposition 2 in Appendix A.3). Hence, as in standard heterogeneous firm trade
models, the export cutoff and the fraction of exporters, (cX/cD)
k, increase after
trade liberalization.
The novelty here is that we can also analyze the effect on the incentive to upgrade
technology. From the expression for the technology adoption cutoff (1.14), the im-
pact of trade liberalization on technology upgrading is given by
dcA
dτ
=
1
2
(
2
dcD
dτ
− 1
)
< 0. (1.23)
A reduction in trade barriers increases the market abroad and induces the most pro-
ductive low-technology firms to upgrade their technology. This larger market or pro
technology-adoption effect is reflected by the second term in the brackets. Trade lib-
eralization increases import competition and reduces market shares at home. The
first term represents this anti technology-adoption effect. The net effect of lower
trade barriers on the technology adoption cutoff is pro technology-adoption: to-
tal output of the most productive low-technology firms increases. Therefore, these
firms have a higher return to technology upgrading. Hence, they now invest in the
advanced technology. This is expressed by an increase in the technology adoption
cutoff cA after trade liberalization. The fraction of high-technology firms, (cA/cD)
k,
increases as well.
Proposition 2. Suppose that fmin < f < fmax such that in equilibrium the
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following order of cutoffs holds: 0 < cA < cX < cD. Suppose further that countries
are identical. A reduction in trade costs τ increases the fraction of exporters, the
fraction of high-technology firms, and average productivity.13
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
1.4.2 Asymmetric Countries
How do the results above change if the home country has a less developed credit
market and therefore higher costs of external finance? The intuition is best explained
graphically (see Proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix A.4 for analytical derivations).
Figure 1.6 depicts the new equilibrium.
c
′
D
cD cM
c∗
′
D
c∗
D
cM
cD
c∗D
FE
FE∗
FE
′
FE∗
′
Figure 1.6: Trade liberalization: Asymmetric countries
13If 0 < cX < cA < cD, the marginal technology adopter is a purely domestic firm. As trade
liberalization reduces domestic production, only the anti-technology adoption effect is at work and
the technology adoption cutoff unambiguously decreases.
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A reduction in trade barriers still causes an inward shift of both free entry condition
curves. However, in contrast to the symmetric case, the entry cutoff in the home
country decreases less. The decrease in the entry cutoff in the foreign country, on
the other hand, is stronger and the more so the more severe the credit constraints
in the home country are. Hence, dcD/dτ < dc
∗
D/dτ . The reason for this is, as will
be shown in the following, that the (initial) export and technology adoption cutoff
are higher in the foreign country. Put differently, the (initial) fraction of exporters
and high-technology firms is higher and more firms can take advantage of the larger
export market after trade liberalization. Therefore, ex-ante expected profits and
entry increase more in the foreign country implying a stronger selection effect.
The effect of trade liberalization on the export cost cutoff is given by
dcX
dτ
=
dc∗D
dτ
− 1 < 0,
dc∗X
dτ
=
dcD
dτ
− 1 < 0.
Hence, the export cutoff and the fraction of exporters increase in both countries if τ
decreases. Moreover, it can be shown that the difference between the two countries
with respect to the fraction of exporters increases as τ decreases:
d
[
(
c∗
X
c∗
D
)k
−
(
cX
cD
)k
]
dτ
< 0. (1.24)
A reduction in trade barriers increases the technology adoption cutoff (and hence,
the fraction of high-technology firms):
dcA
dτ
=
dc∗A
dτ
=
1
2
(
dcD
dτ
+
dc∗D
dτ
− 1
)
< 0. (1.25)
The first two terms in the brackets describe again the import competition or anti
technology-adoption effect and the third term the larger market or pro technology-
adoption effect. The anti technology-adoption effect reflects the increase in com-
petition in the home and in the foreign market after trade liberalization. Since
high-technology firms belonging to either country are active in both markets, it is
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the same for both countries. It decreases in the entry cutoffs cD and c
∗
D, that is,
the strength of this effect depends on the initial (before trade liberalization) level
of these cutoffs: for a given increase in ex-post expected profits, the entry cutoff cD
has to decrease the more, the lower it was initially, in order to satisfy the free entry
condition. The pro technology-adoption effect is also the same for both countries.14
Hence, the marginal increase in the technology adoption cutoff after trade liberal-
ization is identical across countries and the difference in the technology adoption
cutoffs cA and c
∗
A is unchanged, d (c
∗
A − cA) /dτ = 0. This implies that the percent-
age increase, (dcA/dτ)/cA, is higher in the home country.
We are interested in particular in the impact on the fraction of high-technology
firms, (cA/cD)
k and (c∗A/c
∗
D)
k, as an indicator of the average technology level of the
home and the foreign country. The increase in the technology adoption cutoff is
the same in both countries. The selection effect, however, is larger in the foreign
country, that is, c∗D decreases more than cD. Therefore, the difference in the fraction
of firms that use the advanced technology increases as τ decreases:
d
[
(
c∗
A
c∗
D
)k
−
(
cA
cD
)k
]
dτ
< 0. (1.26)
From (1.18), the average cost of production (our main (inverse) measure of average
productivity) in home and foreign country is given by
k
k + 1
cD − t
(
cA
cD
)k
,
k
k + 1
c∗D − t
(
c∗A
c∗D
)k
.
A stronger selection effect in the foreign country implies a larger decrease in the
average cost draw, that is, in the average production cost of low-technology firms
(first term). Moreover, from (1.26), the difference between the two countries in
terms of the fraction of high-technology firms is even larger after trade liberalization
(second term). Hence, average productivity increases more in the foreign country:
trade liberalization widens the average productivity gap. This is summarized in the
14This is due to the per-unit specification of trade costs (τ enters cA additively).
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following proposition:
Proposition 3. Suppose that fmin < f < fmax such that in equilibrium the
following order of cutoffs holds: 0 < cA < cX < cD. Suppose further that ψ > ψ
∗.
A reduction in trade costs τ increases the fraction of exporters, the fraction of high-
technology firms, and average productivity in both countries. However, the absolute
difference between the two countries with respect to the fraction of exporters, the
fraction of high-technology firms, and average productivity increases as well. Fur-
thermore, the relative average productivity increases:
•
d
[
(
c
∗
X
c∗
D
)k
−
(
cX
cD
)k
]
dτ
< 0,
d
[
(
c
∗
A
c∗
D
)k
−
(
cA
cD
)k
]
dτ
< 0,
d(CoP −CoP ∗)
dτ
< 0
•
d(CoP /CoP ∗)
dτ
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The impact of a reduction in τ on the relative difference between the two coun-
tries with respect to the fraction of exporters and the fraction of high-technology
firms cannot be determined analytically. For our parametrization introduced in Sec-
tion 1.5, we can show that the relative difference increases after trade liberalization
(see Appendix A.5). In addition, we consider a measure of aggregate productivity
which corresponds to the cost of production weighted either by demand q(c) or by
revenues r(c). The impact of trade liberalization on the aggregate productivity gap
can be analyzed only numerically. We do this in Section 1.5.
Thus, trade liberalization increases average productivity and the adoption of ad-
vanced technologies in both countries. However, a reduction in trade costs — with-
out improved access to credit — is not enough to ensure convergence between the
home and the foreign country. Credit market deficiencies prevent the home coun-
try from taking full advantage of the opportunities offered by trade liberalization.
First, as fewer firms can take advantage of the larger export market, the selection
effect is less severe. Hence, efficiency gains through resource allocation from less to
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more productive firms are lower. Second, while a reduction in trade costs increases
the adoption of advanced technologies, the gap with respect to the fraction of high-
technology firms, does not close. For both reasons, the relative average productivity
of the country with a developed credit market increases.
1.5 Welfare Analysis
In the following, we parametrize the model to conduct a welfare analysis.
1.5.1 Parametrization
The parameters representing trade costs (τ), industry cost effectiveness (k), techno-
logical leap (t) and product differentiation (γ) are taken from empirical studies and
calibrations to connect the model to real data. We allow τ ∈ [0.7, 1] as this reduction
of 30% corresponds to the typical reduction in trade costs in the industries most
affected by trade liberalization (Constantini and Melitz, 2008). Del Gatto, Otta-
viano, and Mion (2006) estimate k = 2 across 18 industries in 11 Western European
countries. In line with Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), Behrens, Mion,
and Ottaviano (2007) calibrate k = 3.6. We set k = 2.5. The technological leap t is
set to 0.5 which corresponds to 10% of the average cost of production in our basic
specification below. This is in line with Constantini and Melitz (2008), who cali-
brate a model of trade liberalization and technology adoption. Finally, Ottaviano,
Taglioni, and Di Mauro (2009) estimate the degree of product differentiation in 12
industries using data on 12 EU countries for the years 2001–2003. Calculating the
average across all industries, we use γ = 0.2.
Entry costs (fE), the upper bound on marginal cost (cM), and market size (S), are
scale parameters that are chosen to be in line with our assumption on the cutoff
ranking, namely
0 < cA < cX < cD < cM . (1.27)
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The range of parameter values to measure credit market development (ψ, ψ∗) is
selected to satisfy (1.27), qc0 > 0, NE > 0 and N
∗
E > 0 and to allow for a large
enough difference in the total technology adoption costs between the two countries.
In particular, S = 1, fE = 10 = cM , ψ, ψ
∗ ∈ [1, 1.25]. Furthermore, the fixed cost of
technology adoption is set to f = 10.
Our preferred specification (“basic specification”) is given by
• τ = 0.8
• k = 2.5
• t = 0.5
• γ = 0.2.
1.5.2 Welfare Analysis
We use the indirect utility function associated with (1.1) to analyze the implications
for social welfare (see Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), p. 298):
W = Ic +
N
γ
σ2p
2
+
1
2
(
γ
N
+ β
)
−1
(α − p̄)2 . (1.28)
Welfare increases with an increase in the number of varieties sold in the market (N)
and in the price variance (σ2p), and decreases with an increase in the average price
(p̄).
The average price in the open economy is
p̄ =
2k + 1
2(k + 1)
cD − (p − pA)
NA
N
+
(pX − p)
k + 1
N∗X
N
, (1.29)
where the first term gives the average price of low-technology firms and the second
term the price difference between low- and high-technology firms weighted by the
share of high-technology sellers in the economy. The share of high-technology sellers
is the sum of the share of domestic NDA/N and of foreign high-technology firms
N∗XA/N . The third term corresponds to difference between export and domestic
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prices weighted with the share of foreign firms in the economy. Because of tougher
selection (lower cD), the average price of low-technology firms is lower in the foreign
country (first term). The fraction of high-technology sellers and the fraction of
foreign firms might be higher in either country. Hence, it is a priori unclear if the
average price is higher in the home country or in the foreign country.
The number of firms in each country is given by:
N =
γ
β
(α−cD)c
∗
D
2(k+1)
+ t
2
1
D
[
(cD)
k (c∗A)
k − (c∗X)
k (cA)
k
]
γ
β
(c∗D − cD)
cDc
∗
D
4(k+1)2
+ t
4(k+1)D
∆+ tτ
4D(k+1)
Θ
+
γ
β
τ(cX∗)
k
2D(k+1)
[
(α − cD) (cX)
k + (α − c∗D) (cD)
k
]
cDc
∗
D
4(k+1)2
+ t
4(k+1)D
∆+ tτ
4D(k+1)
Θ,
(1.30)
where
D =(cD)
k (c∗D)
k − (cD − τ)
k (c∗D − τ)
k
∆ =cD
{
(cD)
k (c∗A)
k − (c∗X)
k
[
(cA)
k −
τ(cX)
k
t(k + 1)
]}
+ c∗D
{
(c∗D)
k (cA)
k − (cX)
k
[
(c∗A)
k −
τ(c∗X)
k
t(k + 1)
]}
Θ =
[
(cX)
k (c∗A)
k + (c∗X)
k (cA)
k −
τ (cX)
k (c∗X)
k
t(k + 1)
]
.
The price variance σ2p is the sum of the price variances of domestic and foreign sellers
weighted with their shares in the total population of sellers:
σ2p =
ND
N
σ2p,dom +
N∗X
N
σ2p,exp. (1.31)
We use the basic specification above to assess the overall impact of credit constraints
on average price, number of sellers, price variance, and welfare. Table 1.1 shows that
the fraction of high-technology sellers NA/N is higher in the home country. This is
due to the large fraction of high-technology firms that export from the foreign to
the home country. However, a higher average price of low-technology firms leads to
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Home Foreign
NA/N 0.1822 0.1608
N∗X/N 0.8086 0.1231
p̄ 7.0329 6.81622
N 1.7286 1.9592
σ2p 0.7661 0.8330
W 1.1882 1.2203
Table 1.1: Parametrization: Equilibrium outcomes
(t = 0.5, k = 2.5, γ = 0.2, S = 1,f = fE = cM = 10, ψ = 1.25)
τ p̄ p̄∗ N N∗ σ2p
(
σ2p
)
∗
W W ∗
1.0000 7.0922 6.9202 1.7094 1.8904 0.7692 0.8270 1.1825 1.2075
0.9500 7.0771 6.8956 1.7150 1.9065 0.7683 0.8280 1.1840 1.2105
0.9025 7.0629 6.8715 1.7199 1.9224 0.7675 0.8292 1.1854 1.2134
0.8574 7.0495 6.8477 1.7241 1.9382 0.7668 0.8307 1.1867 1.2164
0.8145 7.0371 6.8243 1.7276 1.9538 0.7663 0.8324 1.1878 1.2193
0.7738 7.0255 6.8013 1.7302 1.9693 0.7659 0.8343 1.1889 1.2222
0.7351 7.0147 6.7786 1.7321 1.9846 0.7656 0.8364 1.1899 1.2252
τ p̄/p̄∗ N/N∗ σ2p/
(
σ2p
)
∗
W/W ∗
1.0000 1.0249 0.9043 0.9301 0.9793
0.9500 1.0263 0.8996 0.9279 0.9781
0.9025 1.0279 0.8947 0.9256 0.9769
0.8574 1.0295 0.8895 0.9231 0.9756
0.8145 1.0312 0.8842 0.9206 0.9742
0.7738 1.0330 0.8786 0.9181 0.9728
0.7351 1.0349 0.8727 0.9154 0.9712
Table 1.2: Impact of a 5%-decrease in trade costs on welfare
(t = 0.5, k = 2.5, γ = 0.2, S = 1,f = fE = cM = 10, ψ = 1.25)
a higher average price and, together with a lower number of sellers, to lower welfare
in the home country.
We next use the basic specification to study the effect of a 5%-decrease in trade
costs τ on welfare in the two countries. Table 1.2 shows the simulation results for
welfare and the three variables that determine welfare (p̄, N , σ2p).
A reduction in trade costs τ increases the number of varieties in both countries.
However, N increases less than N∗. The average price decreases in both markets
but it decreases more in the foreign country. The price variance that positively
affects welfare increases more in the foreign country. Hence, welfare increases in
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Average productivity Aggregate productivity
τ CoP CoP ∗ CoPq CoP ∗q CoPr CoP
∗
r
1.0000 5.8301 5.6914 26.3507 25.3051 177.0300 165.1811
0.9500 5.8183 5.6737 26.244 25.1547 175.9566 163.6664
0.9025 5.8071 5.6565 26.1434 25.0084 174.9478 162.1963
0.8574 5.7966 5.6398 26.0491 24.8658 174.0027 160.7685
0.8145 5.7867 5.6233 25.9609 24.7267 173.1202 159.3807
0.7738 5.7775 5.6073 25.8786 24.5911 172.2992 158.0304
0.7351 5.7690 5.5915 25.8023 24.4585 171.5386 156.7151
τ CoP/CoP ∗ CoPq/CoP ∗q CoPr/CoP
∗
r
1.0000 1.0244 1.0413 1.0717
0.9500 1.0255 1.0433 1.0751
0.9025 1.0266 1.0454 1.0786
0.8574 1.0278 1.0476 1.0823
0.8145 1.0291 1.0499 1.0862
0.7738 1.0304 1.0524 1.0903
0.7351 1.0317 1.0549 1.0946
Table 1.3: Impact of a 5%-decrease in trade costs on productivity
(t = 0.5, k = 2.5, γ = 0.2, S = 1,f = fE = cM = 10, ψ = 1.25)
both countries but the welfare increase is larger in the foreign country. The welfare
gap between the two countries thus widens.
From Section 1.4.2, we know that the average productivity gap increases too. Table
1.3 shows the simulation results for aggregate production cost, our (inverse) measures
of aggregate productivity, where CoP q, CoP ∗q denotes weighting with demand q(c)
and CoP r, CoP ∗r describes weighting by revenues r(c). Both measures of aggregate
production cost decrease after trade liberalization and more so in the foreign country,
that is, the relative aggregate costs increase. We interpret this result as an increase
in the aggregate productivity gap.
1.6 Conclusion
Even though recommended to many developing countries, only if certain conditions
are met does opening up to trade enhance economic convergence. This paper exam-
ines the role of credit market imperfections as a reason for a potentially detrimental
effect of trade liberalization on convergence. In particular, we introduce the possi-
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bility of investing in a more efficient technology into a two-country heterogeneous
firm model with variable mark-ups. The two countries may differ with respect to
credit market development: in the less developed country, firms face more severe
credit constraints and therefore higher costs of technology upgrading. As a conse-
quence, credit constrained firms cannot take advantage of the larger market to the
same extent but face fiercer import competition. Therefore, the difference between
the two countries with respect to the fraction of domestic firms that invest in the
advanced technology increases. Hence, the productivity gap between the two coun-
tries widens. Moreover, our simulations show that the welfare gap also increases
after trade liberalization.
Our focus is on the interplay of trade liberalization and credit market frictions
because credit market deficiencies are a major obstacle to achieving convergence.
However, our model could naturally be extended to the analysis of other market
imperfections.
Our results have important policy implications. Trade liberalization fosters conver-
gence if and only if firms in emerging countries have equal access to external finance.
In order to reduce the productivity gap, a reduction in trade barriers must thus be
accompanied by credit market development. In our model, small and medium-sized
firms might have an incentive to invest in technology adoption but are prevented
from doing so by high costs of external finance. Policies aimed at increasing the
access of smaller firms to external finance are therefore expected to have a strong
effect.
Our model has abstracted from several important considerations. First, we assume
a quasi-linear utility function that allows normalizing the wage to unity. In doing
so, we ignore the effect that trade liberalization might have on (relative) wages (e.g.
Bustos, 2011). Second, we abstract from the possibility that firms serve the foreign
market through foreign direct investment. An interesting extension would thus be
to include knowledge spillovers from foreign to domestic producers. Third, we focus
on technology adoption and do not consider product innovation. However, following
Atkeson and Burstein (2010), we can interpret entry into the differentiated good
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industry as product innovation. Our model then shows that trade liberalization
increases the divergence between developed and less developed country in product
innovation activity.
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Chapter 2
Financial Constraints and the
Missing Technology Adoption
2.1 Introduction
Despite numerous reform agendas, cross-country differences in per capita income
are surprisingly persistent over time. One major consensus that has emerged from
the discussion on why some countries grow and others don’t is that innovation is a
major determinant of economic growth. For developing countries, the adoption of
new technologies is the most important part of the innovation process (Hall, 2006).
Weak financial market development in these countries, however, is a major obstacle
to technology adoption. Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), for example,
show that financial constraints prevent less developed countries from adopting new
technologies, and lead to persistent income differences between countries. While
their study is at the country level, it is necessary to go to the firm level and examine
how financial market development shapes firms’ growth-related investments in order
to provide meaningful policy implications.
This paper is an attempt to do so by providing new firm level evidence of the im-
pact of cross-country differences in financial market development on investments in
export activities and, most importantly, in new, more advanced technologies. The
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underlying thought experiment is as follows. Consider the probability that a firm
active in a country with a developed financial market invests in the adoption of an
advanced production technology. Then, compare this probability to the likelihood
that the very same firm adopts an advanced technology in a less developed finan-
cial market. The difference in probabilities is what we call the missing technology
adoption.
To guide our empirical analysis, we extend the heterogeneous firm model developed
in Peters and Schnitzer (2012) to multiple industries and to allow for heterogeneous
costs of external finance. In the model, firms have the option to invest in a more
expensive but more efficient production technology, as in Bustos (2011). Consistent
with the data used in the empirical analysis, external finance is assumed to be more
costly for smaller firms. The impact of financial market development thus differs
across the firm size distribution. The largest firms have sufficient access to external
finance, but the very small firms, which are financially constrained, have no incentive
to pay the cost of such investment. Firms in the middle of the size distribution,
however, would invest in a developed financial market but are prevented from doing
so in a less developed financial market. Those firms thus account for the missing
technology adoption and are the most affected by financial development.
We test the predictions of the model using data from the World Bank Enterprise
Surveys. These are firm level surveys conducted by the World Bank in a large num-
ber of countries. The Enterprise Surveys are ideal for the purpose of our study for
two reasons. First, almost all countries which have been surveyed are developing
and emerging economies. These countries are very likely to exhibit missing tech-
nology adoption and the cross-country variation is large enough to allow for robust
results. Second, the survey questionnaire includes detailed questions about export
behavior, investment in new technologies, and access to external finance. Hence, we
are able to construct direct measures of technology use and access to finance. The
use of direct measures reduces measurement error and is a major advantage over
other studies that have relied on indirect proxies, for example TFP estimations and
balance sheet data.
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For empirical identification, we exploit the variation in financial dependence across
industries, in addition to the variation in financial development across countries. In
particular, the main explanatory variable is an interaction between countries’ finan-
cial development and the sectoral dependence on external finance. This amounts to
a comparison of industries with different external financing needs across countries at
different levels of financial development: firms active in industries with high external
financing needs have a relatively higher probability of exporting and of investing in
new technologies in financially developed countries.15
This identification strategy has several advantages. Using an interaction between
a country (financial development) and an industry characteristic (external financial
dependence) to study the impact of financial market development on firm level
investments allows the inclusion of country and industry dummies. Hence, we control
for country and industry characteristics that might be correlated with both financial
market development and investments, and thus avoid an important source of omitted
variable bias. A further advantage is that both the variation at the country and at
the industry level are exogenous to the firm. This is important because the main
difficulty in most firm level studies on financial constraints is to avoid the endogeneity
bias due to reverse causality.
First, we show that financial market development increases the access to external
finance, especially in industries which require a lot of external funding. Second, we
find that the probability that a firm exports increases with an increase in financial
market development (and disproportionately so in financially dependent industries).
Our results thus confirm the existence of financial constraints in international trade
found in the existing literature. The positive effect of financial market development
is driven by firms in the lower quartiles of the firm size distribution. Hence, financial
constraints primarily prevent the smaller firms from serving foreign markets. Third,
and most importantly, we provide evidence for the missing technology adoption.
Given country and industry characteristics, a lower level of financial market devel-
opment decreases the probability of using new technologies. This result is strongest
15This approach was proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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in industries with high external financing needs. We consider two types of invest-
ments in new technologies: investment in less costly and investment in very costly
new technologies. In the case of less costly investments, financial development has
the largest effect on firms in the lower size quartiles. For very costly investments,
the effect is largest for firms in the fourth size quartile.
Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, it is related to previous
research on the determinants of economic growth and convergence. These studies
document the positive effect of financial market development on technological pro-
gess and economic growth at the country level (e.g. Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000;
Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000). Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), for ex-
ample, show, both theoretically and empirically, that financial constraints prevent
less developed countries from taking advantage of international technology trans-
fers. In a similar vein, a body of work has argued that in the presence of financial
constraints, financially developed countries have a comparative advantage in more
financially dependent industries (e.g. Beck, 2002; Buera, Kaboski, and Shin, 2009;
Manova, 2011). The present paper brings the analysis to the firm level and provides
micro-level evidence of the detrimental impact of financial constraints on technology
adoption. Furthermore, it shows that the impact of financial development differs
across the firm size distribution. It is thus important to take into account firm
heterogeneity when designing policies destined to improve sectoral competitiveness.
The second strand of literature examines empirically the effect of financial con-
straints on firm behavior. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) and Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2008) use data from the World Bank Enter-
prise Surveys to study the effect of legal and financial constraints on firm growth. In
line with our results, they show that smaller firms are those most affected by finan-
cial constraints which are the most important obstacle to firm growth. A number of
empirical studies provide evidence for the detrimental effect of financial constraints
on export behavior: Greenaway, Guariglia, and Kneller (2007) for firms in the UK,
Muûls (2008) for Belgian firms, Minetti and Zhu (2011) for a sample of Italian firms,
and McCann and Peters (2012) for Eastern European firms. Berman and Héricourt
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(2010) study firms in nine developing countries using data from the Enterprise Sur-
veys. A small number of papers analyze the effect of financial constraints on the
innovative behavior of firms in different countries. Seker (2012) finds, in a sample
of firms taken from the Enterprise Surveys, a positive correlation between access to
finance and product and process innovation. Using BEEPS data (a subset of the
World Bank Enterprise Surveys), Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2012) establish a
negative causal effect of financial constraints on innovative activity. Our paper, on
the other hand, examines the impact of financial constraints on technology adop-
tion, an innovative activity that is particularly important for developing countries.
Furthermore, none of these studies accounts for the heterogeneous effect of financial
market development across the firm size distribution.
Finally, the paper probably most related to our study is Maskus, Neumann, and
Seidel (2012). Using a similar identification strategy, the authors show that finan-
cial development increases the innovative activity disproportionately in industries
with large external financing needs. The focus of their paper is, however, slightly
different. While Maskus, Neumann, and Seidel (2012) study the effect on sectoral
R&D intensity in OECD countries, our focus is on the missing technology adoption
in developing economies. Moreover, our analysis uses firm level data and documents
the importance of taking into account firm heterogeneity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the theoretical model and the
resulting predictions. The data are described in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 explains the
econometric approach and presents the results. Section 2.5 provides some sensitivity
tests and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
This section develops a model of the decision to export and adopt an advanced
technology in the presence of financial constraints. In the model, firms are hetero-
geneous, as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), and have the option to decrease their
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production cost by investing in technology adoption, as in Bustos (2011).16 Further-
more, firms require external finance to cover the fixed investment cost. We consider
two countries, home and foreign, that differ in their financial market development.
The variables with an asterisk pertain to the foreign country.
2.2.1 Setup of the Model
Both countries have a population S and each inhabitant is endowed with one unit
of labor. Labor is the only factor of production. There are two types of industries,
an industry that produces a homogeneous good, which serves as numéraire, and
k = 1, ..., K differentiated goods industries.
Preferences. Preferences in the two countries are described by the quasi-linear
quadratic utility function developed by Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002):
U = qc0 +Πk
[
α
∫
i∈Ωk
qcikdi −
1
2
γ
∫
i∈Ωk
(qcik)
2 di −
1
2
β
(
∫
i∈Ωk
qcikdi
)2
]θk
, (2.1)
where α, β, γ > 0. qc0 and q
c
ik denote the per capita consumption of the homogeneous
good and of each variety i of the differentiated good k. α, β characterize the substi-
tutability of the homogeneous good for the differentiated good k. γ represents the
degree of product differentiation with γ = 0 indicating perfect substitutability. The
θk indicate the shares of the differentiated goods industries in the total expenditure
on differentiated goods, and we have
∑
k θk = 1 and 0 < θk < 1.
These preferences generate the linear demand system
qik = Sq
c
ik =
αS
γ + βNk
−
S
γ
pik +
βNk
γ + βNk
S
γ
pk. (2.2)
pk = 1/N
∫
i∈Ω′
k
pikdi is the average price and Nk the number of consumed varieties
in industry k.
16The Melitz and Ottaviano framework is as tractable as the Melitz framework and models the
competition effect of international linkages — which is an important determinant of the incentive
to invest in exporting and technology adoption — as we observe it in the real world via the product
market.
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Variety ik is consumed whenever pik ≤ p
max
k where p
max
k is the prohibitive price
above which demand qik is equal to zero.
Supply. The homogeneous good is produced under perfect competition and at unit
labor requirement. If a positive demand for the homogeneous good is assumed, the
wage in both countries equals unity.
The differentiated goods industries are characterized by monopolistic competition
and free entry. Production is at constant returns to scale with firm-specific labor re-
quirement cik. cik reflects the cost differences between firms. A firm which produces
at a lower cost has a larger demand, and therefore a higher output. Entry requires
a fixed investment fEk. This investment is thereafter sunk: it captures start-up
costs, such as setting up a facility and buying equipment. Upon entry, firms draw
their production cost from a common Pareto distribution with lower bound 1/cM
and shape parameter k ≥ 1, G(c) = (c/cM)
k. When learning the cost of production,
firms decide (i) whether to exit the industry or to stay and produce, and if they
produce, then (ii) whether to export and whether to invest in technology adoption.
Technology adoption. Technology is assumed to be industry specific. Firms have
the option of upgrading their technology by paying fk units of labor. The fixed
technology adoption cost fk can be thought of as a per period fixed cost that comes
with acquiring a more advanced technology, as for example the rent or the licensing
fee for new machinery, or its periodized purchasing cost. One way to think about
technology upgrading is that it reduces production cost by a fixed amount tk: firms
adopt a process innovation that reduces the labor input requirement. An alternative
interpretation of tk is as an increase in the price margin through the adoption of
an advanced technology that increases quality at unchanged cost. tk is called the
“technological leap”. Advanced technology thus comes at a higher fixed cost but
increases productivity.
Financial constraints. The fixed cost of technology adoption fk is paid upfront.
Internal funds are not sufficient to cover the investment, that is, firms need to raise
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external finance for a fraction of the fixed technology adoption cost. For simplicity,
we normalize the fraction financed externally to one. However, the results are un-
changed if an industry specific fraction dk is assumed instead.
The credit market is imperfect. In particular, we assume weak creditor protection.
Creditors are repaid with probability λ, λ ∈ (0, 1), and with probability 1− λ, firms
default. Therefore, creditors require a collateral Cik > 0 that they can seize in case
the credit is not repaid. However, in case of default, they realize only a fraction θ,
θ ∈ (0, 1) of the collateral, due to liquidation costs.
The credit market is perfectly competitive. Creditors make firms a take it or leave
it offer specifying the required repayment Rik
λRik + (1− λ)θCik = fk ⇔ Rik =
fk − (1− λ)θCik
λ
. (2.3)
Firms use the net revenue from technology adoption, πA,varik (cik)− πik(cik), to repay
creditors, where πA,varik (cik) are the variable profits when using the advanced tech-
nology. The net revenue increases with firm size, that is, larger firms gain more from
technology adoption. The idea is that this makes it easier for creditors to enforce
repayment, and hence lowers the collateral requirement. Firms restrict the collateral
to the minimum collateral required17:
πA,varik (cik)− πik(cik) =
fk − (1− λ)θCik
λ
⇔Cik = max



f − λ
[
πA,varik (cik)− πik(cik)
]
(1− λ)θ
, 0



. (2.4)
The total cost functions of firms using the baseline and the advanced technology,
respectively, TCik and TC
A
ik, are
TCik (cik) = cikqik
TCAik (cik) = (cik − tk) q
A
ik + λRik + (1− λ)Cik = (cik − tk) q
A
ik + fk + f
ext
ik ,(2.5)
17Hence, the collateral is endogenous, as in Buch, Kesternich, Lipponer, and Schnitzer (2009).
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where f extik = (1−λ)(1− θ)Cik. Weaker creditor protection, higher liquidation costs,
and a larger collateral requirement increase the cost of obtaining external finance.
Very large firms have zero collateral requirement (Cik = 0) and therefore no extra
costs of obtaining external finance.
Exporting. Serving the foreign market involves per-unit trade costs, τ > 0.18
2.2.2 Firm Behavior
Prices and profits. Let pDik, p
X
ik, p
DA
ik , and p
XA
ik denote the price in the domestic and
in the export market of firms using the baseline technology and of firms using the
advanced technology, respectively. Profit maximization implies
pDik =
1
2
(pmaxk + cik) , p
X
ik =
1
2
(pmaxk∗ + cik + τ)
pDAik =
1
2
(pmaxk + cik − tk) , p
XA
ik =
1
2
(pmaxk∗ + cik + τ − tk) .
The prices charged by firms using the advanced technology are lower: pDAik = p
D
ik −
tk/2 and p
XA
ik = p
X
ik − tk/2. Accordingly, the quantities sold are higher. Technology
adoption increases the variable profits but involves a higher fixed cost. The profits
of firms serving only the domestic market using the baseline and the advanced
technology are given by
πDik =
S
4γ
(pmaxk − cik)
2 , πDAik =
S
4γ
(pmaxk − cik + tk)
2 − fk − f
ext
ik . (2.6)
18The iceberg form of the trade costs implies that firms with lower production cost also have ac-
cess to a transport technology of lower cost. Therefore, reallocation forces are distorted (Schroeder
and Sorensen, 2011; Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla, 2011).
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The profits of firms serving also the foreign market are, respectively,
πik = π
D
ik + π
X
ik =
S
4γ
[
(pmaxk − cik)
2 + (pmaxk∗ − cik − τ)
2
]
πAik = π
DA
ik + π
XA
ik =
S
4γ
[
(pmaxk − cik + tk)
2 + (pmaxk∗ − cik − τ + tk)
2
]
− fk − f
ext
ik .
(2.7)
Firms’ sorting pattern. Denote by cDk , c
X
k , and c
A
k , respectively, the cost cutoffs
below which firms in industry k stay in the market and produce, serve the foreign
market, and invest in technology adoption. In the data used for the empirical anal-
ysis, only a subset of the domestic producers serve the foreign market and/or use an
advanced production technology, that is, cXk < c
D
k and c
A
k < c
D
k . Furthermore, there
are two possible sorting patterns (Figure 2.1). The sorting pattern AX (cAk < c
X
k )
Figure 2.1: Sorting patterns
cAk c
X
k c
D
k
ting Pattern AX
advanced, exporter baseline, exporter baseline, domestic
cXk c
A
k c
D
k
ting Pattern XA
advanced, exporter advanced, domestic baseline, domestic
obtains if the fixed cost of technology adoption fk is high. In this case, the marginal
technology adopter is an exporter, that is all purely domestic firms use the base-
line technology. The sorting pattern XA (cXk < c
A
k ) results if fk is low. Then, the
marginal technology adopter is a purely domestic firm and all exporters use the
advanced technology. In the empirical analysis, we consider two types of new tech-
nologies: one associated with low, and one associated with high cost of adoption.
In the following, the firm decisions for sorting pattern AX will be derived. The
analysis for sorting pattern XA is analogous (see Appendix B.1).19
Firm decisions. The least productive firms serve only the domestic market and
19In the following, we will derive analytical expressions for the cutoffs and then provide the
parameter restrictions that correpond to each sorting pattern.
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use the baseline technology. They decide to stay in the market and produce if their
profits πDik are non-negative:
πDik(c
D
k ) = 0 ⇔ c
D
k = p
max
k . (2.8)
Firms export if they can profitably serve the foreign market. This is the case if their
production costs are below the export cutoff cXk where
πXik(c
X
k ) = 0 ⇔ c
X
k = c
D
k∗ − τ. (2.9)
Exporters invest in technology adoption if their total profits are higher when using
the advanced technology, that is, if πAik (cik) ≥ πik (cik). The technology adoption
decision depends on the total costs of technology adoption, fk + f
ext
ik . The largest
firms have no extra costs of external finance, and pay only the fixed cost of technology
adoption, fk. These are the financially not constrained (NC) firms with production
cost below cNC , where, from (2.4),
cNCk =
1
2
(
cDk + c
D
k∗ + tk − τ −
1
λ
2γfk
Stk
)
. (2.10)
Firms with production cost above cNC have to pay for external finance.
The technology adoption cutoff cAk depends on whether the marginal technology
adopter is a financially unconstrained or a financially constrained firm:
cAk =





1
2
(
cDk + c
D
k∗ + tk − τ −
2γfk
Stk
)
if cik ≤ c
NC
k
1
2
[
cDk + c
D
k∗ + tk − τ −
1
θ+(1−θ)λ
2γfk
Stk
]
if cik > c
NC
k





. (2.11)
It follows from (2.10) and (2.11) that cNCk < c
A
k
(
cik > c
NC
k
)
: all financially uncon-
strained firms invest in the advanced technology. The marginal technology adopter
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is thus a financially constrained firm and the technology adoption cutoff is
cAk =
1
2
[
cDk + c
D
k∗ + tk − τ −
1
θ + (1− θ)λ
2γfk
Stk
]
.20 (2.12)
Firms with cost draws cik ∈ [( c
A
k (λ < 1) , c
A
k (λ = 1) ) would invest in technology
adoption if the financial market were perfect, but are prevented from doing so by
f extik > 0. The probability of being in that cost interval is what we call the missing
technology adoption.
2.2.3 Industry Equilibrium
Free entry ensures that, in each industry k, firms enter until expected profits are
equal to the fixed entry cost fEk. The resulting free entry condition for industry k
is
fEk =
∫ cNC
k
0
[
πAik (cik) + f
ext
ik
]
dF (cik) +
∫ cA
k
cNC
k
πAik (cik) dF (cik)
+
∫ cX
k
cA
k
πXik (cik) dF (cik) +
∫ cD
k
cX
k
πDik (cik) dF (cik).
And, solving the integral,
(
cDk
)k+2
+
(
cDk∗ − τ
)k+2
k + 2
+
2tk
θ
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ]
(
cAk
)k+1
−(1− θ)λ
(
cNCk
)k+1
}
=
fEk2γ (cM)
k (k + 1)
S
,
(2.13)
where cAk and c
NC
k are given by (2.12) and (2.10). The free entry condition for
industry k in the foreign country is analogous.
For each industry k, (2.13) is thus a system of two equations with two unknowns, cDk
and cDk∗. It can be shown that there is a unique equilibrium pair
(
cDk , c
D
k∗
)
provided
that λ, given λ∗, is not very small (see Appendix B.2.1).
20For cAk < c
X
k , fk must thus be larger than
(
cDk − c
D
k∗ + tk + τ
)
Stk [θ + (1 − θ)λ] /2γ, where
both cDk and c
D
k depend on τ, k, tk, fk, γ, S, fEk, cM .
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Assume that the creditor protection in the home country is lower than that in
the foreign country, that is, λ < λ∗. In this case, the higher costs of external
finance decrease the ex-ante probability of technology adoption in the home country.
Therefore, expected profits are smaller and fewer firms pay the entry cost. In other
words, competition in the home country is less intense and firms with higher costs of
production are able to survive (higher entry cutoff in the home country: cDk > c
D
k∗).
As a consequence, firms from the home country are, on average, less competitive
abroad than vice-versa. Hence, the ex-ante probability of exporting is lower in the
home country, that is, the country with a less developed financial market. This
is reflected by a lower export cutoff, cXk < c
X
k∗. From (2.12), it follows that the
technology adoption cutoff is also lower in the home country, cAk < c
A
k∗. The missing
technology adoption is thus larger. It decreases with increasing financial market
development at home, for a given level of financial market development in the foreign
country (see Appendix B.2.1).
2.2.4 Theoretical Predictions
Prediction 1. The probability that firm i, active in industry k, will be financially
constrained is
Pr
(
cik ≥ c
NC
k
)
= Pr
(
cik − c
NC
k ≥ 0
)
.
It can be shown that dcNCk /dλ > 0.
An increase in financial market development λ decreases the probability of being
financially constrained.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.1.
Prediction 2. The probability that firm i, active in industry k, will export is
Pr
(
cik ≤ c
X
k
)
= Pr
(
cDk∗ − τ − cik ≥ 0
)
.
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It can be shown that dcDk∗/dλ > 0.
A higher level of financial market development λ increases the probability of ex-
porting. From the assumption that cXk ≤ c
D
k , it follows that this effect works through
firms in the middle of the firm size distribution.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.1.
Prediction 3. The probability that firm i, active in industry k, will invest in
new technologies is
Pr
(
cik ≤ c
A
k
)
= Pr
(
cAk − cik ≥ 0
)
.
It can be shown that dcAk /dλ > 0.
A higher level of financial market development λ increases the probability of tech-
nology adoption. For advanced technologies associated with high (low) fixed costs fk,
this effect works through firms at the upper (lower) end of the firm size distribution.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.1.
We will test these predictions in the following empirical analysis.
2.3 Data
In order to test the predictions of our model, we match data from the World Bank
Enterprise Surveys with country level data on financial development and industry
level data on the use of external finance.
World Bank Enterprise Surveys. The Enterprise Surveys are firm level surveys con-
ducted by the World Bank in a large number of developing and emerging countries.
We focus here on the surveys conducted between 2002 and 2006, as these contain
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detailed information on technology use.21 More than a third of the countries were
surveyed more than once in this time period. However, as we do not know whether
the same firms were surveyed more than once, and hence, whether a panel structure
is available, the empirical analysis is based on the pooled data. In order to improve
the representativeness, the sampling methodology used is stratified random sam-
pling, where firms are chosen randomly within each stratum (firm size, geographical
location, and sector of activity).22 The data include firms active in manufacturing,
retail and other services. However, we restrict our analysis to manufacturing firms.
First, the model outlined above best applies to this sector.23 Second, the empirical
measure of the sectoral use of external finance used for identification is not available
for service firms.
The Enterprise Surveys collect information on firm characteristics, such as the num-
ber of workers, their skill composition, balance sheet data, ownership, and age. From
these data, we construct Size as the logarithm of the number of permanent work-
ers. Productivity is measured as the logarithm of sales per worker.24 Ownership
information is captured by two dummy variables, Foreign and State, that take the
value one if more than 10% of the firm is owned by the foreign private sector and the
government/state. Finally, the skill level of the workforce is proxied by the fraction
of the total workforce of the firm constituted by its non-production workers (Skill).
Furthermore, and most important for our purposes, the Enterprise Surveys provide
information on export behavior, technology use, and access to external finance.
More specifically, firms were asked what percentage of [their] sales are exported di-
rectly. We classify a firm as an exporter (Exporter = 1) if it exports a positive share
of its sales. 33% of all firms export (standard devation: 0.47), with the minimum of
21As these surveys were conducted by different units within the World Bank, the different
questionnaires were standardized for a joint analyis only later on. Therefore, not all questions
were asked in all countries (see Table B.3). In a robustness check, we use the the BEEPS data (a
subset of the WBES) based on identical questionnaires in all countries (see Table B.11).
22For more information, see http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology/.
23It seems reasonable to assume that technology adoption in the manufacturing sector is more
likely to involve high acquisition costs than technology adoption in the service sector.
24Productivity is only used in robustness checks.
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11% being in Uganda and the maximum of 88% being in Malaysia.25
We use two measures of technology adoption that are in line with the two possible
sorting patterns, AX and XA.
Firms report whether they use technology licensed from a foreign-owned company
where the license may be held by the parent company. This question measures
access to foreign technology. Firms have an incentive to use foreign technology
only if it increases productivity and this is especially true for the developing and
emerging countries in the sample. Moreover, obtaining a license is likely to be quite
costly, and thus matches firms’ sorting pattern AX (high fk). Indeed, in almost
all countries, the share of firms using foreign technology is lower than the share
of exporters (see Table B.4). Therefore, a firm is considered a technology adopter
(ForeignTechnology = 1) if it reports using foreign technology. 14% of all firms
that answered the question use a licensed foreign technology (standard deviation:
0.34), with the minimum of 5% being in Morocco and the maximum of 32% being
in Costa Rica. One drawback of using this measure is that firms might use tech-
nology from a foreign-owned firm without a license or a formal agreement. In this
case, ForeignTechnology = 0 while, in reality, the firm is a technology adopter.
Furthermore, holding a license might be a substitute for purchasing new machinery
or equipment.
The second measure defines a firm as a technology adopter if it regularly uses email
[...] in its interactions with clients and suppliers (Email = 1). This is in line with
Hall (2006, p. 463), who takes the replacement of a wired physical connection to the
internet with a wireless one as an example of “the adoption decision in a modern
technological setting”. In a similar vein, Comin and Mestieri (2010) use the frac-
tion of PCs and Internet users to measure the degree of technology adoption in the
respective country. The use of e-mail is associated with lower costs of technology
adoption (low fk). This measure of technology adoption is thus in line with firms’
sorting pattern XA. 69% of all firms that answered the question use e-mail to in-
teract with customers and suppliers (standard deviation: 0.46), with the minimum
25The results are unchanged if Malaysia, the only country with an extremely high fraction of
exporters, is excluded.
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of 27% being in Egypt and the maximum of 99% being in South Africa. In almost
all countries, the share of firms using e-mail is higher than the fraction of exporters
(see Table B.4).
The Enterprise Surveys provide two measures of financial constraints. Firms report,
using a 0 (“no obstacle”) to 4 (“very severe obstacle”) scale, whether (i) access to
financing (e.g., collateral) and (ii) the cost of financing (e.g., interest rates) are an
obstacle to their operations and growth. We classify firms as being financially con-
strained (ConstrAcc = 1, ConstrCost = 1) if, respectively, the access to financing
and the cost of financing are at least a moderate obstacle (2 on the four-point scale).
59% of the firms asked about their cost of financing report it to be at least a moder-
ate obstacle (standard deviation: 0.5) while 37% of the firms reporting information
about access to finance are considered financially constrained (standard deviation:
0.48). These self-reported and hence direct measures constitute a major advan-
tage over the indirect proxies used in other studies (e.g., total debt/total assets or
cash flow/total assets in Berman and Héricourt, 2010). However, in a cross-country
study, self-reported measures might be influenced by cultural differences between
countries. In order to meet this objection, we show that the percentage of firms
reporting being financially constrained is negatively related to macro-level measures
of financial market development (see Figures B.1 and B.2).
Financial market development. In the model, financial market development cap-
tures the overall access of firms to external finance. Our main empirical measure
is the sum of private credit (provided by deposit money banks and other finan-
cial institutions) and stock market capitalization over GDP obtained from Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2009). This measure has been extensively used in the
literature (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Manova, 2011). It captures the size of the
financial sector and hence the actual use of external finance. This use of external
finance greatly varies across countries, with the minimum of 4% being in the Kyr-
gyz Republic and the maximum of 326% being in Jordan.26 In the median country,
26The results are unchanged if countries with very high or very low values of financial develop-
ment are excluded.
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Turkey, private credit amounts to 45% of GDP (see Table B.1). In the robustness
checks, we consider an alternative set of measures: the rule of law, the repudiation
of contracts, and the risk of expropriation from LaPorta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1998).
Dependence on external finance. The definition and computation of industries’
dependence on external finance follows Rajan and Zingales (1998). The need for
external finance is defined as “capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations
divided by capital expenditures” (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, p. 564) and is computed
using Standard and Poor’s Compustat North America. This database contains the
financial information of all publicly listed US based firms. The idea is that the US
has one of the most developed financial systems worldwide and that therefore the
amount of external finance used by US firms best reflects the sectoral demand for
credit. We compute for each firm the average use of external finance over the period
1996–2005 in order to smooth temporal fluctuations, and then take the median for
each NAICS 3-digit industry.27 We then calculate a weighted average to match these
values to the industries in the Enterprise Surveys.28
We use three alternative measures of sectoral financial vulnerability, following Feen-
stra, Zhiyuan, and Miaojie (2011) and Askenazy, Caldera, Gaulier, and Irac (2011),
in the robustness checks: tangible assets/total assets, the liquidity ratio, and trade
credit accounts payable/turnover. These measures were constructed from the Amadeus
database using German firms’ balance sheets by Felbermayr and Yalcin (2011).
The final dataset includes over 27,500 observations. The descriptive statistics are
listed in Table B.5. Financially unconstrained firms, exporters, and technology
adopters operate in more developed financial markets, are larger, and more often
foreign owned than financially constrained firms, non-exporters, and non-adopters.
27The results are equivalent to those in Chor and Manova (2012).
28There are only thirteen, very broadly defined, manufacturing industries. However, the surveys
also provide the ISIC 3-digit industry classification of each firm’s main product line. As a robustness
check, we match the Compustat measure to each of those industries using the concordance table
provided by the US Census Bureau. The results are similar (see Table B.12).
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Moreover, technology adopters operate in industries with higher external financing
needs and have a more skilled workforce than non-adopters. This descriptive evi-
dence underlines the importance for the empirical analysis, of controlling for firm
size, foreign ownership, and the skill composition of the workforce. Table B.7 gives
the descriptive statistics by firm size quartile. The share of exporters increases most
in the first three size quartiles, while the increase in the share of users of foreign
technology is largest between the third and fourth size quartiles. This is in line
with Predictions 2 and 3: financial development mostly affects the export decision
(foreign technology use) of firms in the lower (the fourth) size quartile. The descrip-
tive statistics by industry are shown in Table B.8. Substantial variation in average
firm size and skill composition of the workforce across industries strengthens the
assumption that technology is (at least in part) industry specific.
2.4 Empirics
This section provides an empirical test of the predictions made in Section 2.2.4.
First, we will outline the econometric strategy used for identification. Then, we will
study the impact of cross-country differences in financial market development on
export market participation and technology adoption.
2.4.1 Econometric Specification
A difference-in-difference type approach. In order to establish causality, we exploit
variation in financial market development across countries and in dependence on
external finance across industries. Both sources of variation are exogenous to the
firm. We thus compare firms in the same industry across countries and firms in the
same country across industries. From our model, it follows that firms active in the
same industry are more likely to have access to external finance (Prediction 1), ex-
port (Prediction 2), and use new, more advanced technologies (Prediction 3) if they
operate in a financially more developed country. The effect of financial development
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is likely to be more pronounced in industries that depend more on the use of exter-
nal finance (see e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Manova, 2011). Putting those two
statements together, a higher level of financial market development increases the
probability of having access to external finance, of exporting, and of using advanced
technologies, and especially so in industries that are more dependent on external
finance. This is the difference-in-difference type approach first proposed in Rajan
and Zingales (1998). The argument is formalized in the following index model.
Xikmt =













1 if β0 + β1FDmt × ExtDepk + β2FDmt
+β3Controlsikmt +Dm +Dk +Dt + ǫikmt > 0
0 otherwise













.
(2.14)
Here, Xikmt = {ConstrAccikmt, ConstrCostikmt, Exporterikmt, Emailikmt, Foreign
Technologyikmt}, respectively, is a dummy variable equal to one if firm i active in
industry k in country m and surveyed in year t reports, respectively, being financially
constrained (Prediction 1), being an exporter (Prediction 2), and using an advanced
technology (Prediction 3). Controlsikmt is a vector of firm level controls including
Sizeikmt, Foreignikmt, and Skillikmt.
29 These variables are expected to have a nega-
tive effect on the probability of being financially constrained and a positive effect on
the incidence of exporting and using advanced technology.30 The main variable of in-
terest is the interaction between financial development and external financing needs
FDmt × ExtDepk, which captures the prediction about within-country differences
between industries described above: financial development increases the probability
of exporting and advanced technology use disproportionately in industries with a
higher need for external finance. Hence, β1 is expected to be positive in the test of
Prediction 2 and 3 and negative when testing Prediction 1.
A major advantage of this difference-in-difference type approach is that it allows
29We exclude all state-owned firms from the sample. The results are similar if a state-ownership
dummy is included.
30In the theoretical model, both firm size and productivity are proportional to cik and thus
capture cost differences between firms. Therefore, Productivity is not included in the main speci-
fication. The results are unchanged if Productivity is included.
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controlling for country and industry characteristics. This makes the analysis robust
to omitted country and industry variables.31
In order to stress the importance of correcting for other country characteristics, we
estimate (2.14) without the interaction, subsequently controlling for other country
characteristics that might influence exporting and technology adoption (Table B.9).
Overall, financial development reduces (increases) the probability of being finan-
cially constrained (exporting and technology adoption). However, the sign and the
significance of the effect of FDmt depends on whether other country characteristics
are controlled for.
In addition to country and industry dummies, Dm and Dk, we include year dummies,
Dt, to control for the fact that the countries were surveyed in different years.
32 Note
that, in contrast to FDmt, ExtDepk is time invariant and captured by the industry
dummies.
Firm heterogeneity. The effect of financial market development on the decision
whether to export and which technology to use is likely to differ across the firm size
distribution (Prediction 2 and 3).
In order to study these heterogeneous effects, we define a set of dummies qkj, j =
1, ..., 4 and a set of triple interactions qkj × FDmt × ExtDepk, j = 1, ..., 4. qkj takes
the value one if the firm is in the jth quartile of the firm size distribution (in industry
k). We estimate the equation
Xikmt =β0 + β1FDmt × ExtDepk +
4
∑
j=1
βj1qkj × FDmt × ExtDepk
+ β2FDmt + β3Controlsikmt +Dm +Dk +Dt + ǫikmt, ∀qkj (2.15)
where Controlsikmt now includes the quartile dummies qk1, ..., qk4 instead of Sizeikmt.
Both (2.14) and (2.15) represent nonlinear models. Therefore, the sign of the in-
31In order to mitigate concerns about omitted firm level variables, we include, in addition, firm
age and a dummy equal to one if the firm is part of a multinational enterprise. The results are
given in Table B.10.
32Results are unchanged if country–time dummies are included.
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teraction terms, FDmt × ExtDepk and qkj × FDmt × ExtDepk, depends on the
value of the covariates and does not necessarily equal the sign of the marginal effect.
Although Ai, Norton, and Wang (2004), for example, explain how to compute the
correct marginal effect (at least for two interacted variables), the interpretation is
more straightforward when estimating a linear model. Hence, we estimate (2.14)
and (2.15) using a linear probability model.33
2.4.2 Results
Access to external finance. Table 2.1 presents the estimation of Equations (2.14)
and (2.15), where Xikmt is a dummy taking the value one if the firm reports being
financially constrained. This is the test of Prediction 1. In columns (1) and (2), the
measurement of the financial constrainedness is based on cost of financing, and in
columns (3) and (4) on reduced access to financing. Columns (1) and (3) contain
the results for the baseline regression and columns (2) and (4) include the quartile
interactions. The dummy for the fourth quartile (qk4) and the corresponding triple
interaction (qk4 × FDmt × ExtDepk) have been omitted and serve as a reference
group.
The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant in the baseline
regression for cost of financing. Financial development reduces the cost of financing
and especially so in industries that depend more on the use of external finance. The
coefficient of the interaction is also negative but insignificant if financial constraints
are measured by reduced access to financing.
Financial market development decreases the costs of obtaining external finance, in
particular for larger firms. This follows from the positive coefficient of the inter-
actions of FDmt × ExtDepk with the dummies for the first, second, and third firm
size quartile (column (2)). A possible explanation is that at lower levels of financial
market development, larger firms have access to external finance: but at very high
costs. Increased access to external finance through financial market development is
33The drawback of estimating a linear probability model is that for certain combinations of the
regressors, the predicted probabilities might be larger than one or less than zero. For the results
presented in the tables below, the predicted probabilities are for the most part between 0 and 1.
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Dependent variable: ConstrCost ConstrAcc
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FD × ExtDep -0.004* -0.014** -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002)
q1 × FD × ExtDep 0.017** -0.001
(0.006) (0.003)
q2 × FD × ExtDep 0.015* 0.005*
(0.008) (0.002)
q3 × FD × ExtDep 0.017*** -0.000
(0.004) (0.003)
Foreign -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.081*** -0.082***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
q1 0.005 0.042***
(0.016) (0.009)
q2 0.022 0.042***
(0.014) (0.008)
q3 0.015 0.038***
(0.010) (0.009)
Size -0.003 -0.012***
(0.005) (0.003)
FD -0.076 -0.081 0.093 0.088
(0.127) (0.126) (0.259) (0.259)
No. Obs. 19719 19719 26718 26718
R2 0.159 0.160 0.308 0.309
All estimations include country, industry, and year dummies.
Standard errors clustered at the industry level in parentheses.
Significance levels: *10%,**5%, ***1%.
Table 2.1: Access to external finance
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less pronounced for firms in the second (as compared to the fourth) size quartile
(column (4)).
The estimated coefficients of the firm level controls show the expected signs. Larger
and foreign-owned firms are less likely to be financially constrained.
Entry into export markets. The empirical test of Prediction 2 is presented in
Dependent variable: Exporter
(1) (2)
FD× ExtDep 0.015*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.001)
q1 × FD× ExtDep 0.011
(0.007)
q2 × FD× ExtDep 0.013***
(0.004)
q3 × FD× ExtDep 0.008***
(0.002)
Foreign 0.177*** 0.198***
(0.012) (0.012)
q1 -0.492***
(0.030)
q2 -0.402***
(0.020)
q3 -0.229***
(0.012)
Size 0.133***
(0.007)
FD 0.161* 0.159*
(0.075) (0.083)
No. Obs. 26975 26975
R2 0.308 0.295
Country, industry, and year dummies.
Standard errors clustered at the industry
level in parentheses. Significance levels:
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Table 2.2: Entry into export markets
Table 2.2. The coefficient of the interaction between financial development and the
dependence on external finance is positive and highly significant: financial market
development disproportionately increases export market participation in industries
that have strong external financing needs. This effect works through firms in the
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lower quartiles of the size distribution (column (2)). Financial market development
thus has a larger effect on the smaller and medium-sized firms, which, at a lower
level of financial market development, are less likely to serve the foreign market.
The firm level determinants of export behavior show the expected sign. Larger and
foreign owned firms have a higher probability of exporting. This is in line with
existing studies of firms’ export behavior.
Use of advanced technologies. Table 2.3 presents the empirical test of Prediction
3 for the two possible sorting patterns. In columns (1) and (2), the measure-
Dependent variable: Email ForeignTechnology
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FD × ExtDep -0.002 -0.015*** 0.008*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
q1 × FD × ExtDep 0.032*** -0.020***
(0.006) (0.002)
q2 × FD × ExtDep 0.031*** -0.006*
(0.005) (0.003)
q3 × FD × ExtDep 0.012** -0.006**
(0.004) (0.002)
Foreign 0.072*** 0.096*** 0.199*** 0.213***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.025) (0.024)
Skill 0.047** 0.045** 0.028*** 0.026***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.008) (0.007)
q1 -0.443*** -0.162***
(0.026) (0.011)
q2 -0.290*** -0.130***
(0.024) (0.010)
q3 -0.124*** -0.095***
(0.015) (0.009)
Size 0.117*** 0.053***
(0.007) (0.004)
FD -0.121 -0.176* 0.550 0.592
(0.101) (0.097) (0.381) (0.407)
No. Obs. 22782 22782 13924 13924
R2 0.326 0.325 0.141 0.132
Country, industry, and year dummies. Standard errors clustered
at the industry level in parentheses. Significance levels:
*10%,**5%, ***1%.
Table 2.3: Use of advanced technologies
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ment of technology adoption is based on use of e-mail. This measure corresponds
to sorting pattern XA and captures investment in lower-cost technologies. Hence,
the marginal technology adopter is a small firm and financial market development is
expected to have the largest effect on firms at the lower end of the firm size distribu-
tion. In columns (3) and (4), technology adoption is measured by foreign technology
use. This measure captures costly investments (sorting pattern AX). Therefore,
financial market development should mostly affect larger firms.
The results are in line with these theoretical predictions. The overall effect of the
interaction between financial development and dependence on external finance is not
significant in the baseline regression for use of e-mail (column (1)). It is significantly
negative when the quartile interactions are included but less so for firms in the lower
quartiles of the size distribution (column (2)). Smaller firms are not able to invest
if financial constraints are more severe.
The estimated coefficient of the interaction term is positive and highly significant
in the regression for foreign technology use. Hence, financial market development
increases the likelihood of using costly new technologies and especially so in more
financially dependent industries. This effect works through the largest firms: this
follows from the negative, and significant, coefficients of the lower quartile interac-
tions (column (4)).
A higher level of financial development, by increasing firms’ access to external fi-
nance, reduces the missing technology adoption: it allows previously constrained
firms to invest in advanced technologies. Size has a positive and highly significant
effect on a firm’s use of advanced technology. The largest firms are indeed the most
likely to invest in more efficient production technologies. Foreign-owned firms have
a higher probability of advanced technology use than domestic-owned firms. This
might be due to the fact that foreign firms have easier access to better technologies
and to external finance. A larger fraction of non-production workers is associated
with a higher probability of technology adoption.
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2.5 Sensitivity Tests
2.5.1 Measurement of Financial Development and External
Financial Dependence
The identification of a causal effect of the level of financial market development (in
industries with high need for credit) on firms’ investment hinges on the measure-
ment of (i) the level of financial market development and (ii) the industries’ need
for external finance.
Alternative measures of financial market development. The main measure of fi-
nancial market development, private credit plus stock market capitalization over
GDP, captures the actual use of external finance in a country, an outcome that
might well be influenced by institutional determinants other than the financial sys-
tem. Therefore, we examine the robustness of our results to alternative measures of
financial market development. In particular, we use the measures of the rule of law,
the risk of expropriation, and the repudiation of contracts compiled by LaPorta,
Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). These measures capture the contrac-
tual environment, that is, the institutional setting that determines the enforcement
of contracts: the rule of law provides an “assessment of the law and order tradition
in the country;” the risk of expropriation reflects the “risk of outright confiscation or
forced nationalization;” and the third measure captures the repudiation of contracts
by government (LaPorta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998, p. 1124).
All three measures are based on the International Country Risk (ICR) guide and
are provided on a zero to ten scale with higher scores for more of a tradition of law
or for greater risks of expropriation and repudiation of contracts. The measures are
time invariant and available only for a subset of the countries.34
34In LaPorta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), higher scores imply less risk of
expropriation or repudiation of contracts.
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The results are displayed in Table 2.4. They are qualitatively similar to those using
private credit as a measure of financial market development.
Alternative measures of external financial dependence. The Rajan and Zingales mea-
sure of external financial dependence quantifies sectors’ needs for external finance.
However, sectoral demand for credit might respond to a country’s level of finan-
cial development, and is therefore potentially endogenous. Moreover, the notion
of the United States having the most developed financial system worldwide might
be true for the 1980s, the period considered in Rajan and Zingales (1998), but not
necessarily for the years close to the millenium analyzed in this paper. Hence, the
assumption that the sectoral ranking with respect to financial dependence computed
from US data carries over to other countries, might be suject to doubt.
We therefore consider a number of alternative measures of sectoral financial vul-
nerability suggested by the recent literature. Moreover, these measures have been
calculated from German balance sheet data by Felbermayr and Yalcin (2011) and
thus represent an alternative to the measures based on US data. In particular, we
consider the fraction of tangible assets in total assets, trade credit received, and the
liquidity ratio (current liabilities over current assets). The first measure has been
suggested by Feenstra, Zhiyuan, and Miaojie (2011) and quantifies the fraction of
collateralizable assets. The second and third measures are taken from Askenazy,
Caldera, Gaulier, and Irac (2011) and capture firms’ liquidity constraints and abili-
ties to meet their obligations. Less collateral, less trade credit received, and a higher
liquidity ratio, each imply a higher degree of financial vulnerability.
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The results using these measures are globally similar to those derived in Section
2.4.2 (Table 2.5). Financial market development increases the exports of smaller
firms, especially in industries with low trade credit received and industries with an,
on average, high liquidity ratio. A higher level of financial development increases
the probability of small firms using e-mail, and this is particularly true in industries
with small levels of trade credit and tangible assets, and high liquidity ratios. The
probability of larger firms using foreign technologies increases especially in industries
with high liquidity ratios, and (in contrast to our assumption) a higher fracton of
tangible assets and trade credit received.
2.5.2 Heckscher–Ohlin Sources of Comparative Advantage
Financially developed countries have a comparative advantage in industries with a
high dependence on external finance. However, the interaction between financial
market development and external financial dependence might also capture tradi-
tional sources of comparative advantage. Table 2.6 therefore includes, in addition
to FD×ExtDep, countries’ (log) per capita endowment of human and physical cap-
ital, and natural resources interacted with industries’ respective factor intensities.
We construct human and physical capital endowment as outlined in Caselli (2005).
The data of natural resource endowments are taken from World Bank (1997), and
the sectoral factor intensities are from Braun (2003). Controlling for traditional,
Heckscher–Ohlin type, sources of comparative advantage does not change the im-
pact of financial market development on the probability of exporting and of investing
in new technologies.
2.5.3 Analysis of Subsamples
The effect of financial market development might differ across types of firms.
Therefore, we estimate (2.14) by firm age and ownership, and by the country’s
income group. Table (2.7) reports the estimated coefficient of the interaction FDmt×
ExtDepk.
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Dependent variable: Exporter Email ForeignTechnology
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FD × ExtDep 0.013*** 0.006*** -0.001 -0.015*** 0.008*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
q1 × FD × ExtDep 0.010 0.033*** -0.020***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
q2 × FD × ExtDep 0.013*** 0.031*** -0.007**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
q3 × FD × ExtDep 0.008*** 0.012*** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
K/L -0.971 -0.538 -2.300*** -2.076*** 1.323*** 1.349***
(0.551) (0.599) (0.618) (0.564) (0.250) (0.250)
H/L -0.570 -0.328
(0.335) (0.400)
N/L 1.277 -0.202 2.032 1.282 1.265*** 1.292***
(1.096) (1.175) (2.318) (2.283) (0.229) (0.222)
K/L × K intensity 1.476** 1.471** 0.317 0.374 -0.280* -0.355**
(0.572) (0.559) (0.263) (0.230) (0.145) (0.159)
H/L × H intensity 0.411*** 0.408*** -0.020 -0.001 -0.140 -0.125
(0.135) (0.129) (0.116) (0.113) (0.087) (0.093)
N/L × N intensity -0.010 -0.007 0.029* 0.028** -0.004 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005)
Foreign 0.166*** 0.189*** 0.060*** 0.087*** 0.201*** 0.216***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.025) (0.024)
Skill 0.040** 0.038** 0.027*** 0.025***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007)
q1 -0.491*** -0.449*** -0.162***
(0.030) (0.023) (0.011)
q2 -0.405*** -0.294*** -0.128***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.010)
q3 -0.231*** -0.127*** -0.097***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.008)
Size 0.136*** 0.119*** 0.054***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
FD -1.043 0.230 -1.915 -1.328 0.993*** 1.028***
(0.933) (1.148) (2.060) (2.013) (0.279) (0.294)
No. Obs. 22140 22140 18388 18388 13323 13323
R2 0.314 0.301 0.340 0.339 0.145 0.136
All estimations include country, industry, and year dummies. Standard errors clustered at
the industry level in parentheses. Significance levels:*10%,**5%, ***1%.
Table 2.6: Heckscher–Ohlin sources of comparative advantage
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Dep. variable: Exporter Email ForeignTechnology
Est. Obs. Est. Obs. Est. Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age New 0.009*** 9219 -0.004 7940 0.006*** 4244
Old 0.015*** 15996 -0.001 13340 0.008*** 8750
Ownership Foreign 0.001 3194 -0.005** 2880 0.008 1647
Domestic 0.018*** 23781 0.001 19902 0.007*** 12277
Inc. group Low -0.049 2438 -0.061* 2255 0.108*** 1088
Lower-middle 0.021*** 11216 0.011*** 10258 0.013*** 6201
Upper-middle 0.008** 11309 -0.006*** 8328 0.006*** 6586
High -0.020** 2012 -0.026*** 1941 0.119*** 49
Country, industry, and year dummies. Standard errors clustered at the industry level in
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%,**5%, ***1%.
Table 2.7: Sample split with respect to firm age, ownership, and income group
First, we estimate (2.14) separately for firms which are younger (“new”) and for firms
which are older than ten years (“old”). There is no significantly different effect of
financial market development on the export and technology adoption probability of
new and old firms. The results are similar if (2.14) is estimated for firms which are
younger and older than five years. This is in line with the results in Table B.10. age
does not enter significantly.
Second, we look at domestic versus foreign owned firms. We find that domestic firms
respond to financial market development with a higher probability of exporting and
investing in foreign technologies whereas financial development does not seem to
affect foreign owned firms. This finding is consistent with the idea that foreign
owned firms might tap internal sources and are not as financially constrained as
domestic firms, whose only source of external finance is the local financial market.
The World Bank classifies countries according to their GNI per capita. Countries
belong either to the low, lower-middle, upper-middle, or high income group.35 The
strength of the response to financial development varies across income groups. The
effect on the use of e-mail is largest in lower-middle income countries, and the effect
on the export probability works through firms in middle-income countries. These
results are in line with the assumption that the use of email is less costly than
exporting.
35See http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications for more information.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of financially constrained firms to derive predictions on
the effect of cross-country differences in financial development on technology adop-
tion. Using data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, we provide new firm
level evidence on the impact of financial market development on the decision to in-
vest in more advanced technologies. In particular, we show that barriers to external
financing, which follow from a lack of financial development, explain cross-country
differences in the use of advanced technologies. Financial market development thus
reduces the missing technology adoption. This has important policy implications,
as the adoption of more efficient technologies is considered to be an engine of eco-
nomic growth. Moreover, we show that the effect of financial market development
differs across the firm size distribution: for new technologies associated with low
investment costs, the effect is largest on small firms. For high-cost investments, on
the other hand, financial market development mostly affects very large firms. This
is important for policy design. Depending on which technology is to be diffused,
policy makers need to target primarily smaller or larger firms. If the government
wanted to promote the use of e-mail, smaller firms need to be targeted. In the case
of a government-led expansion of machinery industries, technology adoption in large
firms has to be fostered.
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Chapter 3
Credit Constraints and the
Margins of International Trade:
Evidence from Eastern European
Firms∗
3.1 Introduction
It is well established that financial market development matters for economic growth.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) for example show in their seminal contribution that
industries with high demand for external finance grow faster in financially developed
countries. In the context of international trade, financial development has been
shown to act as a source of comparative advantage. Financially advanced countries
export larger volumes, a wider range of products, and to a larger number of markets.
These effects are magnified in industries with high demand for external finance
(see Beck, 2002, 2003; Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2005; Berthou, 2010; Manova, 2011).
Recent theoretical research has attempted to explain these patterns at the firm level:
there are entry costs to exporting which must be paid ex-ante. If access to credit
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Fergal McCann.
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is constrained, a range of potential exporters are not able to trade internationally.
Understanding to what extent credit constraints affect participation in international
trade is crucial to policy makers given that entry into international markets has been
shown to increase productivity, both on the export (De Loecker, 2007) and on the
import side (Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008; McCann, 2011).
This paper provides an empirical test of the hypothesis that credit constraints affect
firms’ participation in international trade. We examine the impact of credit con-
straints on the import and export decision of firms, using data from the Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS). BEEPS are firm level
surveys conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
the World Bank in a large number of Eastern European and former CIS countries.
These countries are not among the most financially advanced worldwide and, at
the same time, very heterogeneous in their level of economic and financial market
development and therefore ideal for our purpose.
Moreover, surveyed firms are asked about their export and import behavior, and
their financial situation. The latter information allows us to directly identify credit
constrained firms. Previous studies have often relied on outcome variables from
firms’ balance sheets, such as leverage and liquidity, to proxy for credit constraints.
There are a number of studies that use survey data to construct direct measures of
credit constraints. However, these studies mostly classify firms as credit constrained
if the firm’s credit application was rejected (see e.g. Cole, 1998; Cole, Goldberg,
and White, 2004). Our measure considers not only firms with unsuccessful credit
applications as credit constrained but also captures firms which are discouraged from
applying for credit for reasons such as high interest rates, corruption or collateral
requirements. Hence, we identify all firms with a demand for but no access to credit.
Thereby, we avoid an important source of bias, as recent research outside the field
of international trade indicates that not accounting for credit demand impedes the
correct identification of financially constrained firms (Hainz and Nabokin, 2012). We
show that taking into account credit demand leads in some instances to a doubling
of the estimated effect of credit constraints on the probability to export.
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Credit constraints are potentially endogenous to the firm’s export and import de-
cision. Unobserved factors might affect both the level of credit constraints and the
firm’s trade status. Moreover, firms might be more or less credit constrained due
to their desire to trade internationally. Controlling for these sources of endogeneity
represents a major challenge when studying the impact of credit constraints. We
show that jointly estimating the import (export) and credit constraints equation
in a bivariate probit setting allows to ignore the potential endogeneity bias. Fur-
thermore, the cross-country nature of the data allows country- and sector-varying
instruments to be used to identify the effect of credit constraints on a firm’s import
and export decision. We are thus able to provide robust evidence on the impact of
credit constraints on the international trading behavior of firms in Eastern Europe.
We find that credit constraints reduce the export probability of both manufacturing
and service firms. Credit constraints also have a negative impact on a firm’s decision
to import material inputs and supplies. Estimated average treatment effects suggest
that the existence of credit constraints lowers the probability that a firm will export
and import by 17 and 33 per cent, respectively.
Our paper is among the first to study the impact of credit constraints on the ex-
port probability of firms in the BEEPS countries (see also Bernard, Stabilito, and
Donghoon Yoo, 2010), and, as far as we know, the first one to study the impact on
the import probability.
It contributes to three strands of literature. First, it is related to theoretical work on
the relationship between financing constraints and the export and import behavior
of firms (e.g. Chaney, 2005; Manova, 2011). The empirical results presented in this
paper are in line with this micro-level channel between financial development and
international trade.
Second, our work contributes to the growing body of empirical studies on the ef-
fect of financial constraints on exporting (Greenaway, Guariglia, and Kneller, 2007;
Muûls, 2008; Forlani, 2010; Berman and Héricourt, 2010; Bellone, Musso, Nesta,
and Schiavo, 2010; Minetti and Zhu, 2011) and importing (Bas and Berthou, 2012;
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Eck, Engemann, and Schnitzer, 2012). These studies find that the effect of credit
constraints is more pronounced on the extensive than on the intensive margin of
international trade. In line with our results, they generally report a significant
negative effect of credit constraints on firms’ export participation. In studying the
effect of credit constraints on both the exporting and importing behavior of firms,
this paper’s scope is wider than previous research, which has focused uniquely on
one side of the firm’s international trade operations.36 Apart from Bas and Berthou
(2012) and Eck, Engemann, and Schnitzer (2012), the effect of credit constraints on
importing has received surprisingly little attention in the literature thus far, given
that previous theoretical (Ethier, 1982; Kasahara and Lapham, 2008) and empirical
(McCann, 2011; Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008) literature suggests that the import-
ing of intermediate inputs can lead to productivity gains.
In considering firms in the service sector separately from manufacturing firms, our
paper also contributes to the growing literature on the characteristics of firms en-
gaging in cross-border trade in services (Breinlich and Criscuolo, 2011; McCann and
Toubal, 2012). Breinlich and Criscuolo (2011) report that only the more productive
service firms participate in international trade. To our knowledge, we are the first to
study the impact of credit constraints on the export behavior of service firms. We
show that the negative impact of credit constraints documented for manufacturing
firms persists when considering service firms.
Third, our work also contributes to a larger literature on the effect of credit mar-
ket imperfections on the economic peformance of firms, stretching back to Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988). Recent research has shown that credit constraints
can have highly deleterious effects on a range of firm attributes such as employ-
ment, marketing expenditure, and technology investment (Campello, Graham, and
Harvey, 2010; Peters, 2012).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides the theoretical background to
our empirical analysis. Section 3.3 describes the data used and Section 3.4 outlines
36A notable exception is Eck, Engemann, and Schnitzer (2012).
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the empirical methodology applied. Results and robustness checks are reported in
Section 3.5 and 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Background
Our empirical analysis is inspired by the theoretical literature on the relationship
between financial market development and the export and import behavior of firms.
In particular, we take to the data the predictions of theoretical work on the effect
of credit constraints on a firm’s decision to trade internationally. This strand of
literature is to a large extent based on the work of Melitz (2003) and Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008). The idea here is that starting to export is costly and that these
costs have to be paid ex-ante. Only the more productive firms are able to overcome
these costs and self select into exporting.
Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) assume a perfect financial market.
Hence, firms do not face financing constraints when it comes to paying the upfront
costs of exporting. Recently, a growing number of studies introduce financing con-
straints into theoretical models of firms’ international trading behavior. Chaney
(2005) assumes that firms cannot borrow externally. There are two sources of in-
ternal funds: domestic profits and a random domestic liquidity shock. Potential
exporters are then able to export only if they are very productive and generate high
domestic profits or dispose of a large amount of exogenous liquidity. Chaney (2005)
shows that there is a non-empty set of firms which are prevented from exporting by
liquidity constraints.
In Manova (2011), firms need external finance for a fixed fraction of the upfront
costs of exporting. There is imperfect enforcement of credit contracts: creditors
are not repaid with positive probability and therefore require a higher repayment
in order to break even. Only the more productive firms offer creditors high enough
revenues from exporting to cover the repayment and get credit. Other studies have
emphasized additional reasons for credit constraints, as for example moral hazard
issues (Zia, 2008 based on Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) and foreign market risk
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(Eck, Engemann, and Schnitzer, 2012). In the presence of credit constraints, there
is thus a range of firms that could profitably export (import) but are either denied
a loan or discouraged from accepting (or even applying for) a loan by high interest
rates or collateral requirements.
The literature thus predicts that, given other firm characteristics, credit constrained
firms are less likely to export (import). In the following section, we describe the
data used to test this prediction.
3.3 Data
The firm level data used come from the Business Environment and Enterprise Per-
formance Survey (BEEPS), which is collected by The European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. This database collects
information on, inter alia, a firm’s sales, exports, imports, outsourcing, employment,
wages, ownership, investment, and opinions on corruption and institutional quality.
Data are collected for 28 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia for 2002,
2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009.37 The EBRD states that “the survey universe was de-
fined as commercial, service or industrial business establishments with at least five
full-time employees”. The statistical sampling technique used is stratified random
sampling. The three levels of stratification used were industry, establishment size
and region. Due to limited availability of data on credit constraints, regression anal-
ysis focuses on the years 2005, 2008 and 2009. The sample size by country and year
that can be used in regressions is given in Table C.1. The data used will be a pooled
cross section of firms across these three years.
37Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
FYROM, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mon-
tenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan. Due to the non-availability of country level variables, observations for Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Bosnia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan are dropped.
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3.3.1 Explanatory Variables
We define two dummy variables, Importer and Exporter, that take the value one if
the firm reports to import any of its material inputs directly and export any of its
output directly. Foreign ownership is captured by a dummy variable that is equal to
one if more than 0 per cent of the [...] firm is owned by private foreign individuals,
companies or organizations.38 Employment, that is, the logarithm of the number of
permanent workers (Size), is also used as a control variable, as is labor productivity
(Productivity), calculated as the difference between the logarithm of of sales and
the logarithm of the number of workers.
Figures for nominal monetary variables are given in local currency units. We nor-
malize these variables by converting them to US dollar figures using the mean yearly
exchange rate from the IMF International Financial Statistics database.
3.3.2 Credit Constraints
Previous research has used an array of methods to proxy for credit constraints. The
much-debated method of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) identifies credit
constraints based on the sensitivity of investments to internal cash resources. This
approach has been applied by Forlani (2010). Another strand of literature has used
balance sheet data such as leverage and liquidity as proxies for financial constraints
(see, for example, Greenaway, Guariglia, and Kneller, 2007; Berman and Héricourt,
2010; Bas and Berthou, 2012). Muûls (2008) takes the novel approach of using a pri-
vate credit analysis firm’s bankrupcy risk score to proxy credit constraints. Bellone,
Musso, Nesta, and Schiavo (2010) also fall into this category, creating a composite
index from seven indicators of financial health and leverage. A third strand of the
literature focuses on survey-based measures of credit constraints, combined with
controls at the country, sector or regional level which mitigate the cross-sectional,
non-panel structure of such surveys. Such a measure is used by Minetti and Zhu
380.5 per cent of the foreign firms in our sample are between 1 and 10 per cent foreign-owned.
Results are identical if the foreign ownership dummy is based on 10 per cent foreign ownership.
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(2011) who identify credit rationed firms by combining two survey responses: (i) “In
2000, would the firm have liked to obtain more credit at the market interest rate?”
and (ii) “In 2000, did the firm demand more credit than it actually obtained?”.
Firms responding positively to both questions are considered “strongly rationed”
while those responding affirmatively to only (i) are considered “weakly rationed”.
Outside the international trade literature, such survey based measures of credit con-
straints have been used by Brown, Ongena, Popov, and Yesin (2011), Ferrando and
Griesshaber (2011), Hainz and Nabokin (2012) and Holton, Lawless, and McCann
(2012).
Among papers in the international trade literature, our method matches most closely
the survey-based instrument approach of Minetti and Zhu (2011). We provide an
alternative survey-based definition of credit constraints which captures a wider range
of constrained firms. In particular, we capture also discouraged firms, that is, firms
with a demand for credit who may not have applied to the lending institution for a
loan.39 Firms are asked two questions40:
1. Did this establishment apply for any new loans or new lines of credit that were
rejected in [the] last fiscal year?
2. What was the main reason why this establishment did not apply for any line
of credit or loan in [the] last fiscal year?
Question (1) can be answered by either “yes” or “no”. We code firms responding
“yes” to (1) as credit constrained. Question (2) has a range of responses:
1. No need for a loan - establishment has sufficient capital.
2. Application procedures for loans or lines of credit are complicated.
3. Interest rates are not favorable.
4. Collateral requirements are too high.
39The survey does not ask firms explicitly whether they were offered a credit facility and then
refused it due to the terms and conditions attached. It is possible that such firms respond as
“rejected” or as “discouraged” due to interest rates, however we cannot verify this in the data.
40See http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/beeps_02_05_09_notes_labels.pdf.
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5. Size of loan or maturity are insufficient.
6. It is necessary to make informal payments to get bank loans.
7. Did not think it would be approved.
The first column of Table 3.1 lists the relative importance of the different reasons for
non-application of all firms answering Question (2). We code all firms that respond
Question (2) with 1. as unconstrained firms. All firms who responded with 2. to 7.
are coded as constrained. This represents a wider range of firms captured as credit
constrained than in previous research. Not only do we capture firms that did not get
credit upon applying, we also capture firms that opt out of the credit market due
to conditions associated with credit applications such as complicated procedures,
interest rates, collateral requirements, insufficient quantities, corruption or a belief
that rejection was likely.
Of the 9417 firms in our regression sample, 3219 report to have applied for a new
credit.
477 firms (5 per cent of the firms in our regression sample) did not receive credit
upon applying (answer “yes” to Question (1)). These firms are coded as credit
constrained.
6236 firms (66 per cent) report not to have been rejected for a credit (answer “no” to
Question (1)). Out of these firms (that also answered Question (2)), 57 per cent did
not apply for a credit because they have no credit demand while 43 per cent were
discouraged from applying by the conditions associated with credit applications (see
second column of Table 3.1). Classifying only firms which report a rejected credit
application as credit constrained (see e.g. Cole, 1998; Cole, Goldberg, and White,
2004) implies that the latter firms are classified as not credit constrained. We
argue that these firms have demand for credit but are discouraged by unfavorable
conditions associated with credit applications and are thus credit constrained.
2704 firms (29 per cent) of the firms in our regression sample do not report an answer
to Question (1). These firms are treated as missing observations when classifying
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only firms which report a rejected credit application as credit constrained. Out of
these firms, 26 per cent were discouraged from applying for a credit (answer 2. to
7. to Question (2), see third column of Table 3.1). They are thus on average more
credit constrained than the firms in our regression sample (26 per cent instead of 16
per cent in the regression sample).
Both, omitting these firms and misclassification of discouraged firms as not credit
constrained are likely to lead to a downward bias in the estimated impact of credit
constraints on importing and exporting.
Q. (2) “no” to No answer
Q. (1) to Q.(1)
No need for a loan 66.34 56.62 74.19
Complicated application procedures 4.45 3.77 4.96
High interest rates 10.63 6.71 13.79
High collateral requirements 3.31 3.31 4.14
Insufficient size or maturity 0.68 0.00 1.22
Informal payment necessary 0.25 0.09 0.37
Did not think it would be approved 1.52 1.75 1.33
Other 0.78 1.75 0.00
Multiple answers 11.57 26.07 0.00
Total 100 100 100
Share of firms stating respective main reason(s) for non-application among all firms:
answering Question (2); answering Question (1) with “no”; not answering
Question (1).
Table 3.1: Main reason(s) not to apply for a new loan
Table 3.2 reports the share of credit constrained firms by country in our regression
sample. The first three columns display the share of constrained firms according to
the measure of credit constraints based on rejected credit applications. The share of
constrained firms according to our measure are reported in the last three columns.
Taking into account credit demand increases the share of credit constrained firms in
every country except Turkey. Moreover, we see that credit constraints vary widely
across countries, from a low of 6.7 per cent of firms in Slovenia to a high of 27.7 per
cent in Kyrgyzstan. A cusory glance at the data suggests that wealthier countries to
the geographic west of our sample tend towards lower incidence of credit constrained
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firms. Figure C.1 confirms a negative relationship between the logarithm of GDP
per capita and credit constraints.
Rejected application With credit demand
Country Unconstr. Constr. Obs. Unconstr. Constr. Obs.
% % No. % % No.
Albania 94.8 5.2 134 90.8 9.2 152
Armenia 96.0 4.0 379 82.6 17.4 524
Bulgaria 94.1 5.9 269 80.2 19.8 410
Croatia 94.9 5.1 196 90.5 9.5 241
Czech Republic 93.8 6.2 339 84.4 15.6 423
Estonia 93.6 6.4 281 91.5 8.5 390
FYROM 89.9 10.1 199 75.7 24.3 366
Georgia 91.7 8.3 242 82.2 17.8 365
Hungary 98.1 1.9 530 91.8 8.2 692
Kazakhstan 92.4 7.6 543 79.5 20.5 776
Kyrgyz Rep. 90.4 9.6 197 72.3 27.7 310
Latvia 89.3 10.7 233 81.4 18.6 344
Lithuania 94.6 5.4 258 86.8 13.2 357
Moldova 91.5 8.5 376 80.7 19.3 538
Poland 95.6 4.4 825 85.3 14.7 981
Russia 89.6 10.4 683 79.0 21.0 981
Slovakia 96.6 3.4 206 88.9 11.1 315
Slovenia 95.2 4.8 336 93.3 6.7 434
Turkey 83.8 16.2 487 85.1 14.9 818
Total 92.9 7.1 6713 83.9 16.1 9417
Table 3.2: Share of credit constrained and unconstrained firms by country
One might expect that financial development leads to improvements in credit access
for firms. The relationship between financial development, as measured by the ratio
of bank credit to GDP (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2009), is shown to be very
mildly positively correlated with credit constraints for our sample countries (Figure
C.2). This suggests caution should be used in making inferences from such measures
alone, which proxy financial development using a stock variable which captures the
built-up output of years of behavior on the part of financial institutions. A country
may have gone through a boom in credit provision, and subsequently entered a
period of recession, making access to finance extremely difficult for firms, despite a
higher outstanding stock of credit in the economy.
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Table 3.3 shows the cross-sector variation in credit constraints. There is less varia-
tion across sectors than across countries, with the share of constrained firms ranging
from 9.6 per cent in basic metals to 21.2 in the garments sector. In addition to man-
ufacturing firms, our sample includes firms in the wholesale, retail, other services,
hotels and restaurants, transport, and IT services sectors. This allows us to con-
tribute to the growing literature on international trade in services (Breinlich and
Criscuolo, 2011; McCann and Toubal, 2012).
Table 3.4 shows that the share of constrained firms increased from 2005 to 2008 to
2009, as one would expect given the proliferation of the global financial crisis from
2008 onwards. When credit constraints are measured based on rejected applications,
the share of constrained firms decreases slightly between 2008 and 2009. This might
be due to the fact that the number of credit applications — that is, the demand for
credit — decreased.
Rejected application With credit demand
Sector Unconstr. Constr. Obs. Unconst. Constr. Obs.
% % No. % % No.
Food 93.1 6.9 824 86.0 14.0 1083
Textiles 89.8 10.2 167 85.3 14.7 258
Garments 91.7 8.3 432 78.9 21.1 592
Chemicals 85.9 14.1 149 83.7 16.3 233
Plastics & rubber 88.7 11.3 97 81.6 18.4 141
Non metallic mineral prod. 88.3 11.7 137 85.4 14.6 240
Basic metals 96.0 4.0 50 90.4 9.6 73
Fabricate metal products 94.8 5.2 460 83.8 16.2 594
Machinery and equipment 92.3 7.7 336 82.7 17.3 421
Electronics 87.5 12.5 32 87.0 13.0 69
Construction 92.0 8.0 722 83.8 16.2 995
Other services 96.6 3.4 804 87.5 12.5 889
Wholesale 93.3 6.7 568 86.9 13.1 794
Retail 91.6 8.4 1150 79.8 20.2 1926
Hotel and restaurants 96.7 3.3 270 87.4 12.6 413
Transport 93.4 6.6 452 85.5 14.5 592
IT 93.7 6.3 63 88.5 11.5 104
Total 92.9 7.1 6713 83.9 16.1 9417
Table 3.3: Share of credit constrained and unconstrained firms by sector
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Rejected application With credit demand
Year Unconstr. Constr. Obs. Unconstr. Constr. Obs.
% % No. % % No.
2005 97.2 2.8 4346 89.4 10.6 4346
2008 84.0 16.0 593 83.5 16.5 1047
2009 85.3 14.7 1774 78.1 21.9 4024
Total 92.9 7.1 6713 83.9 16.1 9417
Table 3.4: Share of credit constrained and unconstrained firms by year
3.3.3 Instruments
A simple regression that attempts to determine the impact of credit constraints on
the likelihood of exporting or importing may be biased both because of omitted
variables and reverse causality. A firm that is credit constrained due to the lender
screening it on the basis of poor credit quality may be unable to participate in
international trade for precisely the same reason. While we control for factors such
as firm size, ownership, and productivity to attempt to alleviate such a concern, the
possibility that unobserved factors, such as managerial quality or agency problems
among firms’ stakeholders, drive both credit constraints and trade cannot be ruled
out. Furthermore, entering into export or import markets may improve a firm’s
financial health which then makes it a more attractive proposition for lenders, thus
easing credit constraints. Alternatively, a firm might find it more difficult to obtain
external finance as lenders perceive international activities as riskier than domestic
ones. In these cases, firms are more or less credit constrained just because they
want to trade internationally. For these reasons, care must be taken in inferring
causal effects from credit constraints to international trade status. The cross-country
nature of the firm level data used in this paper facilitates the search for variables
that affect credit constraints while plausibly having no effect on the international
trade status of a firm. We utilize three such variables, which vary at the firm level,
country-sector level and country level, respectively.
At the firm level, we use the response to the question whether the firm has pay-
ments overdue by more than 90 days (Overdue). This variable has previously been
used in a similar way as a proxy for liquidity constraints by Gorodnichenko and
84
Credit Constraints and the Margins of International Trade
Schnitzer (2012). A firm that is liquidity constrained is also likely to suffer from
credit constraints as a result.
At the sector-country level, we create an interaction variable between a country’s
level of investor protection and a sector’s dependence on external finance (Disclosure×
ExtDep). The value of this interaction variable is larger for firms in sectors that are
more dependent on external finance, in countries where transparency in investor
protection is higher. The external financial dependence measure is calculated as
in Rajan and Zingales (1998). The need for external finance is defined as “capi-
tal expenditures minus cash flow from operations divided by capital expenditures”
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998, p. 564) and is computed using Standard and Poor’s
Compustat North America database. This database contains financial information
of all publicly listed US based firms. The idea is that the US has one of the most
developed financial systems worldwide and that therefore, the amount of external
finance used by US firms best reflects sectoral demand for credit. We compute for
each firm the average use of external finance over the period 1996–2005 in order to
smooth temporal fluctuations and then take the median for each industry.
The measure of investor protection used comes from the World Bank Doing Business
data base. The Extent of Disclosure Index measures the requirements on approval
and disclosure of related-party transactions. The measure is constructed on the basis
of interviews with national corporate and securities lawyers relating to a hypothet-
ical transaction between related parties in which damages are caused to the buyer.
The Extent of Disclosure Index combines information on the requirements around
the corporate body that can provide legally sufficient approval for the transaction;
whether immediate disclosure of the transaction to the public, the regulator, and
the shareholders is required; whether disclosure of the transaction is required in the
company’s annual report; whether disclosure is required to the board of directors;
whether an external body such as an auditor is required to review the transaction
before it takes place. The index from 0 to 10 is calculated as the sum of the scores
for these five categories, with higher scores indicating a higher extent of disclosure.
It could be argued that the Extent of Disclosure Index itself causes lower credit
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constraints, as moral hazard and adverse selection problems are alleviated by such
transparency-inducing protections. Introducing this measure alone into a regression
could however be subject to omitted variable bias.41 The advantage of interacting
the Extent of Disclosure Index with a measure of the external financial dependence of
a sector is that it allows a differential effect within countries to be identified, whereby
firms active in more financially dependent industries benefit even more from such
protections, suggesting a causal effect of disclosure requirements in alleviating credit
constraints.
Our final instrument is an interaction variable at the country level. We follow
previous literature in using the financial development of a country as a predictive
variable for the firm’s likelihood of being credit constrained. We take as a proxy
for financial development the ratio of total bank and non-bank credit to GDP from
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2009). However, as shown in Figure C.2, this
variable alone may not have the necessary predictive power: a country might simply
have a high ratio of credit to GDP because of poor regulation. With this in mind,
we use as our predictive variable the interaction of private credit to GDP with the
World Governance Indicators measure of regulatory quality (Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi, 2009), RegQu×FinDev. With this variable we hope to proxy the extent
to which the country is governed by a strong, market-friendly institutional structure.
Regulatory Quality captures “perceptions of the ability of the govern-
ment to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that
permit and promote private sector development” (Kaufmann, Kraay,
and Mastruzzi, 2010, p. 4).
Figure C.3 shows that countries that are managed more efficiently, by this mea-
sure, are those in which less credit constrained firms are observed. By interacting
regulatory quality with financial development, we aim at capturing those countries
that have both liberalized financial systems combined with an effective structure for
ensuring a well-run financial system.
41Moreover, the Extent of Disclosure Index varies little over time so that its effect is likely to
be captured by the country dummies, if introduced alone.
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3.3.4 Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Credit Constrained 9417 0.161 0.367 0 1
Exporter 9408 0.245 0.430 0 1
Importer 5542 0.352 0.478 0 1
Size 9417 3.279 1.591 0 9.810
Productivity 9417 10.147 2.063 1.204 19.543
Foreign 9417 0.105 0.307 0 1
Overdue 9417 0.040 0.196 0 1
Disclosure × ExtDep 9417 5.580 6.774 0 66.092
RegQu × FinDev 9417 103.624 77.019 7.418 379.076
Table 3.5: Summary statistics for variables included in the regression sample
Summary statistics for the main variables used in the regression analysis are given
in Table 3.5. In the empirical analysis, we provide sample splits for manufacturing
and service firms. In the Appendix, Tables C.2 and C.3 give the same statistics for
the manufacturing and services sample, respectively. We see that the fraction of
exporters and the fraction of importers is higher in manufacturing than in services
(39 versus 17 per cent, 42 percent versus 27 per cent), while the share of credit
constrained firms is similar across the two sectors (16 per cent).
Table 3.6 reports “trade status premia”, given as the coefficient of dummies for
importer-only, exporter-only, and two-way trader status relative to a dummy for
purely domestic firms. The dependent variables of interest are the logarithm of
sales, employment and productivity, and dummies for credit constraints, foreign
technology licensing, and research and development activity. We find a general hier-
archy of performance: importers-only are larger (in terms of employment and sales),
less credit constrained and more innovative than purely domestic firms, exporters-
only outperform importers-only, and two-way traders rank highest in each case.
One exception is productivity. Importers-only, exporters-only, and two-way traders
are all more productive than purely domestic firms but do not appear significantly
different from each other.
In the Appendix, Tables C.4 and C.5 separately replicate Table 3.6 for the manu-
facturing and the services sample, respectively. In each subsample, two-way traders
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have a productivity advantage over exporters-only and importers-only. In terms of
sales and employment, the premium of each trading category over purely domestic
firms is larger in the manufacturing sample than in the total sample whereas it is
smaller in the services subsample. This suggests that manufacturing firms are differ-
ent from service firms, perhaps due to the potential for scale economies to be more
easily exploited by the largest, most productive firms.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
We study the impact of credit constraints on the extensive margin of trade, that
is, on the probability that a firm i active in industry k in country c exports and
imports, respectively. In the following, we will derive the empirical strategy for the
extensive margin of exporting. The strategy for the extensive margin of importing
is analogous.
The probability of being an exporter can be written as follows:
Expikct =











1 if α0 + α1Constrikct + α2Contrikct
+Dk + Dc + Dt + ǫikct > 0
0 otherwise











, (3.1)
where Expikct is the exporter dummy. Constrikct is a binary variable that takes the value
one if the firm reports to be credit constrained. Contrikct is a vector of firm level controls
that includes Sizeikct, Productivityikct and Foreignikct. Dk, Dc, Dt are a set of industry,
country and year dummies and ǫikct is a normally distributed random error.
The major challenge of estimating (3.1) is that Constrikct is potentially endogenous. There
might be unobserved factors that determine both the export decision and the credit con-
straints faced by firms. Furthermore, exporter status and credit constraints might be si-
multaneously determined (see discussion in Section 3.3.2). Then, cov (Constrikct, ǫikct) Ó= 0
and α̂1 does not correspond to the true α1.
The usual approach to tackle these endogeneity issues is to use non-linear instrumental
variable (IV) techniques, such as IV probit. However, IV probit is only applicable if the
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endogenous regressor is a continuous variable. Here, the potentially endogenous regressor,
Constrikct, is a binary variable.
42
There exists a simple solution (Greene, 2002, p. 716). We write the probability that a
firm is credit constrained as
Constrikct =











1 if β0 + β1Zikct + β2Contrikct
+Dk + Dc + Dt + µikct > 0
0 otherwise











. (3.2)
Zikct includes Overdueikct, Disclosurect×ExtDepk and RegQuct×FinDevct. These variables
are regarded as instruments: they affect the degree of credit constraints reported by firms
but are exogenous to the export decision given the other regressors (see Section 3.3.2).
µikct is a normally distributed random error.
We assume that ǫickt and µikct are jointly normally distributed according to Φ2(0, 0, 1, 1, ρ),
where Φ2 denotes the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate normal distribution.
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) then represent a recursive bivariate probit model that can be
consistently estimated using maximum likelihood techniques:
pr (Expikct = 1) = Φ (γ1X1 + δConstrikct)
pr (Constrikct = 1) = Φ (γ2X2) ,
where γ1X1 = α0 +α2Contrikct +Dk +Dc +Dt
γ2X2 = β0 + β1Zikct + β2Contrikct +Dk +Dc +Dt. (3.3)
The recursive structure follows from the fact that only one endogenous variable, Constrikct,
is allowed on the right-hand side of (3.3). The vector of instruments Zikct — included only
in the second equation — generates variation in the treatment and allows the identification
of a causal effect of credit constraints on the export probability.
In particular, the probability that a firm is credit constrained and exports is
pr (Expikct = 1, Constrikct = 1) = pr (Expikct = 1|Constrikct = 1)pr (Constrikct = 1)
=
Φ2 (γ1X1 + δConstrikct, γ2X2, ρ)
Φ (γ2X2)
Φ (γ2X2)
= Φ2(γ1X1 + δConstrikct, γ2X2, ρ). (3.4)
42Moreover, the simultaneous likelihood estimation described in the following is considered
superior to conventional two-stage IV procedures. See, for example, Marra and Radice (2011).
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(3.4) is just the unconditional bivariate probability of exporting and being credit con-
strained, that is, the probability one obtains when estimating (3.3) without paying atten-
tion to the endogeneity issue. The probabilities of the other cells
• pr (Expikct = 1, Constrikct = 0),
• pr (Expikct = 0, Constrikct = 1),
• pr (Expikct = 0, Constrikct = 0)
are computed analogously to (3.4). Standard bivariate probit software then maximizes
the log-likelihood
L =
1
∑
i=0
1
∑
j=0
pr (Expikct = i, Constrikct = j) . (3.5)
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Main Results
The results are reported in Table 3.7. In each specification, sector, year and country
dummies are included.
First, we estimate Equation (3.1) using probit, that is, we treat credit constraints as
exogenous. Marginal effects at the mean are displayed in column (1). Credit constraints
have a statistically significant negative effect on the export probability: at the mean, credit
constraints reduce the export probability by 3.2 per cent. Larger, more productive and
foreign owned firms have a higher probability of exporting.
Column (2) reports the results for the bivariate probit estimation of Equation (3.3). The
lower cell of column (2) confirms that the coefficients of the instruments have the expected
sign and are all statistically significant at the one per cent level. Firms that have payments
overdue by more than 90 days are found to be more likely to be credit constrained. At
the country level, the interaction of regulatory quality and financial development is shown
to influence credit constraints in the expected direction: for a given level of financial de-
velopment, firms in countries with higher regulatory quality are less credit constrained.
Similarly, firms with higher reliance on external finance in countries with more transparent
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Exporter Importer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Biv. Probit Probit Biv. Probit
Credit Constr. (d) -0.032*** -0.876*** 0.020 -1.270***
(0.012) (0.214) (0.021) (0.117)
Size 0.062*** 0.209*** 0.033*** 0.034**
(0.003) (0.018) (0.004) (0.014)
Productivity 0.022*** 0.075*** -0.007 -0.026*
(0.004) (0.015) (0.005) (0.013)
Foreign (d) 0.191*** 0.574*** -0.005 -0.064
(0.018) (0.053) (0.021) (0.055)
Credit Constr. Credit Constr.
Disclosure × ExtDep -0.022*** -0.018**
(0.007) (0.007)
Overdue (d) 0.266*** 0.118
(0.075) (0.106)
RegQu × FinDev -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.002)
Size -0.162*** -0.168***
(0.013) (0.018)
Productivity -0.040*** -0.045***
(0.011) (0.017)
Foreign (d) -0.145** -0.273***
(0.061) (0.086)
No. Obs. 9408 9408 5542 5542
Pseudo-R2 0.275 0.090
ρ 0.429*** 0.762***
ATE -0.172 -0.330
Marginal effects at the mean for probit regressions. Year, country, sector dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from
0 to 1. Significance levels: *10%,**5%, ***1%.
Table 3.7: Extensive Margin – All Firms
investor protection are less likely to be credit constrained. Furthermore, larger, more pro-
ductive and foreign owned firms are less likely to be credit constrained. In the upper cell
of Column (2), firm size, productivity and foreign ownership have the expected positive
effect on exporter status. Credit constraints have a negative effect on the likelihood of a
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firm exporting. The average treatment effect (ATE) of credit constraints on exporting is
given by Φ (γ1X1 + δ)−Φ (γ1X1), that is, the export probability of a credit constrained
firm, conditional on the other regressors, as compared to a firm that is not credit con-
strained (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 477). It is equal to -0.172 and significant at the one per
cent level. This implies that after controlling for the endogeneity of credit constraints as
well as for firm, sector, time, and country characteristics, credit constraints lead to a 17.2
per cent reduction in the probability that a firm will export. ρ, the correlation coefficient
between the residuals of the export (ǫikct) and the credit constraints equation (uikct), is
equal to 0.429 and significantly different from zero. This indicates that we can reject the
hypothesis that credit constraints are exogenous. Hence, the bivariate probit specification
is preferable to two individual probit regressions.
Columns (3) and (4) report the estimates from the probit and bivariate probit estimation
of the extensive margin of importing. Larger firms are more likely to import material
inputs. Credit constraints have no significant effect on the import probability when credit
constraints are treated as exogenous (Column (3)). After controlling for the endogeneity
of credit constraints in Column (4), we find that credit constraints do have a significant
negative effect on the probability of importing. ρ is again significantly different from zero.
The average treatment effect is equal to -0.33, indicating that credit constraints reduce
the import probability by 33 per cent.
Estimating a linear probability model by Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) instead of the
bivariate probit specification in (3.3), we obtain similar results (see Table C.6). However,
caution should be used when drawing conclusions from the linear probability model as the
predicted probabilities might be larger than one or less than zero.
The results of Table 3.7 combine effects for firms in the manufacturing, construction, and
service sectors. In the following, we study the impact of credit constraints on the export
and import probability separately for manufacturing and service firms.
Table 3.8 repeats the four specifications of Table 3.7 for manufacturing firms only. Larger,
more productive, and foreign owned manufacturers are less likely to be credit constrained
and more likely to export. Column (1) reports that the effect of credit constraints on the
export probability of manufacturers is negative but not statistically signficant if credit
constraints are treated as exogenous. Column (2) then confirms that the negative effect
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Exporter Importer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Biv. Probit Probit Biv. Probit
Credit Constr. (d) -0.032 -0.914*** 0.058* -1.049***
(0.025) (0.265) (0.030) (0.173)
Size 0.148*** 0.344*** 0.054*** 0.080***
(0.007) (0.031) (0.007) (0.021)
Productivity 0.036*** 0.077*** 0.051*** 0.099***
(0.008) (0.023) (0.012) (0.030)
Foreign (d) 0.303*** 0.729*** -0.012 -0.053
(0.033) (0.087) (0.031) (0.078)
Credit Constr. Credit Constr.
Disclosure × ExtDep -0.022*** -0.023***
(0.008) (0.008)
Overdue (d) 0.281** 0.225
(0.117) (0.153)
RegQu × FinDev -0.003* -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
Size -0.187*** -0.182***
(0.020) (0.023)
Productivity -0.071*** -0.061***
(0.019) (0.023)
Foreign (d) -0.143 -0.244**
(0.096) (0.108)
No. Obs. 3698 3698 2864 2864
Pseudo-R2 0.284 0.152
ρ 0.475*** 0.672***
ATE -0.234 -0.308
Marginal effects at the mean for probit regressions. Year, country, sector dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from
0 to 1. Significance levels: *10%,**5%, ***1%.
Table 3.8: Extensive Margin – Manufacturing Firms
of credit constraints on the export probability identified for all firms is present for manu-
facturing firms, if endogeneity is controlled for. The three instruments in the lower cell of
Column (2) have almost identical coefficients to Table 3.7. The average treatment effect
is equal to -0.234, and hence larger than that for the sample spanning all sectors.
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Exporter
(1) (2)
Probit Biv. Probit
Credit Constr. (d) -0.030** -1.339***
(0.012) (0.359)
Size 0.025*** 0.078**
(0.003) (0.033)
Productivity 0.021*** 0.096***
(0.004) (0.022)
Foreign (d) 0.108*** 0.383***
(0.020) (0.088)
Credit Constr.
Disclosure × ExtDep 0.001
(0.021)
Overdue (d) 0.180
(0.117)
RegQu × FinDev -0.003***
(0.001)
Size -0.139***
(0.018)
Productivity -0.017
(0.016)
Foreign (d) -0.078
(0.082)
No. Obs. 4715 4715
Pseudo-R2 0.202
ρ 0.702*
ATE -0.199
Marginal effects at the mean for probit regressions.
Year, country, sector dummies. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. (d) for discrete change of
dummy variable from 0 to 1. Significance levels:
*10%,**5%, ***1%.
Table 3.9: Extensive Margin – Service Firms
Firm size and productivity positively affect the import probability while foreign ownership
has no effect on the import decision. As in the full sample, credit constraints have a
positive effect on the import probability (that is here statistically significant at the 10
95
Credit Constraints and the Margins of International Trade
per cent level) when estimating the probit specification. The effect turns negative and
highly significant when controlling for the endogeneity of the credit constraints variable.
ρ is statistically significant at the one per cent level, underlining the importance of jointly
estimating the importer and the credit constraints equation. The average treatment effect
amounts to -0.308 and is thus similar to that for the full sample. The effect of credit
constraints is again similar if estimating a linear probability model (see Table C.7).
Firms in the service sector are studied in Table 3.9. Results are reported for the export
equation only, as the import equation does not converge without the removal of sector
and country dummies.43 Larger, more productive and foreign owned firms are more likely
to export. Larger firms are, in addition, less likely to report credit constraints. Credit
constraints have a negative and statistically significant effect on the export probability
that persists when we control for endogeneity in the bivariate probit specification.
In all, we find that credit constraints negatively affect firms’ participation in international
trade. Credit constraints reduce the export probability of both manufacturing and service
firms and the import probability of manufacturing firms. Moreover, we confirm that more
productive, larger and foreign owned firms are more likely to trade internationally. Finally,
our results stress the importance of taking into account the potential endogeneity of the
credit constraints variable.
3.5.2 Comparison with Measure Based on Rejected Appli-
cations
Table 3.10 displays the results when using the measure of credit constraints that is based
on rejected applications. This measure classifies only firms which report a rejected credit
application as credit constrained (see Section 3.3.2).
Column (1) reports the results for the full sample. Credit constraints negatively affect the
export probability. The reported statistical significance and the average treatment effect
are slightly lower than those in Table 3.7, pointing to a downward bias in the estimates
43Table C.8 reports the results of a 2SLS estimation. However, the three instruments are not
significant in the first stage regression.
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when using this measure of credit constraints. The equation for the importer status does
not converge without the removal of sector and country dummies.
The results for manufacturing firms are shown in Columns (3) to (6). The effect of credit
constraints on the export probability is negative but not significant. Moreover, the aver-
age treatment effect (ATE) is -0.113 and thus much smaller than that in Table 3.8. This
points to a downward bias when using this measure of credit constraints that does not
account for the firm’s credit demand. Most importantly, the correlation coefficient ρ is
not significant. This indicates that the hypothesis that credit constraints are exogenous
cannot be rejected. Hence, we can estimate the exporter and the credit constraints equa-
tion separately. However, the results from the probit estimation in Column (3) show no
significant effect of credit constraints on the export probability.
The estimated average treatment effect of credit constraints on the import probability is
similar to that reported in Table 3.7.
The same is true for the average treatment effect of credit constraints on the export
probability of service firms (Column (8)). Unfortunately, the equation for the importer
status does not converge.
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3.6 Sensitivity Tests
3.6.1 Additional Controls: Firm Age and Transparency
We test whether the negative impact of credit constraints on the export and import
probability found in the previous section is robust to the inclusion of additional
firm level controls. In particular, we include firm age and an audit dummy, in
addition to firm size, productivity and foreign ownership. Firm age is the difference
between the year in which the survey took place and the year in which the firm
began operations. Our assumption is that older firms are less likely to be credit
constrained as they have longer credit records. The audit dummy takes the value
one if the firm had its annual financial statements checked and certified by an external
auditor. This variable captures how opaque the firm is to outsiders: audited firms
signal transparency and good quality to potential creditors and trading partners.
The results are displayed in Table 3.11. Our previous results are unchanged:
larger and foreign-owned firms are less likely to be credit constrained and more
likely to export and import. Credit constraints significantly reduce the probability
of both exporting and importing. The audit dummy has a negative (though not
statistically significant) effect on the probability of being credit constrained and a
positive effect on the export probability. Firm age does not affect the export and
import probability. However, older firms are more likely to be credit constrained.
This is, at first sight, surprising. A potential explanation is the following: older
firms have been founded before the fall of the Iron Curtain or shortly after. Hence,
they were established as state-owned firms whereas younger firms have, for the most
part, been founded as private firms. They might be more competitive and therefore
preferred by creditors.
3.6.2 Entry and Exit into Importing and Exporting
In the following, we use the panel structure in our data to study the effect of credit
constraints on entry into and exit from exporting and importing (see Bernard, Sta-
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Exporter Importer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Credit Constr. (d) -0.878*** -0.877*** -0.879*** -1.267*** -1.276*** -1.271***
(0.218) (0.210) (0.213) (0.115) (0.116) (0.113)
Size 0.203*** 0.196*** 0.192*** 0.028* 0.031** 0.026*
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Productivity 0.075*** 0.072*** 0.072*** -0.027** -0.029** -0.029**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Foreign (d) 0.578*** 0.560*** 0.563*** -0.058 -0.067 -0.061
(0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Audit (d) 0.098** 0.097** 0.035 0.031
(0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.041)
Credit Constr. Credit Constr.
Disclosure × ExtDep -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.018** -0.018** -0.018**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Overdue (d) 0.264*** 0.277*** 0.274*** 0.117 0.126 0.123
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.106) (0.105) (0.106)
RegQu × FinDev -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Size -0.170*** -0.157*** -0.165*** -0.184*** -0.161*** -0.178***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021)
Productivity -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.047*** -0.045*** -0.046***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Foreign (d) -0.136** -0.136** -0.125** -0.258*** -0.261*** -0.243***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087)
Age 0.003** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Audit (d) -0.037 -0.042 -0.048 -0.054
(0.037) (0.037) (0.052) (0.052)
No. Obs. 9370 9298 9261 5527 5469 5454
ρ 0.430*** 0.431*** 0.432*** 0.762*** 0.770*** 0.769***
ATE -0.172 -0.173 -0.173 -0.329 -0.331 -0.330
Bivariate probit estimations. Year, country, sector dummies. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Significance levels:
*10%,**5%, ***1%.
Table 3.11: Robustness Check: Firm age and audit dummy included
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bilito, and Donghoon Yoo, 2010). We keep observations of firms which were surveyed
both in 2005 and 2008/2009. No firm was surveyed in both 2008 and 2009. We then
create two dummy variables, entry and exit. entry takes the value one if a firm
did not export in 2005 but exported in 2008/2009 and exit is equal to one if a firm
exported in 2005 but no longer exported in 2008/2009. We estimate the following
equations using probit to examine the impact of credit constraints on entry and exit
Entryikc = α0 + α1Constrikc05 +α2Contrikc05 +Dk +Dc + ǫikct
Exitikc = α0 + α1Constrikc08/9 +α2Contrikc08/9 +Dk +Dc + ǫikct. (3.6)
Table 3.12 shows the results.
Entry Exit
Exporter Importer Exporter Importer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit Constr. (d) -0.033* 0.164 -0.000 0.400**
(0.020) (0.167) (0.097) (0.169)
Size 0.021*** 0.063 -0.056** -0.129**
(0.007) (0.043) (0.028) (0.060)
Productivity 0.038** 0.150* -0.056** 0.219*
(0.015) (0.087) (0.028) (0.124)
Foreign (d) 0.090 -0.085 -0.186** -0.465**
(0.066) (0.170) (0.078) (0.193)
No. Obs. 518 108 229 58
Pseudo-R2 0.264 0.285 0.256 0.272
Marginal effects at the mean. Year, country, sector dummies. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. (d) for discrete change of dummy
variable from 0 to 1. Significance levels: *10%,**5%, ***1%.
Table 3.12: Robustness Check: Entry and Exit
Only 531 firms in our sample have been surveyed both in 2005 and in 2008/2009.
Each firm corresponds to one observation as we no longer use the pooled data.
Hence, the number of observations drops dramatically. The results should therefore
be interpreted with caution.
Columns (1) and (3) display the results of the entry and exit equation for exporting.
Larger, more productive, and foreign owned firms are more likely to start exporting
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and less likely to exit the export market. The impact of credit constraints on the
entry probability is negative and statistically significant while credit constraints do
not seem to affect the exit probability. This result is in line with the Melitz model
of selection into exporting due to fixed export costs.
The results of the entry and exit equation for importing are reported in Columns
(2) and (4). More productive firms are more likely to start importing while larger
and foreign-owned firms are less likely to exit the import market. Credit constraints
do not affect entry into importing but foster exit.
3.7 Conclusion
The importance of financial development for economic growth in general, and in-
ternational trade in particular, is well established. Recent theoretical work stresses
sunk entry costs as a potential explanation for why imperfections in credit markets
may impede firms’ entry into export markets. We study empirically the impact of
credit constraints on the export and import decision of firms in Eastern Europe. We
document a negative impact of credit constraints on a firm’s participation in inter-
national trade, both for manufacturers and service firms. These findings are in line
with the predictions of the related theoretical literature. They have implications for
policy makers aiming to promote productivity growth by widening participation in
export and import markets. Policies designed to improve access to external finance
must be implemented for firms in the services, as well as the manufacturing sec-
tor. Moreover, smaller firms that are discouraged by high interest rates or collateral
requirements are to be encouraged to apply for a credit.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Total differentiation of (1.19) yields the slopes of the free entry conditions of the
home country and of the foreign country in the (cD, c
∗
D) space:
FE :
dc∗D
dcD
= −
(cD)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (cA)
k
(cX)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (cA)
k
FE∗ :
dc∗D
dcD
= −
(c∗X)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (c∗A)
k
(c∗D)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (c∗A)
k . (A.1)
Both curves are downward sloping. From our assumption that cX < cD follows that
(cX)
k+1 < (cD)
k+1. The absolute amount of the slope of FE is unambiguously larger
than one and the absolute amount of the slope of FE∗ is unambiguously smaller
than one. Hence, there is a unique intersection if the two curves intersect.
For a given (ψ, ψ∗), let cD(1) denote the solution to home’s free entry condition for
c∗D = cM . Furthermore, denote with ψ̄ the value of ψ, given ψ
∗, for which (cD(1), cM)
is the solution to foreign’s free entry condition. It follows that for ψ < ψ̄ and, by
symmetry, for ψ∗ < ψ̄ the two curves intersect.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Entry cutoffs
The RHS of the two free entry conditions is identical. For a given entry cutoff in
the other country, (i) the LHS monotonously increases in the own entry cutoff and
(ii) the LHS of (1.19) is larger in the foreign country. Therefore, c∗D < cD.
Average productivity
From (1.18) the average cost of domestic firms, our (inverse) measure of average
productivity, is
CoP =
k
k + 1
cD − t
(
cA
cD
)k
. (A.2)
Since c∗D < cD and, from (1.14), c
∗
A > cA, CoP
∗
< CoP , that is, average productivity
is higher in the foreign country.
The aggregate production cost is obtained by weighting the production cost either
with output q(c) or with revenues r(c):
CoPq =
NDA
ND
∫ cA
0
(c − t)qA(c)
g(c)
G(cA)
dc+
NDL
ND
∫ cD
cA
cq(c)
g(c)
G(cD)− G(cA)
dc
=
S
2γ
{
k(cD)
2
(k + 1)(k + 2)
− t
(
cA
cD
)k
[
cD −
2k
k + 1
cA + t
]}
(A.3)
CoPr =
NDA
ND
∫ cA
0
(c − t)rA(c)
g(c)
G(cA)
dc+
NDL
ND
∫ cD
cA
cr(c)
g(c)
G(cD)− G(cA)
dc
=
S
4γ
{
2k(cD)
3
(k + 1)(k + 3)
−
t(cA)
k
(cD)k−2
−
t2k(cA)
k+1 [(k + 2)− (k + 1)cA]
(k + 1)(k + 2)(cD)k
+ t3
}
.
(A.4)
Fraction of exporters and high-technology firms
From (1.13) and (1.14), it follows directly that
(
cX
cD
)k
<
(
c∗
X
c∗
D
)k
and
(
cA
cD
)k
<
(
c∗
A
c∗
D
)k
:
the fraction of exporters and high-technology firms is larger in the foreign country.
Divergence
Total differentiation of (1.19) yields dcD
dψ
> 0 and
dc∗
D
dψ
< 0. Intuitively, given ψ∗, an in-
crease in ψ lowers (increases) ex-ante expected profits in the home (foreign) country
leading to less (more) entry and hence to a higher (lower) entry cutoff. Furthermore,
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dcX
dψ
=
dc∗
D
dψ
< 0,
dc∗
X
dψ
= dcD
dψ
> 0, dcA
dψ
= dcD
dψ
+
dc∗
D
dψ
− 2γf
St
< 0 and
dc∗
A
dψ
= dcD
dψ
+
dc∗
D
dψ
> 0.
It follows that CoP −CoP
∗
,
(
c∗
X
c∗
D
)k
−
(
cX
cD
)k
and
(
c∗
A
c∗
D
)k
−
(
cA
cD
)k
increase. Moreover:
d
[
(
c∗X
c∗
D
)k
/
(
cX
cD
)k
]
dψ
=k
(
c∗XcD
c∗DcX
)k
[
cD
dc∗X
dψ
+ c∗X
dcD
dψ
]
c∗DcX −
[
cX
dc∗D
dψ
+ c∗D
dcX
dψ
]
cDc
∗
X
(c∗DcX)
2
=k
(
c∗XcD
c∗DcX
)k (cD + c
∗
X)
dcD
dψ
c∗DcX − (cX + c
∗
D)
dc∗D
dψ
cDc
∗
X
(c∗DcX)
2 > 0
d
[
(
c∗A
c∗
D
)k
/
(
cA
cD
)k
]
dψ
=k
(
c∗AcD
c∗DcA
)k
[
cD
dc∗A
dψ
+ c∗A
dcD
dψ
]
c∗DcA −
[
cA
dc∗D
dψ
+ c∗D
dcA
dψ
]
cDc
∗
A
(c∗DcA)
2
=k
(
c∗AcD
c∗DcA
)k



[
cD
(
dcD
dψ
+
dc∗D
dψ
)
+ c∗A
dcD
dψ
]
c∗DcA
(c∗DcA)
2
−
[
cA
dc∗D
dψ
+ c∗D
(
dcD
dψ
+
dc∗D
dψ
− 2γf
St
)]
cDc
∗
A
(c∗DcA)
2



> 0
d
(
CoP/CoP ∗
)
dψ
=
[
k
k+1
dcD
dψ
− tk
(
cA
cD
)k−1 dcA
dψ
cD−
dcD
dψ
cA
(cD)
2
]
CoP ∗
(
CoP
)2
−
[
k
k+1
dc∗D
dψ
− tk
(
c∗A
c∗
D
)k−1 dc
∗
A
dψ
c∗D−
dc∗
D
dψ
c∗A
(c∗D)
2
]
CoP
(
CoP
)2 > 0. (A.5)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Fraction of exporters and high-technology firms
In the symmetric case, ψ = ψ∗. The free entry condition (1.19) reduces to:
(cD)
k+2 + (cD − τ)
k+2
k + 2
+ 2t (cA)
k+1 =
fE2γc
k
M(k + 1)
S
. (A.6)
Total differentiation of (A.6) yields
dcD
dτ
=
(cD − τ)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (cA)
k
(cD)
k+1 + (cD − τ)
k+1 + 2t(k + 1) (cA)
k . (A.7)
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cX then decreases in τ :
dcX
dτ
=
dcD
dτ
− 1 < 0
⇐⇒ − (cD)
k+1 − t(k + 1) (cA)
k < 0.
Since cD increases in τ , the fraction of exporters, given by
(
cX
cD
)k
unambiguously
decreases in τ .
cA decreases in τ
dcA
dτ
=
1
2
(
2
dcD
dτ
− 1
)
< 0
⇐⇒ (cD − τ)
k+1 − (cD)
k+1 < 0.
The fraction of high-technology firms also unambiguously decreases in τ .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Entry cutoffs
Total differentiation of the free entry conditions yields the following expressions:
dcD
dτ
=
[
(cX)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (cA)
k
]
[
(
c∗
D
)k+1
−
(
c∗
X
)k+1
]
[
(cD)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (cA)
k
]
[
(
c∗
D
)k+1
+ t(k + 1)
(
c∗
A
)k
]
−
[
(cX)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (cA)
k
]
[
(
c∗
X
)k+1
+ t(k + 1)
(
c∗
A
)k
]
dc∗
D
dτ
=
[
(
c∗
X
)k+1
+ t(k + 1)
(
c∗
A
)k
]
[
(cD)
k+1
− (cX)
k+1
]
[
(
c∗
D
)k+1
+ t(k + 1)
(
c∗
A
)k
]
[
(cD)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (cA)
k
]
−
[
(
c∗
X
)k+1
+ t(k + 1)
(
c∗
A
)k
]
[
(cX)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (cA)
k
]
.
(A.8)
Hence, dcD
dτ
> 0,
dc∗
D
dτ
> 0, and dcD
dτ
<
dc∗
D
dτ
. Moreover, dcD
dτ
+
dc∗
D
dτ
< 1.
Average productivity, fraction of exporters and high-technology firms
From (A.8) follows that dcX
dτ
=
dc∗
D
dτ
− 1 < 0,
dc∗
X
dτ
= dcD
dτ
− 1 < 0. Moreover,
dcA
dτ
=
dc∗
A
dτ
= 1
2
(
dcD
dτ
+
dc∗
D
dτ
− 1
)
< 0.
It follows that the difference between the countries with respect to average produc-
tivity of domestic firms, the fraction of exporters and the fraction of high-technology
firms decreases in τ .
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Moreover:
d
[
(
c∗X
c∗
D
)k
/
(
cX
cD
)k
]
dτ
=k
(
c∗XcD
c∗DcX
)k
[
cD
dc∗X
dτ
+ c∗X
dcD
dτ
]
c∗DcX −
[
cX
dc∗D
dτ
+ c∗D
dcX
dτ
]
cDc
∗
X
(c∗DcX)
2 >< 0
d
[
(
c∗A
c∗
D
)k
/
(
cA
cD
)k
]
dτ
=k
(
c∗AcD
c∗DcA
)k
[
cD
dc∗A
dτ
+ c∗A
dcD
dτ
]
c∗DcA −
[
cA
dc∗D
dτ
+ c∗D
dcA
dτ
]
cDc
∗
A
(c∗DcA)
2 >< 0
d
(
CoP/CoP ∗
)
dτ
=
[
k
k+1
dcD
dτ
− tk
(
cA
cD
)k−1 dcA
dτ
cD−
dcD
dτ
cA
(cD)
2
]
CoP
∗
(
CoP
∗
)2
−
[
k
k+1
dc∗D
dτ
− tk
(
c∗A
c∗
D
)k−1 dc
∗
A
dτ
c∗D−
dc∗
D
dτ
c∗A
(cD∗ )
2
]
CoP
(
CoP
∗
)2
=
k
(
CoP ∗
)2
(k + 1)
[
dcD
dτ
CoP ∗ −
dc∗D
dτ
CoP
]
−
tk
(
CoP ∗
)2
{
dcA
dτ
[
(
cA
cD
)k−1
CoP
∗
cD
−
(
c∗A
c∗D
)k−1
CoP
c∗D
]
−
[
(
cA
cD
)k
CoP
∗
cD
dcD
dτ
−
(
c∗A
c∗D
)k
CoP
c∗D
dc∗D
dτ
]}
< 0.
(A.9)
A.5 Welfare Analysis
Average price
The average price of varieties sold in the home country is the sum of the average
price of domestic and the average price of foreign sellers weighted with their share
in the total population of sellers:
p̄ =
ND
N
p̄dom +
N∗X
N
p̄∗exp, (A.10)
where N , ND and N
∗
X are the total number of sellers, the number of domestic
sellers, and the number of foreign sellers in the home country. The average price in
the foreign country is analogous.
Moreover:
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(1) The number of sellers in each market is the sum of domestic and foreign sellers:
N = G (cD)NE +G (c
∗
X)N
∗
E
N∗ = G (c∗D)N
∗
E +G (cX)NE. (A.11)
(A.11) can be solved for the number of entrants NE and N
∗
E:
NE =
(cM)
k
(cD)
k (c∗D)
k − (c∗X)
k (cX)
k
[
N (c∗D)
k − N∗ (c∗X)
k
]
N∗E =
(cM)
k
(cD)
k (c∗D)
k − (c∗X)
k (cX)
k
[
N∗ (cD)
k − N (cX)
k
]
. (A.12)
Using (A.12), the fraction of domestic and foreign producers is then
ND
N
=
1
(cD)
k (c∗D)
k − (c∗X)
k (cX)
k
[
(cD)
k (c∗D)
k −
N∗
N
(cD)
k (c∗X)
k
]
N∗X
N
=
1
(cD)
k (c∗D)
k − (c∗X)
k (cX)
k
[
N∗
N
(c∗X)
k (cD)
k − (cX)
k (c∗X)
k
]
. (A.13)
(2) The average price of domestic sellers is the sum of the average price of domestic
low- and high-technology firms weighted with their share in the total population of
domestic sellers, NDL
ND
= G(cD)−G(cA)
G(cD)
and NDA
ND
= G(cA)
G(cD)
:
p̄dom =
NDA
ND
∫ cA
0
pDA
g(c)
G (cA)
dc +
NDL
ND
∫ cD
cA
pD
g(c)
G (cD) − G (cA)
dc
=
2k + 1
2(k + 1)
cD −
t
2
(
cA
cD
)k
. (A.14)
Analogously, the average price of foreign sellers is the sum of the average price
of foreign low- and high-technology firms weighted with their share in the total
population of foreign sellers,
N∗
XL
N∗
X
=
G(c∗X)−G(c∗A)
G(c∗X)
and
N∗
XA
N∗
X
=
G(c∗A)
G(c∗X)
,:
p̄∗exp =
N∗XA
N∗X
∫ c∗
A
0
p∗XA
g(c)
G (c∗A)
dc +
N∗XL
N∗X
∫ c∗
X
c∗
A
p∗X
g(c)
G (c∗X) − G (c
∗
A)
dc
=
2k + 1
2(k + 1)
cD −
t
2
(
c∗A
c∗X
)k
+
τ
2(k + 1)
. (A.15)
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Substituting (A.13), (A.14) and (A.15) into (A.10) gives
p̄ =
2k + 1
2(k + 1)
cD −
t
2



ND
N
(
cA
cD
)k
+
N∗X
N


(
c∗A
c∗X
)k
−
τ
t(k + 1)





=
2k + 1
2(k + 1)
cD − (p − pA)
NA
N
+
(pX − p)
k + 1
N∗X
N
. (A.16)
Number of firms in the market
From (2.8) follows that
p̄ = cD −
γ(α − cD)
βN
. (A.17)
Equating (A.17) with (A.16) yields the following expression for N :
N =
γ
β
(α − cD)−
t
2
1
(cD)
k(c∗D)
k
−(cD−τ)
k(c∗D−τ)
k N
∗
{
(cD)
k
[
(c∗A)
k
− τ(cD−τ)
k
t(k+1)
]
− (cD − τ)
k
(cA)
k
}
cD
2(k+1) +
t
2
1
(cD)
k(c∗D)
k
−(cD−τ)
k(c∗D−τ)
k
{
(c∗D)
k
(cA)
k
− (c∗D − τ)
k
[
(c∗A)
k
− τ(cD−τ)
k
t(k+1)
]} .
(A.18)
The expression for N∗ is symmetric:
N∗ =
γ
β
(α − c∗D)−
t
2
1
(cD)
k(c∗D)
k
−(cD−τ)
k(c∗D−τ)
k N
{
(c∗D)
k
[
(cA)
k
−
τ(c∗D−τ)
k
t(k+1)
]
− (c∗D − τ)
k
(c∗A)
k
}
c∗
D
2(k+1) +
t
2
1
(cD)
k(c∗D)
k
−(cD−τ)
k(c∗D−τ)
k
{
(cD)
k
(c∗A)
k
− (cD − τ)
k
[
(cA)
k
−
τ(c∗D−τ)
k
t(k+1)
]} .
(A.19)
Plugging (A.18) into (A.19) gives
N =
γ
β
(α−cD)c
∗
D
2(k+1) +
t
2
1
D
[
(cD)
k
(c∗A)
k
− (c∗X)
k
(cA)
k
]
γ
β
(c∗D − cD)
cDc
∗
D
4(k+1)2 +
t
4(k+1)D∆+
tτ
4D(k+1)Θ
+
γ
β
τ(c∗X )
k
2D(k+1)
[
(α − cD) (cX)
k
+ (α − c∗D) (cD)
k
]
cDc
∗
D
4(k+1)2 +
t
4(k+1)D∆+
tτ
4D(k+1)Θ
N∗ =
γ
β
(α−cD∗ )cD
2(k+1) +
t
2
1
D
[
(c∗D)
k
(cA)
k
− (cX)
k
(c∗A)
k
]
γ
β
(cD − c
∗
D)
cDc
∗
D
4(k+1)2 +
t
4(k+1)D∆+
tτ
4D(k+1)Θ
+
γ
β
τ(cX )
k
2D(k+1)
[
(α − c∗D) (c
∗
X)
k
+ (α − cD) (c
∗
D)
k
]
cDc
∗
D
4(k+1)2 +
t
4(k+1)D∆+
tτ
4D(k+1)Θ
, (A.20)
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where
D =(cD)
k
(c∗D)
k
− (cD − τ)
k
(c∗D − τ)
k
∆ =cD
{
(cD)
k
(c∗A)
k
− (c∗X)
k
[
(cA)
k
−
τ(cX)
k
t(k + 1)
]}
+ c∗D
{
(c∗D)
k
(cA)
k
− (cX)
k
[
(c∗A)
k
−
τ(c∗X)
k
t(k + 1)
]}
Θ =
[
(cX)
k
(c∗A)
k
+ (c∗X)
k
(cA)
k
−
τ (cX)
k
(c∗X)
k
t(k + 1)
]
.
Price variance
The price variance σ2p is the sum of the price variances of domestic and foreign sellers
weighted with their shares in the total population of sellers:
σ2p =
ND
N
σ2p,dom +
N∗X
N
σ2p,exp, (A.21)
where the price variance of domestic firms is the sum of the price variances of domes-
tic low-and high-technology firms weighted with their shares in the total population
of domestic firms, NDL
ND
= G(cD)−G(cA)
G(cD)
and NDA
ND
= G(cA)
G(cD)
,
σ2p,dom =
NDA
ND
∫ cA
0
[pDA − p̄]
2 g(c)
G (cA)
dc +
NDL
ND
∫ cD
cA
[pD − p̄]
2 g(c)
G (cD) − G (cA)
dc.
(A.22)
Analogously, the price variance of foreign sellers is the sum of the price variances
of foreign low- and high-technology firms weighted with their shares in the total
population of foreign sellers,
N∗
XL
N∗
X
=
G(c∗X)−G(c∗A)
G(c∗X)
and
N∗
XA
N∗
X
=
G(c∗A)
G(c∗X)
,
σ2p,exp =
N∗XA
N∗X
∫ c∗
A
0
[p∗XA − p̄]
2 g(c)
G (c∗A)
dc +
N∗XL
N∗X
∫ c∗
X
c∗
A
[p∗X − p̄]
2 g(c)
G (c∗X) − G (c
∗
A)
dc.
(A.23)
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τ
(
cX
cD
)k
(
c∗
X
c∗
D
)k (
cA
cD
)k
(
c∗
A
c∗
D
)k
1.0000 0.6900 0.7530 0.0739 0.1615
0.9500 0.6999 0.7674 0.0746 0.1633
0.9025 0.7093 0.7815 0.0753 0.1649
0.8574 0.7181 0.7953 0.0759 0.1665
0.8145 0.7263 0.8089 0.0764 0.1681
0.7738 0.7340 0.8222 0.0769 0.1696
0.7351 0.7412 0.8352 0.0774 0.1710
τ
(
cX
cD
)k
/
(
c∗
X
c∗
D
)k (
cA
cD
)k
/
(
c∗
A
c∗
D
)k
1.0000 0.9163 0.4576
0.9500 0.9120 0.4568
0.9025 0.9076 0.4566
0.8574 0.9029 0.4559
0.8145 0.8979 0.4545
0.7738 0.8927 0.4534
0.7351 0.8875 0.4526
Table A.1: Impact of a 5%-decrease in trade costs on the fraction of exporters and
high-technology firms
(t = 0.5, k = 2.5, γ = 0.2, S = 1,f = fE = cM = 10, ψ = 1.25)
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Selection XA
Exporters invest in technology adoption if their profits are higher when using the
advanced technology, that is, if πDAik (cik) ≥ π
D
ik (cik). The technology adoption
decision depends on the total costs of technology adoption, fk + f
ext
ik . Firms with
production costs below cNC have no extra costs of external finance, where
cNCk = c
D
k +
tk
2
−
1
λ
2γfk
Stk
. (B.1)
Firms with production costs above cNC have to pay for external finance. The tech-
nology adoption cutoff cAk that depends on whether the marginal technology adopter
is a financially unconstrained or a financially constrained firm is given by
cAk =





cDk +
tk
2
− 2γfk
Stk
if cik ≤ c
NC
k
cDk +
tk
2
− 1
θ+(1−θ)λ
2γfk
Stk
if cik > c
NC
k .





(B.2)
It follows from (B.1) and (B.2) that cNCk < c
A
k (cik ≤ c
NC
k ). The technology adoption
cutoff is
cAk = c
D
k +
tk
2
−
1
θ + (1− θ)λ
2γfk
Stk
. (B.3)
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Firms export if cik ≤ c
X
k where
πXAik (c
X
k ) = 0 ⇔ c
X
k = c
D
k∗ − τ + tk.
44 (B.4)
Given (B.1), (B.3), and (B.4), the free entry condition for industry k is
fEk =
∫ cNC
k
0
[
πAik (cik) + f
ext
ik
]
dF (cik) +
∫ cX
k
cNC
k
πAik (cik) dF (cik)
+
∫ cA
k
cX
k
πDAik (cik) dF (cik) +
∫ cD
k
cA
k
πDik (cik) dF (cik).
And, solving the integral,
(
cDk
)k+2
+
(
cDk∗ − τ + tk
)k+2
k + 2
+
tk
θ
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ]
(
cAk
)k+1
−(1− θ)λ
(
cNCk
)k+1
}
=
fEk2γ (cM )
k (k + 1)
S
,
(B.5)
where cAk and c
NC
k are given by (B.3) and (B.1). The free entry condition for industry
k in the foreign country is analogous.
44We assume that cXk > c
NC
k . Therefore, (c
D
k − c
D
k∗ − tk/2 + τ)Stk[θ + (1 − θ)λ]/2γ > fk >
(cDk − c
D
k∗ − tk/2 + τ)Stkλ/2γ for Selection XA.
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B.2 Mathematical Appendix
B.2.1 Existence of a Unique Equilibrium
Total differentiation of (2.13) yields the slopes of the free entry conditions of the
home country and of the foreign country in the (cDk , c
D
k∗) space (Selection AX):
FE :
dcDk∗
dcDk
= −
(
cDk
)k+1
+ tk
θ
(k + 1)
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ]
(
cAk
)k
− (1− θ)λ
(
cNCk
)k
}
(cXk )
k+1
+ tk
θ
(k + 1)
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ] (cAk )
k
− (1− θ)λ (cNCk )
k
}
FE∗ :
dcDk∗
dcDk
= −
(
cXk∗
)k+1
+ tk
θ
(k + 1)
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ∗]
(
cAk∗
)k
− (1− θ)λ∗
(
cNCk∗
)k
}
(cDk∗)
k+1
+ tk
θ
(k + 1)
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ∗] (cAk∗)
k
− (1− θ)λ∗ (cNCk∗ )
k
} .
(B.6)
Total differentiation of (B.5) yields the slopes of the free entry conditions of the
home country and of the foreign country in the (cDk , c
D
k∗) space (Selection XA):
FE :
dcDk∗
dcDk
= −
(
cDk
)k+1
+ tk
θ
(k + 1)
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ]
(
cAk
)k
− (1− θ)λ
(
cNCk
)k
}
(cXk )
k+1
FE∗ :
dcDk∗
dcDk
= −
(
cXk∗
)k+1
(cDk∗)
k+1
+ tk
θ
(k + 1)
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ∗] (cAk∗)
k
− (1− θ)λ∗ (cNCk∗ )
k
} .
(B.7)
Both curves are downward sloping. From our assumption that cXk < c
D
k , it follows
that
(
cXk
)k+1
<
(
cDk
)k+1
. Hence, the absolute amount of the slope of home’s free
entry condition is unambigously larger than one and the absolute amount of the
slope of foreign’s free entry condition is unambigously smaller than one. Hence,
there is a unique intersection if the two curves intersect.
For a given (λ, λ∗), let c
D
k (1) denote the solution to home’s free entry condition for
cDk∗ = cM . Furthermore, denote by λ̄ the value of λ, given λ∗, for which
(
cDk (1), cM
)
is the solution to foreign’s free entry condition. It follows that for λ̄ < λ, and, by
symmetry, for λ̄ < λ∗, the two curves intersect.
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B.2.2 Proof of Theoretical Predictions 1-3 for Selection AX
Define:
D ≡
{
(
cDk
)k+1
+
tk
θ
(k + 1)
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ]
(
cAk
)k
− (1− θ)λ
(
cNCk
)k
}
}
×
{
(
cDk∗
)k+1
+
tk
θ
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ∗]
(
cAk∗
)k
− (1− θ)λ∗
(
cNCk∗
)k
}
}
−
{
(
cDk∗ − τ
)k+1
+
tk
θ
(k + 1)
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ]
(
cAk
)k
− (1− θ)λ
(
cNCk
)k
}
}
×
{
(
cDk − τ
)k+1
+
tk
θ
(k + 1)
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ∗]
(
cAk∗
)k
− (1− θ)λ∗
(
cNCk∗
)k
}
}
. (B.8)
Assume that tk < 1 and (1− θ)γfk/ [θ + (1− θ)λ]
2 Stk > 1.
Proof of Theoretical Prediction 1
From (2.10), it follows that
dcNCk
dλ
=
1
2
(
dcDk
dλ
+
dcDk∗
dλ
+
2γfk
λ2Stk
)
=
1
2
{
−
2tk(1− θ)
θ
{
[
(
cAk
)k+1
−
(
cNCk
)k+1
]
+
2γ(k + 1)fk
Stk
[
1
θ + (1− θ)λ
(
cAk
)k
−
1
λ
(
cNCk
)k
]}
[
(
cDk∗
)k+1
−
(
cXk∗
)k+1
]
+
2γfk
λ2Stk
D
}
> 0. (B.9)
where
dcDk
dλ
= −
{
(
cDk∗
)k+1
+ tk
θ
(k + 1)
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ∗]
(
cAk∗
)k
− (1− θ)λ∗
(
cNCk∗
)k
}}
D
×
2tk(1−θ)
θ
{[
(
cAk
)k+1
−
(
cNCk
)k+1
]
+ 2γ(k+1)fk
Stk
[
1
θ+(1−θ)λ
(
cAk
)k
− 1
λ
(
cNCk
)k
]}
D
< 0 (B.10)
dcDk∗
dλ
=
{
(
cXk∗
)k+1
+ tk
θ
(k + 1)
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ∗]
(
cAk∗
)k
− (1− θ)λ∗
(
cNCk∗
)k
}}
D
×
2tk(1−θ)
θ
{[
(
cAk
)k+1
−
(
cNCk
)k+1
]
+ 2γ(k+1)fk
Stk
[
1
θ+(1−θ)λ
(
cAk
)k
− 1
λ
(
cNCk
)k
]}
D
> 0. (B.11)
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Proof of Theoretical Prediction 2
From (2.9), it follows that
dcXk
dλ
=
dcDk∗
dλ
> 0. (B.12)
Proof of Theoretical Prediction 3
From (2.12), it follows that
dcAk
dλ
=
1
2
(
dcDk
dλ
+
dcDk∗
dλ
+
2γ(1− θ)fk
[θ + (1− θ)λ]
2
Stk
)
=
1
2
{
−
2tk(1− θ)
θ
{
[
(
cAk
)k+1
−
(
cNCk
)k+1
]
+
2γ(k + 1)fk
Stk
[
1
θ + (1− θ)λ
(
cAk
)k
−
1
λ
(
cNCk
)k
]}
[
(
cDk∗
)k+1
−
(
cXk∗
)k+1
]
+
2γ(1− θ)fk
[θ + (1− θ)λ]
2
Stk
D
}
> 0. (B.13)
B.2.3 Proof of Theoretical Predictions 1-3 for Selection XA
Define:
D ≡
{
(
cDk
)k+1
+
tk
θ
(k + 1)
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ]
(
cAk
)k
− (1− θ)λ
(
cNCk
)k
}
}
×
{
(
cDk∗
)k+1
+
tk
θ
(k + 1)
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ∗]
(
cAk∗
)k
− (1− θ)λ∗
(
cNCk∗
)k
}
}
−
(
cXk
)k+1 (
cXk∗
)k+1
. (B.14)
Assume that tk < 1 and
2γfk
[θ+(1−θ)λ]2Stk
[
(
cDk
)k+1
−
(
cXk
)k+1 (
cXk∗
)k+1
]
≥ tk
θ
[
(
cAk
)k+1
−
(
cNCk
)k+1
]
.
Proof of Theoretical Prediction 1
From (B.1), it follows that
dcNCk
dλ
=
dcDk
dλ
+
2γfk
λ2Stk
= −
tk(1− θ)
θ
{
[
(
cAk
)k+1
−
(
cNCk
)k+1
]
+
2γ(k + 1)fk
Stk
[
1
θ + (1− θ)λ
(
cAk
)k
−
1
λ
(
cNCk
)k
]}
×
{
(
cDk∗
)k+1
+
tk(k + 1)
θ
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ∗]
(
cAk∗
)k
− (1− θ)λ∗
(
cNCk∗
)k
}
}
+
2γfk
λ2Stk
D > 0.
(B.15)
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where
dcDk
dλ
= −
tk(1−θ)
θ
{[
(
cAk
)k+1
−
(
cNCk
)k+1
]
+ 2γ(k+1)fk
Stk
[
1
θ+(1−θ)λ
(
cAk
)k
− 1
λ
(
cNCk
)k
]}
D
×
{
(
cDk∗
)k+1
+ tk(k+1)
θ
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ∗]
(
cAk∗
)k
− (1− θ)λ∗
(
cNCk∗
)k
}}
D
< 0 (B.16)
Proof of Theoretical Prediction 2
From (B.4), it follows that
dcXk
dλ
=
dcDk∗
dλ
=
tk(1−θ)
θ
{[
(
cAk
)k+1
−
(
cNCk
)k+1
]
+ 2γ(k+1)fk
Stk
[
1
θ+(1−θ)λ
(
cAk
)k
− 1
λ
(
cNCk
)k
]}
(
cXk∗
)k+1
D
> 0
(B.17)
Proof of Theoretical Prediction 3
From (B.3), it follows that
dcAk
dλ
=
dcDk
dλ
+
2γ(1− θ)fk
[θ + (1− θ)λ]
2
Stk
= −
tk(1− θ)
θ
{
[
(
cAk
)k+1
−
(
cNCk
)k+1
]
+
2γ(k + 1)fk
Stk
[
1
θ + (1− θ)λ
(
cAk
)k
−
1
λ
(
cNCk
)k
]}
×
{
(
cDk∗
)k+1
+
tk(k + 1)
θ
{
[θ + (1− θ)λ∗]
(
cAk∗
)k
− (1− θ)λ∗
(
cNCk∗
)k
}
}
+
2γ(1− θ)fk
[θ + (1− θ)λ]
2
Stk
D > 0. (B.18)
B.2.4 Financial Market Development and the Missing Tech-
nology Adoption
Define cDPk = c
D
k (λ = 1) and c
AP
k = c
A
k (λ = 1).
The missing technology adoption corresponds to the range of firms which would
invest in technology adoption in a perfect financial market but are prevented from
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investing by financial constraints:
Pr
(
cAk ≤ cik ≤ c
AP
k
)
=
(
cAPk
cM
)k
−
(
cAk
cM
)k
. (B.19)
The effect of financial market development, that is an increase in λ, is then given by
d
(
cAP
k
−cA
k
cM
)k
dλ
= −
k
(cM)
k
(
cAk
)k−1 dcAk
dλ
< 0. (B.20)
Note that cAPk is evaluated at λ = 1, the maximum value of λ. Therefore, c
AP
k does
not change.
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B.3 Figures
Figure B.1: Correlation between the cost of financing and financial development
Figure B.2: Correlation between the difficulty in access to financing and financial
development
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B.4 Tables
Country Year Fin. Dev. No. Obs. Country Year Fin. Dev. No. Obs.
Kyrgyz Republic 2002 0.04 42 Russian Federation 2002 0.45 110
Kyrgyz Republic 2003 0.05 102 Turkey 2005 0.45 1278
Uganda 2003 0.06 134 Lithuania 2004 0.47 160
Armenia 2002 0.07 53 Botswana 2006 0.49 113
Uganda 2006 0.07 306 Hungary 2002 0.50 49
Armenia 2005 0.08 217 Czech Republic 2002 0.50 63
Kyrgyz Republic 2005 0.09 53 Bulgaria 2005 0.52 53
Georgia 2002 0.10 30 Mexico 2006 0.52 1157
Zambia 2002 0.13 83 India 2002 0.54 1632
Tanzania 2003 0.13 166 El Salvador 2003 0.54 465
Tanzania 2006 0.14 267 Slovenia 2002 0.55 45
Romania 2002 0.16 70 Poland 2005 0.55 514
Georgia 2005 0.16 47 Bolivia 2006 0.57 405
Malawi 2005 0.17 153 Oman 2003 0.57 97
Paraguay 2006 0.20 432 Vietnam 2005 0.59 234
Macedonia, FYR 2002 0.20 41 Croatia 2002 0.60 29
Bulgaria 2002 0.21 44 Brazil 2003 0.61 1634
Kazakhstan 2002 0.22 41 Czech Republic 2005 0.61 78
Uruguay 2006 0.23 395 Lithuania 2005 0.62 41
Lithuania 2002 0.24 34 El Salvador 2006 0.66 467
Ecuador 2003 0.26 432 Estonia 2002 0.67 29
Swaziland 2006 0.28 70 Guyana 2004 0.67 153
Mongolia 2004 0.29 188 Latvia 2005 0.68 33
Bangladesh 2002 0.30 967 Colombia 2006 0.69 649
Turkey 2002 0.30 133 Peru 2006 0.69 361
Ecuador 2006 0.31 392 Philippines 2003 0.74 620
Macedonia, FYR 2005 0.32 55 Hungary 2005 0.75 352
Pakistan 2002 0.32 893 Russian Federation 2005 0.76 137
Romania 2005 0.33 374 Slovenia 2005 0.78 55
Turkey 2004 0.36 155 Morocco 2004 0.82 838
Latvia 2002 0.36 28 Croatia 2005 0.87 62
Moldova 2002 0.37 42 Egypt, Arab Rep. 2004 0.93 962
Indonesia 2003 0.37 680 Estonia 2005 0.97 39
Costa Rica 2005 0.39 341 Panama 2006 1.09 313
Bulgaria 2004 0.39 326 Mauritius 2005 1.12 163
Moldova 2003 0.40 103 Greece 2005 1.20 98
Kazakhstan 2005 0.40 334 Jamaica 2005 1.62 67
Slovak Republic 2005 0.41 32 Thailand 2004 1.65 1383
Poland 2002 0.41 95 Chile 2004 1.80 682
Poland 2003 0.42 105 Chile 2006 1.82 694
Sri Lanka 2004 0.43 368 Korea, Rep. 2005 1.98 215
Kenya 2003 0.43 224 Malaysia 2002 2.48 139
Slovak Republic 2002 0.44 24 South Africa 2003 2.51 573
Argentina 2006 0.45 740 Jordan 2006 3.26 350
Peru 2002 0.45 118
Table B.1: Private credit + stock market capitalization/GDP across countries
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Industry ExtDep Liqu Tang TrCr
Food -0.535 1.554 0.302 0.241
Beverages -0.274 1.554 0.302 0.241
Textiles -0.123 1.268 0.128 0.081
Garments -0.729 1.268 0.128 0.081
Leather -1.822 0.640 0.110 0.059
Paper -0.386 0.763 0.268 0.065
Chemicals and pharmaceutics 5.175 1.337 0.193 0.081
Non-metallic and plastic materials -0.273 1.128 0.216 0.077
Metals and machinery -0.480 7.378 0.192 0.102
Electronics 0.357 0.827 0.106 0.077
Other transport equipment -0.451 1.330 0.138 0.095
Wood and furniture -0.788 0.994 0.168 0.126
Other manufacturing 0.141 1.330 0.138 0.095
2002-2006 average for Liqu and TrCr.
Table B.2: External financial dependence across industries
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Country Year ConstrCost ConstrAcc Exporter For.Techn. Email
Argentina 2006 x x x x
Armenia 2002,2005 x x x x
Bangladesh 2002 x x x x
Bolivia 2006 x x x x
Botswana 2006 x x x x
Brazil 2003 x x x x x
Bulgaria 2002,2004,2005 x x x x
Chile 2004,2006 x,- x x x x
Colombia 2006 x x x
Costa Rica 2005 x x x x x
Croatia 2002,2005 x x x x
Czech Republic 2002,2005 x x x x
Ecuador 2003,2006 x,- x x x x
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2004 x x x x x
El Salvador 2003,2006 x,- x x x x
Estonia 2002,2005 x x x x
Georgia 2002,2005 x x x x
Greece 2005 x x x x
Guyana 2004 x x x x x
Hungary 2002,2005 x x x x
India 2002 x x x x
Indonesia 2003 x x x x x
Jamaica 2005 x x x x x
Jordan 2006 x x x x
Kazakhstan 2002,2005 x x x x
Kenya 2003 x x x x x
Korea, Rep. 2005 x x x x
Kyrgyz Republic 2002,2003,2005 x x x x
Latvia 2002,2005 x x x x
Lithuania 2002,2004,2005 x x x -,x,- x
Macedonia, FYR 2002,2005 x x x x
Malawi 2005 x x x x x
Malaysia 2002 x x x x
Mauritius 2005 x x x x x
Mexico 2006 x x x x
Moldova 2002,2003 x x x x
Mongolia 2004 x x x x x
Morocco 2004 x x x x x
Oman 2003 x x x x x
Pakistan 2002 x x x x
Panama 2006 x x x x
Paraguay 2006 x x x x
Peru 2002,2006 x,- x x -,x x
Philippines 2003 x x x x x
Poland 2002,2003,2005 x x x x
Romania 2002,2005 x x x x
Russian Federation 2002,2005 x x x x
Slovak Republic 2002,2005 x x x x
Slovenia 2002,2005 x x x x
South Africa 2003 x x x x x
Sri Lanka 2004 x x x x
Swaziland 2006 x x x x
Tanzania 2003,2006 x,- x x x x
Thailand 2004 x x x x
Turkey 2002,2004,2005 x x x -,-,x x
Uganda 2003,2006 x,- x x -,x x
Uruguay 2006 x x x x
Vietnam 2005 x x x x
Zambia 2002 x x x x x
Table B.3: Data availability
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Country Exporter Email ForeignTechnology
Argentina 47.31 95.94 15.50
Armenia 26.67 52.59
Bangladesh 38.02 70.19
Bolivia 18.81 84.90 14.01
Botswana 18.58 57.52 19.47
Brazil 25.52 92.04 7.47
Bulgaria 39.76 78.35
Chile 30.75 90.07 15.89
Colombia 18.51 85.67 6.65
Costa Rica 24.10 87.14 32.26
Croatia 50.57 83.52
Czech Republic 48.20 82.98
Ecuador 22.58 87.86 20.36
Egypt, Arab Rep. 17.56 27.37 9.87
El Salvador 34.88 68.78 15.48
Estonia 50.00 97.06
Georgia 44.16 45.45
Greece 41.84 61.22
Guyana 30.26 30.92 10.42
Hungary 46.29 87.78
India 16.57 62.00
Indonesia 38.43 50.00 18.29
Jamaica 34.92 68.18 18.75
Jordan 49.28 64.00 21.49
Kazakhstan 14.67 50.40
Kenya 50.78 77.58 8.38
Korea, Rep. 41.23 88.37
Kyrgyz Republic 30.10 42.13
Latvia 55.00 77.05
Lithuania 45.30 68.09 20.00
Macedonia, FYR 42.71 63.54
Malawi 22.30 67.97 15.69
Malaysia 88.35 58.70
Mauritius 58.86 90.18 17.79
Mexico 11.68 60.33 10.14
Moldova 44.14 55.86
Mongolia 13.98 44.00 8.51
Morocco 54.85 79.17 5.29
Oman 32.63 59.79 12.22
Pakistan 17.69 30.01
Panama 15.71 82.75 11.34
Paraguay 17.40 78.94 11.80
Peru 31.71 78.39 10.56
Philippines 30.57 49.35 16.67
Poland 31.97 70.59
Romania 26.53 65.77
Russian Federation 23.97 71.66
Slovak Republic 69.64 89.29
Slovenia 79.00 93.00
South Africa 57.19 98.60 22.69
Sri Lanka 46.17 71.20
Swaziland 36.23 71.43 14.29
Tanzania 12.50 46.84 14.65
Thailand 54.20 54.09
Turkey 53.14 77.33 16.20
Uganda 11.42 32.05 9.80
Uruguay 30.75 81.77 8.31
Vietnam 24.36 56.41
Zambia 25.32 91.46 6.10
Table B.4: Fractions of exporters, users of e-mail and of foreign technology
123
Appendix to Chapter 2
A
ll
fi
rm
s
C
on
st
rA
cc
C
on
st
rC
os
t
E
x
p
or
te
r
C
on
st
r.
N
on
-c
on
st
r.
t-
te
st
C
on
st
r.
N
on
-c
on
st
r.
t-
te
st
E
x
p
.
N
on
-e
x
p
.
t-
te
st
F
in
an
ci
al
d
ev
el
op
m
en
t
0.
72
0.
62
0.
78
23
.4
8
0.
62
0.
84
26
.0
9
0.
83
0.
67
-1
9.
32
E
x
te
rn
al
fi
n
.
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
0.
09
-0
.1
0
0.
20
14
.6
7
-0
.0
8
0.
03
5.
14
0.
04
0.
09
2.
58
A
cc
es
s
to
fi
n
a
n
ce
A
cc
es
s
is
ob
st
ac
le
0.
37
0.
76
0.
13
-1
20
.0
0
0.
38
0.
37
-2
.9
4
C
o
st
s
ar
e
ob
st
ac
le
0.
59
0.
89
0.
28
-1
10
.0
0
0.
58
0.
60
3.
24
M
a
rk
et
pa
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
E
x
p
or
t
p
ar
ti
p
at
io
n
0.
33
0.
34
0.
32
-2
.9
4
0.
35
0.
37
3.
24
D
om
es
ti
c
sa
le
s
(t
h
d
s.
)
17
4.
53
36
7.
57
73
.9
8
-1
.2
1
33
5.
11
11
0.
65
-1
.0
7
42
9.
47
80
.3
1
0.
86
F
or
ei
gn
sa
le
s
(t
h
d
s.
)
23
0.
92
29
9.
58
19
6.
79
-0
.3
6
26
5.
37
15
0.
23
-0
.5
1
T
ot
al
sa
le
s
(t
h
d
s.
)
23
6.
52
42
3.
85
13
6.
48
-0
.9
5
38
6.
35
16
0.
37
-0
.8
7
56
4.
38
80
.1
5
-1
.3
9
T
ec
h
n
o
lo
gy
u
se
F
or
ei
gn
te
ch
n
ol
o
gy
0.
14
0.
11
0.
15
7.
11
0.
12
0.
18
7.
69
0.
22
0.
10
-1
9.
37
U
se
of
e-
m
a
il
0.
69
0.
68
0.
70
3.
49
0.
69
0.
64
-7
.0
6
0.
89
0.
59
-5
9.
70
F
ir
m
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
14
9.
96
14
0.
00
15
6.
96
2.
91
15
1.
98
19
6.
67
5.
78
31
9.
30
66
.8
0
-3
0.
54
F
or
ei
gn
-o
w
n
ed
0.
12
0.
08
0.
14
14
.6
9
0.
09
0.
16
13
.5
1
0.
24
0.
06
-3
7.
03
S
h
ar
e
sk
il
le
d
w
or
k
er
s
0.
16
0.
11
0.
20
22
.2
6
0.
11
0.
11
-0
.2
1
0.
15
0.
17
2.
91
F
ir
m
ag
e
19
.5
1
17
.5
9
20
.5
7
13
.1
1
17
.9
9
19
.2
3
4.
72
22
.4
5
17
.9
6
-1
7.
55
M
N
E
0.
09
0.
08
0.
11
6.
68
0.
08
0.
10
3.
72
0.
17
0.
04
-2
5.
30
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
99
41
16
77
7
11
65
2
80
67
87
95
18
18
0
T
h
e
ta
b
le
re
p
or
ts
th
e
m
ea
n
st
at
is
ti
cs
an
d
th
e
t-
te
st
st
at
is
ti
cs
fo
r
th
e
te
st
of
m
ea
n
d
iff
er
en
ce
s.
T
ab
le
B
.5
:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
st
at
is
ti
cs
(i
)
124
Appendix to Chapter 2
A
ll
fi
rm
s
F
or
ei
gn
T
ec
h
n
ol
og
y
E
m
ai
l
Y
es
N
o
t-
te
st
Y
es
N
o
t-
te
st
F
in
an
ci
al
d
ev
el
op
m
en
t
0.
72
0.
84
0.
76
-4
.8
5
0.
76
0.
66
-1
3.
16
E
x
te
rn
al
fi
n
.
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
0.
09
0.
53
0.
10
-9
.2
5
0.
20
-0
.1
3
-1
6.
40
A
cc
es
s
to
fi
n
a
n
ce
A
cc
es
s
is
ob
st
ac
le
0.
37
0.
26
0.
34
7.
16
0.
36
0.
38
3.
49
C
os
ts
ar
e
ob
st
ac
le
0.
59
0.
54
0.
66
7.
79
0.
60
0.
55
-7
.0
6
M
a
rk
et
pa
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
E
x
p
or
t
p
ar
ti
p
at
io
n
0.
33
0.
51
0.
28
-2
0.
31
0.
42
0.
12
-6
0.
22
D
om
es
ti
c
sa
le
s
(t
h
d
s.
)
17
4.
53
11
54
.7
8
48
.7
7
-1
.0
4
22
2.
95
91
.7
2
-0
.9
9
F
or
ei
gn
sa
le
s
(t
h
d
s.
)
23
0.
92
12
25
.9
1
36
.2
5
-1
.3
7
26
1.
70
28
.3
7
-1
.7
3
T
ot
al
sa
le
s
(t
h
d
s.
)
23
6.
52
16
77
.5
1
59
.8
2
-1
.1
9
31
5.
04
90
.1
5
-1
.3
3
T
ec
h
n
o
lo
gy
u
se
F
or
ei
gn
te
ch
n
ol
og
y
0.
14
0.
17
0.
05
-2
3.
49
U
se
of
e-
m
ai
l
0.
69
0.
89
0.
71
-2
4.
92
F
ir
m
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
14
9.
96
33
9.
59
10
6.
18
-1
1.
63
19
5.
15
58
.3
1
-2
8.
89
F
or
ei
gn
-o
w
n
ed
0.
12
0.
31
0.
08
-2
3.
19
0.
15
0.
05
-2
8.
75
S
h
a
re
sk
il
le
d
w
or
k
er
s
0.
16
0.
25
0.
20
-2
.0
8
0.
18
0.
14
-1
0.
73
F
ir
m
ag
e
19
.5
1
23
.6
4
20
.7
9
-6
.1
5
20
.9
2
16
.2
4
-2
1.
65
M
N
E
0.
09
0.
25
0.
09
-1
3.
19
0.
12
0.
03
-2
3.
76
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
on
s
22
42
14
20
7
18
44
0
82
46
T
h
e
ta
b
le
re
p
or
ts
th
e
m
ea
n
st
at
is
ti
cs
an
d
th
e
t-
te
st
st
at
is
ti
cs
fo
r
th
e
te
st
of
m
ea
n
d
iff
er
en
ce
s.
T
ab
le
B
.6
:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
st
at
is
ti
cs
(i
i)
125
Appendix to Chapter 2
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Financial development 0.61 0.69 0.76 0.84
External financial dependence 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.09
Access to finance
Access is obstacle 0.34 0.38 0.41 0.36
Costs are obstacle 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.55
Market participation
Export partipation 0.10 0.19 0.39 0.65
Domestic sales (thds.) 20.22 44.76 91.24 467.70
Foreign sales (thds.) 1.21 6.87 28.29 270.18
Total sales (thds.) 21.56 52.25 122.23 745.23
Technology use
Foreign technology use 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.28
Use of e-mail 0.48 0.62 0.78 0.89
Firm characteristics
Employment 8.06 22.29 64.43 508.34
Foreign-owned 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.26
Share skilled workers 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.14
Firm age 15.22 17.60 19.62 25.62
MNE 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.18
Mean statistics and t-test statistics for the test of mean differences reported.
Table B.7: Descriptive statistics by firm size quartile
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Dependent variable: Exporter Email ForeignTechnology
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FD × ExtDep 0.006* -0.002 -0.009*** -0.017*** 0.003* 0.009**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
q1 × FD × ExtDep 0.011 0.029*** -0.009
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
q2 × FD × ExtDep 0.012*** 0.022 -0.017***
(0.004) (0.013) (0.005)
q3 × FD × ExtDep 0.015*** 0.010 -0.007**
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003)
Foreign 0.163*** 0.182*** 0.075*** 0.098*** 0.236*** 0.249***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.023) (0.023)
MNE 0.167*** 0.184*** 0.012 0.030 0.062*** 0.071***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013)
Age 0.000 0.001* -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Skill 0.127*** 0.124*** 0.062*** 0.061***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018)
q1 -0.476*** -0.432*** -0.131***
(0.024) (0.037) (0.020)
q2 -0.377*** -0.285*** -0.106***
(0.016) (0.033) (0.016)
q3 -0.214*** -0.129*** -0.067***
(0.014) (0.019) (0.011)
Size 0.126*** 0.112*** 0.046***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
FD -0.127 -0.126 -0.418*** -0.445*** -0.027 -0.021
(0.082) (0.100) (0.072) (0.076) (0.020) (0.021)
No. Obs. 14672 14672 11710 11710 5160 5160
R2 0.311 0.301 0.303 0.296 0.177 0.169
Country, industry, and year dummies. Standard errors clustered at the industry level in .
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%,**5%, ***1%.
Table B.10: Additional regressors: Firm age, MNE dummy
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Dependent variable: Exporter Email ForeignTechnology
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FD × ExtDep 0.008** 0.012*** 0.000 -0.006 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.003)
q1 × FD × ExtDep -0.001 0.013 -0.003
(0.003) (0.010) (0.005)
q2 × FD × ExtDep -0.006*** 0.013* 0.009*
(0.001) (0.006) (0.004)
q3 × FD × ExtDep -0.003 -0.001 -0.010**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Foreign 0.215*** 0.224*** 0.063*** 0.076*** 0.096*** 0.097***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
Skill 0.129*** 0.121*** 0.031* 0.021
(0.029) (0.031) (0.016) (0.016)
q1 -0.455*** -0.357*** -0.101***
(0.022) (0.060) (0.021)
q2 -0.328*** -0.184*** -0.093***
(0.014) (0.036) (0.014)
q3 -0.174*** -0.078*** -0.074***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.017)
Size 0.119*** 0.092*** 0.028***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.004)
FD -0.036 -0.037 0.035 0.032 -0.005 -0.005
(0.031) (0.031) (0.026) (0.025) (0.016) (0.017)
No. Obs. 6494 6494 6429 6429 5551 5551
R2 0.315 0.304 0.274 0.270 0.135 0.137
Country, industry, and year dummies. Standard errors clustered at the industry level in
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%,**5%, ***1%.
Table B.11: BEEPS data only
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Dependent variable: Exporter Email ForeignTechnology
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FD × ExtDep 0.001 -0.003 -0.007** -0.018** 0.004 0.010
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
q1 × FD × ExtDep 0.007 0.043** -0.017**
(0.006) (0.019) (0.006)
q2 × FD × ExtDep 0.003 0.018 -0.013*
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
q3 × FD × ExtDep 0.007* 0.008 -0.010***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
Foreign 0.164*** 0.185*** 0.055*** 0.075*** 0.180*** 0.195***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.029) (0.028)
Skill 0.164*** 0.155*** 0.080*** 0.072***
(0.043) (0.045) (0.022) (0.022)
q1 -0.495*** -0.394*** -0.160***
(0.018) (0.031) (0.013)
q2 -0.398*** -0.217*** -0.120***
(0.010) (0.026) (0.014)
q3 -0.243*** -0.079*** -0.099***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.009)
Size 0.137*** 0.105*** 0.054***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.004)
FD -0.494*** -0.459*** -0.271 -0.286 0.037 0.035
(0.120) (0.138) (0.250) (0.240) (0.028) (0.027)
No. Obs. 14020 14020 12960 12960 9343 9343
R2 0.315 0.302 0.287 0.293 0.128 0.117
Country, industry, and year dummies. Standard errors clustered at the industry level in
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%,**5%, ***1%.
Table B.12: Narrower industry classification
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B.5 Data Appendix
Variable list
Age is the firm’s age, which is computed as the year of the survey minus the year in
which the firm began operations in its country. The corresponding question is “In
what year did your firm begin operations in this country?”
ConstrAcc is a dummy based on the question “Please tell us if access to financing
(e.g., collateral) is a problem for the operation and growth of your business.” The
answer can take the values “No obstacle”, “Minor obstacle”, “Moderate obstacle”,
“Major obstacle”, or “Very severe Obstacle”. The dummy takes the value one if the
answer is “Moderate obstacle”, “Major obstacle”, or “Very severe Obstacle”; it takes
the value zero if the answer is “No obstacle” or “Minor obstacle”.
ConstrCost is a dummy based on the question “Please tell us if the cost of fi-
nancing (e.g., interest rates) is a problem for the operation and growth of your
business.” The answer can take the values “No obstacle”, “Minor obstacle”, “Mod-
erate obstacle”, “Major obstacle”, or “Very severe Obstacle”. The dummy takes the
value one if the answer is “Moderate obstacle”, “Major obstacle” or “Very severe
Obstacle’; it takes the value zero if the answer is “No obstacle” or “Minor obstacle”.
Email is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm responds “Yes” to the ques-
tion “Does your enterprise regularly use e-mail [...] in its interactions with clients
and suppliers?”
Exporter is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm reports a positive
magnitude for the following question “What percent of your establishment’s sales
are exported directly?”
Expr is the LaPorta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) measure of
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the risk of expropriation. It is provided on a zero to ten scale with higher scores
for greater risks of expropriation (LaPorta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny,
1998, see p. 1125).
ExtDep captures the sectoral demand for credit. ExtDep is computed using the
information about US firms in the Compustat North America database. For each
firm, we sum the use of external finance (i.e., capital expenditures minus cash flow
from operations) over the period 1996–2005 and divide by the sum of the capital
expenditures over the same time period. Then, we take the median for each NAICS
3-digit industry. Finally, we calculate a weighted average to match these values to
the industries in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
FD measures the country’s level of financial development. FD is the sum of “private
credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions / GDP” and “stock
market capitalization / GDP”, both taken from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine
(2009).
Foreign is a dummy variable equal to one if at least 10% of the firm is owned
by the foreign private sector.
ForeignTechnology is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm re-
sponds “Yes” to the question “Does your establishment use technology licensed from
a foreign-owned company?”
H/L is the human capital per worker. We set H/L = exp {φ(s)}, where s is the
average number of years of schooling in the population over 25 years old from Barro
and Lee (2010). φ(s) is a piecewise linear function with slope 0.13 for s ≤ 4, 0.10
for 4 < s ≤ 8, and 0.07 for 8 < s (Caselli, 2005, p. 687). The Barro and Lee (2010)
measure is available for the years 2000 and 2005. For countries surveyed in 2002, we
use the human capital in 2000, and for those surveyed after 2002, we use the human
capital in 2005.
133
Appendix to Chapter 2
Law is the LaPorta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998, p. 1124) measure
of the rule of law. It is provided on a zero to ten scale with higher scores for stronger
traditions of law and order.
Liqu is a sectoral measure of the liquidity ratio. It is taken from Felbermayr and
Yalcin (2011), who construct the liquidity ratio as the current liabilities over the
current assets for a large number of NACE 1.1 sectors, using the Amadeus database
for Germany. we match these data with the World Bank Enterprise Surveys using
the ISIC classification of the firm’s main product line.
N/L is the (log) of the natural resources per worker. In order to measure a country’s
natural resources endowment, we use data from World Bank (1997). In particular,
we take the difference between “natural capital” and “protected areas”. The popu-
lation data is from the Penn World Tables Version 7.0.
MNE is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm responds “Yes”
to the question “Does your firm have holdings or operations in other countries?”
K/L is the (log) of the physical capital per worker. We compute K/L accord-
ing to the perpetual inventory method, setting Kt = It + δKt−1, where It is the
investment in the year t and δ = 0.06 is the depreciation rate. For details, see
Caselli (2005, p. 685). The population data is from the Penn World Tables Version
7.0.
Productivity is computed as (log) of the sales per (permanent) worker.
Repud is the LaPorta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998, p. 1125)
measure of the repudiation of contracts by the government. It is provided on a zero
to ten scale, with higher scores for greater risks of the repudiation of contracts.
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Size The firm size is measured as the (log) of the number of (permanent) work-
ers.
Skill is the fraction of the total workforce of the firm constituted by its non-
production workers, and captures the average skill level of the firm’s workforce.
State is a dummy variable equal to one if at least 10% of the firm is owned by
the government / state.
Tang is the ratio of the tangible assets to the total assets, and provides a sectoral
measure of asset tangibility. This measure is taken from Felbermayr and Yalcin
(2011), who compute asset tangibility for a large number of NACE 1.1 sectors using
the Amadeus database for Germany. We match these data with the World Bank En-
terprise Surveys using the ISIC classification of the firm’s main product line. Tang
is time invariant.
TrCr is accounts payable over turnover and provides a sectoral measure of trade
credit received. It is taken from Felbermayr and Yalcin (2011), who compute trade
credit received for a large number of NACE 1.1 sectors using the Amadeus database
for Germany. We match these data with the World Bank Enterprise Surveys using
the ISIC classification of the firm’s main product line.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Figures
Figure C.1: Correlation between GDP per capita and the share of credit
constrained firms, 2005, 2008, 2009.
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Figure C.2: Correlation between private credit to GDP and the share of credit
constrained firms, 2005, 2008, 2009.
Figure C.3: Correlation between regulatory quality and the share of credit
constrained firms, 2005, 2008, 2009.
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C.2 Tables
Country 2005 2008 2009 Total
Albania 129 0 23 152
Armenia 268 0 256 524
Bulgaria 198 0 212 410
Croatia 158 0 83 241
Czech Republic 270 0 153 423
Estonia 179 0 211 390
FYROM 93 0 273 366
Georgia 136 229 0 365
Hungary 454 0 238 692
Kazakhstan 402 0 374 776
Kyrgyz Republic 148 0 162 310
Latvia 151 0 193 344
Lithuania 153 0 204 357
Moldova 217 0 321 538
Poland 719 0 262 981
Russia 340 0 641 981
Slovakia 142 0 173 315
Slovenia 189 0 245 434
Turkey 0 818 0 818
Total 4346 1047 4024 9417
Table C.1: Baseline regression sample by country and year
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Credit Constrained 3704 0.162 0.368 0 1
Exporter 3698 0.392 0.488 0 1
Importer 2864 0.418 0.493 0 1
Size 3704 3.686 1.562 0 9.048
Productivity 3704 10.178 1.725 1.204 16.478
Foreign 3704 0.120 0.325 0 1
Overdue 3704 0.043 0.202 0 1
Disclosure × ExtDep 3704 6.549 9.886 0 66.092
RegQu × FinDev 3704 88.916 66.170 7.418 379.076
Table C.2: Summary statistics, Manufacturing
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Credit Constrained 4718 0.160 0.367 0 1
Exporter 4715 0.165 0.371 0 1
Importer 2222 0.273 0.446 0 1
Size 4718 2.901 1.543 0 9.810
Productivity 4718 10.156 2.226 1.504 19.543
Foreign 4718 0.104 0.306 0 1
Overdue 4718 0.036 0.185 0 1
Disclosure × ExtDep 4718 5.102 3.578 0 26.904
RegQu × FinDev 4718 112.700 81.507 7.418 379.076
Table C.3: Summary statistics, Services
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Exporter Importer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS-First 2SLS OLS 2SLS-First 2SLS
Credit Constr. (d) -0.024** -0.336* 0.016 -1.902**
(-2.469) (-1.820) (0.855) (-2.427)
Size 0.062*** -0.033*** 0.052*** 0.031*** -0.029*** -0.025
(21.374) (-13.298) (7.589) (7.259) (-10.182) (-1.054)
Productivity 0.011*** -0.011*** 0.009*** -0.009* -0.010** -0.021**
(4.479) (-3.830) (2.981) (-1.957) (-2.377) (-2.252)
Foreign (d) 0.191*** -0.026** 0.183*** -0.002 -0.037*** -0.075*
(12.574) (-2.421) (11.285) (-0.081) (-3.267) (-1.830)
Disclosure × ExtDep -0.005*** -0.004**
(-3.086) (-1.995)
Overdue (d) 0.068*** 0.020
(3.259) (0.830)
RegQu × FinDev -0.001*** -0.001**
(-4.117) (-2.082)
No. Obs. 9408 9408 9408 5542 5542 5542
R2 0.275 0.067 0.208 0.113 0.055 -1.543
F 103.170 16.043 93.680 20.971 7.482 6.818
F (first stage) 12.49*** 3.04**
Hansen J 0.207 0.113
Year, country, sector dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. (d) for discrete
change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Significance levels: *10%,**5%, ***1%.
Table C.6: Linear Probability and 2SLS Models – All Firms
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Exporter Importer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS-First 2SLS OLS 2SLS-First 2SLS
Credit Constr. (d) -0.023 -0.536* 0.044* -1.449**
(-1.273) (-1.783) (1.738) (-2.349)
Size 0.116*** -0.040*** 0.096*** 0.046*** -0.035*** -0.006
(23.801) (-9.488) (7.340) (7.631) (-7.771) (-0.248)
Productivity 0.021*** -0.018*** 0.013* 0.026*** -0.014** 0.009
(4.066) (-3.701) (1.767) (3.866) (-2.502) (0.809)
Foreign (d) 0.226*** -0.024 0.214*** -0.001 -0.028* -0.044
(10.136) (-1.452) (8.779) (-0.051) (-1.695) (-1.102)
Disclosure × ExtDep -0.005*** -0.004**
(-2.859) (-2.296)
Overdue (d) 0.071** 0.041
(2.117) (1.112)
RegQu × FinDev -0.001** -0.001**
(-2.052) (-2.024)
No. Obs. 3698 3698 3698 2864 2864 2864
R2 0.325 0.076 0.186 0.185 0.067 -0.864
F 84.957 8.659 69.268 27.367 5.770 10.553
F (first stage) 5.62*** 3.52**
Hansen J 0.275 0.115
Year, country, sector dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. (d) for discrete
change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Significance levels: *10%,**5%, ***1%.
Table C.7: Linear Probability and 2SLS Models – Manufacturing Firms
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Exporter Importer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS-First 2SLS OLS 2SLS-First 2SLS
Credit Constr. (d) -0.025** -0.129 -0.061* 0.448
(-2.111) (-0.509) (-1.900) (0.760)
Size 0.028*** -0.029*** 0.025*** 0.031*** -0.018*** 0.041***
(7.273) (-8.476) (2.994) (4.680) (-4.657) (3.156)
Productivity 0.018*** -0.005 0.018*** 0.091*** -0.021** 0.102***
(5.969) (-1.292) (5.793) (6.314) (-2.269) (5.066)
Foreign (d) 0.127*** -0.016 0.125*** 0.201*** -0.033** 0.218***
(5.881) (-1.021) (5.675) (6.536) (-2.196) (5.841)
Disclosure × ExtDep -0.003 0.002
(-0.732) (0.681)
Overdue (d) 0.060** -0.004
(2.026) (-0.127)
RegQu × FinDev -0.001*** 0.006
(-3.376) (1.635)
No. Obs. 4715 4715 4715 2222 2222 2222
R2 0.170 0.066 0.161 0.184 0.051 0.094
F 28.948 11.201 28.459 120.007
F (first stage) 5.48*** 1.05**
Hansen J 0.187 0.000
Year, country, sector dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. (d) for discrete
change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Significance levels: *10%,**5%, ***1%.
Table C.8: Linear Probability and 2SLS Models – Service Firms
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